Institutions, FDI and Capabilities in the Development of Chinese Banking: an Analysis of Banks in Hunan Province by Zhu, Weijia
	  	  
	  
Institutions, FDI and Capabilities in the 
Development of Chinese Banking: an Analysis 
of Banks in Hunan Province 
 
 
Weijia Zhu  
 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
 
A thesis submitted for examination for       
the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2015 
	  
	  
	   1	  
Declaration of Authorship 
 
 
I, Weijia Zhu, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is 
entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always 
clearly stated. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Weijia Zhu    
 
01/06/2015 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   2	  
Abstract 
This thesis analyses the development of Chinese banking since the period of 
economic reform and particularly since 2003. Existing studies are limited in 
number, and lack depth of analysis and an understanding of Chinese banks at 
an operational level. This thesis is founded on firm-level research, and it 
assesses the extent to which management practices have changed. It focuses 
specifically on human resources, product development, client relationships, 
and information technology, which are the resources and capabilities regarded 
as strategically important to banking firms. In order to explain why and how 
changes to China’s banking have been implemented, the thesis evaluates the 
impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinationals with knowledge of 
international best practice, and it demonstrates the importance of the 
regulatory body appointed as a consequence of policy and institutional reform 
to accelerate the industry’s performance. The thesis examines FDI and 
institutionalist theories and their relevance to the development of China’s 
banking industry. It offers five case-studies of banks in Hunan province, 
selected to represent different types of banks and to facilitate comparisons: 
three former directly-owned banks, the China Construction Bank, the Bank of 
China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; one national 
commercial bank, the China CITIC Bank; and one provincial commercial bank, 
the Huarong Xiangjiang Bank. Through case comparisons, the thesis 
considers the relative effect of foreign multinationals and institutional 
pressures, and their relationship to technological and market factors. In order 
to assess their influence, it utilizes ideas on strategic management and core 
capabilities. The thesis reveals how Chinese banks have developed their 
management practices and performance, adds substantially to our empirical 
knowledge of the Chinese banking industry, and offers insights for 
management theory and practice. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Banking Reform in China 
 
This thesis focuses on the strategic and organizational changes introduced to 
China’s banking industry. The topic is important because the country, for its 
next stage of economic development, needs to raise the competitiveness of 
China’s service and finance sector, in order to support small and medium sized 
enterprises, stimulate domestic demand, and transform the inland provinces. 
To obviate the risks of China’s development model – focused on government 
intervention and support, infrastructure investment and high indebtedness in 
state-owned business - the creation of a more service orientated, 
performance-driven and internationally competitive banking industry has 
emerged as a policy objective. To interpret the significance of the evolution of 
Chinese banks, this thesis has called upon ideas about the cross-border 
transfer of management know-how and practices through alliances with 
foreign multinational firms. In addition, it utilizes and assesses the literature on 
the influence of national government and institutions in determining 
management practice at the operational level of firms. After surveying the 
nature of banking in China, since the inception of reform, the thesis 
concentrates on more recent changes in firm practices and capabilities. It 
employs concepts from business strategy and adopts them to an 
understanding of bank firms in the context of a developing and transitional 
economy. This case-driven research supplies new evidence on a vital industry, 
and offers lessons for academic research, policy makers and managers.  
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From 1978, the Chinese government implemented economic reform, and 
inward FDI has been considered one of the key factors to economic growth by 
bringing capital, advanced technology, and managerial skills. To date, most of 
this inward investment has flowed to manufacturing. The Chinese banking 
sector has largely lagged behind the successes of industry, as the government 
has tended to protect it from international competition and has not opened the 
industry to foreign investors. After China joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2002, it was committed to liberalizing the banking sector, including 
removing restrictions on foreign banks. Therefore, in 2003, it established the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to oversee industry regulation 
and the process of bank reform in Mainland China, including initiatives in 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI). The CBRC was responsible, too, for 
improving the industry’s performance in management, employee skills, 
marketing and technological capabilities to meet the needs of individual 
customers and businesses. In evaluating the extent and the success of these 
developments, this thesis considers the degree to which the causes of the 
changes have been international partnerships, institutional pressure, or 
managerial initiative. This chapter begins firstly with the propositions of the 
thesis, which address these issues. It notes secondly the contribution of the 
research to our understanding of Chinese banks and the processes of 
economic transformation. It presents thirdly the structure of this thesis. 
 
1.1 Research Propositions  
To what extent and in what ways have China’s banks been able to develop 
their strategic resources and capabilities in personnel, products and client 
networks in readiness for increasing domestic and international competition?  
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There has been no detailed case study of China’s banks investigating their 
strategic resources and capabilities, nor any that has studied empirically what 
has changed in their organization over the last decade, particularly at the 
operational branch level. Therefore, there is a need to analyse the 
development of Chinese banks in order to discover the resources and 
capabilities required by banking firms within the context of China’s transitional 
and institutional economy, if they are to pursue sustainable competitive 
advantages. 
 
How effectively does FDI theory adequately explain how capabilities and 
global ‘best practices’ have been implemented and developed at the 
operational branch level of Chinese banks? 
As service industries, such as banks, require different mixes of resources and 
capabilities to manufacturing concerns, and as banks may need to develop 
many key capabilities in combination with customers and markets, the transfer 
of capabilities through FDI may not be so effective or may need to be applied 
differently. In examples of FDI in which a parent multinational owns or controls 
a subsidiary, or has a major stake in a joint venture, the foreign investor has in 
principle a mechanism for transferring its capabilities. As we shall see, in the 
example of Chinese banks, the levels of ownership and control open to a 
foreign investor were minimized, and yet the transfer or adaptation of global 
‘best practice’ did occur. The cases in this thesis explore how new practices 
were embedded in Chinese banks, and to what extent they copied systems 
used overseas or introduced hybrid outcomes. They show the link between 
engagement with foreign multinationals through FDI and the enhancement of 
firm level strategic capabilities, which has had so far limited empirical 
investigation. On the other hand, the cases reveal why FDI and strategic 
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alliances with multinationals cannot offer a full explanation of the reform of 
Chinese banks. 
 
To what extent is the CBRC, the formative regulatory institution, responsible 
for the development of capabilities in Chinese banks?  
In a market-based view of transition economies, institutions are considered as 
blocks on the transformation process, because government and regulation 
inhibit the emergence of competitive market mechanisms. In the late 
development perspective, government and other institutions are an important 
factor of economic development during its initial stages. Do ideas on 
transitional economies about institutional barriers holding back the process of 
market reform reflect the reality of China’s bank industry? Furthermore, how 
valid is the notion of strong isomorphic pressures in the theory of national 
institutions, implying that there would be little scope for management initiative 
and variations in firm capability? Chinese banking cases show that isomorphic 
pressures have not inhibited the evolution of firm-level or differentiated 
capabilities, nor hindered the transfer or emulation of international best 
practice. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has, 
nonetheless, emerged as the key component for reforming banks and 
enhancing their capabilities. 
 
While we must consider the effects of foreign multinational investors, 
transferred international practices, and formative institutions, the unit of 
analysis for our research remains the individual bank and the focus is on the 
investigation of firm-level capability development. The thesis shows the 
development of bank resources and capabilities in China in the period since 
2003, and concentrates on matters of human resources, remuneration, 
	   16	  
training, qualifications, products and services, technology, and client networks. 
The comparative case studies enable an assessment of the extent to which 
Chinese banks have become competitively differentiated from each other, and 
the extent to which changes are driven by firm-level capabilities as opposed to 
external influences such as FDI and national institutions. What is interesting 
about the recent evolution of Chinese banks is the link between internationally 
transferred practices and strategic capabilities, and, in contrast to the example 
of many manufacturing initiatives, the strong link between institutional 
influences and firm-level capability. This thesis utilizes ideas from the 
Resource Based View (RBV) of business strategy to define the resources and 
capabilities needed by a bank firm to achieve a sustained competitive 
advantage. It notes furthermore the context of foreign multinational alliances, 
transition from a controlled economy, institutions, and levels of economic 
development and consumer expectations, as well as technological factors. 
The thesis employs as a consequence ideas from the Dynamic Capabilities 
Approach (DCA) of business strategy, in order to incorporate influences on 
resource and capability development that are external to the firm, and to 
appreciate more comprehensively the processes of capability development 
over time. 
 
1.2 The Significance of the Research  
This research is significant from three perspectives. Firstly, it identities gaps in 
existing studies on Chinese banks, and it is the first empirically based attempt 
to analyse Chinese banks and to assess their operational capability over time.  
Secondly, this thesis draws on extensive new sources of information. It utilizes 
a range of secondary data sources written in both English and Chinese, 
including reports produced by government, companies’ internal documents, 
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newspapers, trade magazines, journal articles, and books. Fundamentally, it 
addresses the research topic through primary information directly collected, for 
the first time, through semi-structured face-to face interviews. The 
interviewees were carefully selected in order to gather accurate and broad 
perspectives. They had a variety of ranks in different departments. It is difficult 
to obtain primary interviews from Chinese banks, due to government controls 
and expectations on safeguarding corporate information. Thirdly, business 
practitioners will find this research highly valuable. The thesis discusses the 
factors that lead to improved Chinese bank performance, and the 
implementation of effective strategies. The findings of the study will help with a 
grounded understanding of dynamic capability at an operational level. This 
research is useful for government’s FDI policy makers. It can inform them 
about which deals are likely to produce the expected positive outcomes, and 
which should be encouraged through incentives and which through 
regulations. 
 
1.3 Outline of Thesis  
The thesis consists of ten chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research topic, 
and the propositions guiding the research. Chapter 2 introduces the 
background to the Chinese economy and the reform of the Chinese banking 
sector. It explores the achievements and limitations of Chinese banking sector 
reform since 1978. It addresses the contribution of FDI to the Chinese 
economy, and suggests how FDI could contribute to Chinese bank capability. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on institutionalism and strategic management. 
It demonstrates the shortcomings of extant studies and explores how existing 
perspectives cannot explain how firms might develop their capabilities under 
the strong control of regulatory institutions. Chapter 4 outlines the 
methodology. It explains why the thesis adopted the multiple case study 
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approach based on qualitative interviews, and the advantages of triangulating 
with internal documents, newspapers and articles. It explains the choice of 
cases and interviewees. It describes the research process, and how the data 
have been collected and analysed. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the China Construction Bank (CCB) case. CCB was 
established before 1978, as one of the big four state owned banks, and it was 
one of the pilots to initiate reform after the establishment of the CBRC. Chapter 
6 considers the Bank of China case (BOC). As with CCB, it was one of the big 
state owned banks, and chosen by CBRC to begin the reform agenda. Chapter 
7 deals with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China case (ICBC), one of 
the large state owned banks, its reform starting after CCB and BOC. Chapter 8 
examines the China CITIC Bank case (CITIC Bank), one of the biggest banks 
not to have been one of the four state-owned firms. Chapter 9 looks at the 
Huarong Xiangjiang Bank case (HXBC), which is a provincial level commercial 
bank. Chapter 10 analyses the findings from the five case studies 
comparatively, and draws conclusions by drawing on theoretical insights and 
empirical evidence. 
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Chapter 2 
Economic Development, FDI, and the Banking Sector 
 
2.1 The Achievement of the Chinese Economy 
The Chinese economy grew quickly under economic reform, from 1978, 
achieving average annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP) of 10 per 
cent (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007). In 1979, the Chinese 
government permitted joint ventures between SOEs and foreign private 
companies, and established which industrial sectors would receive FDI, the 
aim being to learn advanced management and innovation. After 1986, China 
permitted the establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries in selected 
industries. For successive years, China became the number one location of 
inward FDI. In 2003, the year in which the reform of the banking sector was 
prioritized, foreign investment reached nearly $85bn (UNCTAD, 2004; Yao et 
al, 2004). Overall, FDI has been considered a major accelerating force behind 
Chinese economic growth. However, most of the inward investment flowed to 
manufacturing. 
 
Despite the country’s economic success, the financial sector has lagged. 
Analysis of Chinese economic reform since 1978 often pays inadequate 
attention to services and finance (Chen, 2009; Ferri, 2009). After China joined 
the WTO in 2002, the Chinese government promised the liberalization of the 
finance sector, including allowing firms to determine their lending rates, 
removing restrictions on foreign banks, and non-discriminatory taxes. The 
policy change implied more opportunities for foreign investors. By the end of 
2006, there were over 300 foreign banks or representative offices or joint 
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ventures with Chinese banks in China (Lin, 2011). It was argued that the 
financial system was important for further economic growth, especially for the 
development of the private sector or small to medium enterprises, and for 
encouraging the efficiency of state-owned enterprise (Berger et al, 2009). 
 
2.2 Unbalanced Economic Development in China 
During 1978 to 2009, the national average real GDP growth is about 9.5% per 
annum. However, the growth did not occur equally between provinces. For 
example, growth rates in the province of Qinghai in the west of the country 
were 13% lower than in the dynamic south coastal provinces, such as Zhejiang 
and Guangdong provinces. Qinghai remained amongst the poorest of China’s 
provinces (China Statistical Year Book, 2010). China is divided into seven 
regions: central and south China (Henan, Hubei, Hunan, An’hui and Jiangxi); 
the east coast (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shangdong, Guangdong and 
Hainan); the north, the northeast, the northwest; and the four municipalities of 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing and Chongqing. The coastal provinces generally 
refer to Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hebei, Liaoning, and 
Shandong. The remaining provinces are referred as inland provinces 
(Groenewold et al, 2008; Lau, 2010). 
 
Historically, economic growth in the inland provinces was lower than in the 
coastal provinces. In the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), the Chinese 
government was trying to balance economic development between inland and 
coastal provinces, through government led investment. The inland provinces 
accounted for 52% of all government investment at the beginning of the first 
Five Year Plan but 70% by the end of the third in 1970. Despite the increase in 
investment in the inland provinces, their GDP per capita was around 0.7 of 
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GDP per capita nationally during the 1950s and 1960s. In the fourth Five Year 
Plan (1971-1975), investment in the inland provinces fell but remained above 
50%; as a result, the ratio of GDP per capita fell to 0.5 by 1977 (Chen & 
Groenewold, 2013). The inland provinces had become wholly reliant on 
government expenditure. 
 
Economic reform was implemented gradually after 1978: firstly, within the 
coastal cities, such as Shenzhen, where there were special economic zones 
(SEZs); then to those provinces containing the SEZs; and latterly to the 
eastern and northern coastal provinces. Major features of economic reform 
since 1978 have been foreign trade and investment and export orientated 
industrialization. From 1988, special measures were taken to secure the low 
wage labour and cheap raw materials that foreign investors sought as a result 
of their efficiency driven strategies. The Chinese government additionally 
provided fiscal and financial benefits for FDI, such as tax rebates for exports. 
As a result, the coastal regions lead national economic growth. China’s GDP 
per capita increased from RMB792 to RMB3631, in 1990 constant prices, 
during the period 1978 to 1999 (Fu, 2004; State Statistical Bureau of China, 
1999). However, inter-provincial growth has not been balanced. During the 
1990s, the real GDP per capital increased by only 95 percent in the inland 
provinces, but by 144 percent in the coastal provinces. In 1999, the average 
GDP per capita in inland regions, measured using 1990 constant prices, was 
RMB2497. However, in the same year, the average GDP per capita in coastal 
regions, measured was RMB5204 (State Statistical Bureau of China, 2000). 
The income and economic opportunities between the coastal and inland 
provinces were uneven. Amongst the reasons were favourable government 
policy, geographical location, access to ports and transportation for an export 
driven boom, superior infrastructure facilities, and FDI.  
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Biggeri (2003) considers that FDI is the main reason for the rapid growth of 
exports, and consequently transformed the coastal regions. In 1999, 91% of 
China’s total exports were from the coastal regions. The major export 
industries included clothing, footwear, electrical equipment, machinery, and 
electronic products. Furthermore, export-oriented FDI in labour intensive 
industries in the coastal regions lead to labour migration from the inland 
provinces to coastal provinces, enabling the coastal provinces to sustain their 
growth. 
 
After 1978, the government policy focused on the coastal regions, and the 
inland provincial regions received limited FDI. In 1992, the Chinese 
government decided to accelerate economic reform nationwide, gradually 
creating a market-oriented economy. However, most of the FDI was still 
concentrated in the earlier developed provinces, and continued to flow there. 
In eastern coastal areas such as Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces and in 
major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, economic growth was consequently 
rapid. Government investment in the coastal areas rose to 65% of the total by 
the end of eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995). However, in the ninth phase of 
economic development (1996-2000), the government became concerned 
about unequal regional development, and decided to shift the focus back to the 
inland provinces (Chen & Groenewold, 2013). 
 
Since the 11th Five-Year Plan, China’s government has aimed to accelerate 
the economic development of inland provinces. Hunan province is one of 
these provinces. Compared to the coastal areas, Hunan is an underdeveloped 
inland province, with economic development restricted by backward 
infrastructure, low urbanization levels, and poor transportation connections. 
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Most of these disadvantages are related to low investment. Therefore, the 
Hunan government focuses on supporting infrastructure construction, public 
transportation, urbanization, agriculture, and, in addition, regulating local 
banks to provide loans to small to medium enterprises. In 2006, the Hunan 
government announced that the top priority should be given to supporting 
economic and social development (Xian et al, 2013). 
 
2.3 Background to Chinese Banking Sector  
As part of overall economic reform since 1978, the banking sector was also 
subject to change. From that date to 1984, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
began to limit itself to a regulatory and supervisory role, and handed over 
commercial activities to the China Construction Bank, the Bank of China, the 
Agricultural Bank of China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
called the State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs). A second step was the 
separation of commercial banking activities from those specially geared 
towards economic development. To this end, policy banks were established in 
1994 in order to take over from SOCBs projects for development purposes, 
and a new Commercial Banking Law was approved in 1995 to regulate the 
commercial banks. Thirdly, the new law more clearly stated the objectives of 
PBC, and its three main responsibilities were monetary stability, banking 
supervision, and oversight of the payment system. But it did not grant PBC 
independence from the State Council. Finally, responsibility for monetary 
policy was separated from banking supervision with the creation of the China 
Bank Regulatory Commission, in 2003. This section will assess the detail of 
China’s banking reform, the issues and problems of the banking sector, and 
the use of foreign investors for the transfer of leading management practices. 
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2.31 The liberalization of China’s banking industry  
The central bank or People’s Bank of China (PBC) was established in 1948, 
one year before the Communist Party took full control of China, and was the 
foundation of the socialist banking system. It was a mono-bank model: other 
banks were taken over by PBC or administered by them. PBC and the Ministry 
of Finance were the institutions charged with ensuring that national production 
plans were fulfilled (Ma, 2001). In a planned economy, the bank acted as an 
intermediary, and made few decisions in the allocation of resources. The 
government guided all investment and resource allocation. In December 1978, 
the Communist Party Congress approved the Open Door Policy to achieve 
economic modernization (Mo, 1999). 
 
The reform of Chinese banks can be divided into four periods (Tang, 2005). 
From 1978 until 1984, the first reform period, the main task was separating 
commercial banking from regulatory and supervisory central banking. PBC 
was still the central bank, but the main tasks were supervision over financial 
institutions, maintaining price stability, and issuing bank notes. The 
commercial operations of PBC were hived off into four specialized state owned 
banks (Jiang et al, 2009). In February 1979, the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC) was split from People’s Bank of China (PBC). In March 1979, the Bank 
of China (BOC) was given greater independence from PBC. The State 
Administration of Exchange Control (SAEC, now State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange, or SAFE) was separated from BOC and affiliated with PBC. 
In October 1979, the China Construction Bank (CCB) transformed from a 
department of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to become a bank under the 
State Council. In January 1984, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) was established to take over PBC’s remaining deposit-taking and 
lending functions. Since 1984, PBC did not have commercial bank functions. 
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Although it was as a central bank, it did not act as would a central bank in 
market-oriented economies (Yang, 2002). PBC was a directly responsible to 
the State Council, and it was consequently required to manage the funding of 
SOEs and government projects. 
 
The Bank of China (BOC) became mainly responsible for foreign currency 
transactions and the financing of foreign trade and investment. The 
Construction Bank of China (CBC) looked after government’s fixed asset 
investments, mainly large urban construction projects. The Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC) was mainly responsible for rural areas, agricultural sectors, and 
the network of rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) that had been providing 
small-scale rural banking. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
looked after commercial banking activities in urban areas and manufacturing 
(Lin & Zhang, 2009). The four specialized state owned commercial banks were 
only allowed to operate commercial services in their designated sectors.  
 
The four commercial banks set up level-one branches in each provincial 
administration of government, and each branch managed its own business 
within its designated region. The headquarters allocated the amount of loans 
and resources to be used in each branch. Business decisions were not based 
on commercial considerations, and the banks mainly provided services to 
SOEs and infrastructure projects under government control. There was still no 
competition among them since they were policy-lending ‘conduits’ and lacked 
any incentive to compete. As a result, the four SOCBs accumulated large 
stocks of non-performing loans. In the meantime, the Chinese government 
gradually opened more cities to inward investors. By the end of 1984, Chinese 
government had opened 14 cities to foreign capital, in addition to the existing 
four SEZs, most of which went into manufacturing (Leung, 2000). 
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The second reform period was between 1984 and 1994. The key objective was 
to transform the policy-driven banking system into a market-oriented one. The 
government removed restrictions on the four specialized state owned 
commercial banks, and allowed them to operate commercial services in all 
sectors (Fu & Heffernan, 2009). Since the mid-1980s, business restrictions on 
the four state owned banks were gradually loosened: the situation was 
described as ‘BOC is landing home, ABC is entering into cities, ICBC is going 
to villages, and CCB is coming into enterprises’ (Shang, 2000; Okazaki, 2007). 
The four commercial banks were established with the purpose of restructuring 
and building a more effective banking system. In order to increase competition, 
the Chinese government encouraged the establishment of joint-stock 
commercial banks (JSBC), with a range of shareholders, but with the majority 
still remaining with government institutions or government owned enterprises. 
The Chinese government gradually allowed the establishment of new ‘small 
and medium sized’ local commercial banks to provide services to individuals 
and to small and medium sized urban firms. Between 1985 and 1992, new 
commercial banks included the Bank of Communications, the CITIC Industrial 
Bank, the Shenzhen Development Bank, the Guangdong Development Bank, 
the China Merchants Bank, the China Everbright Bank, and the Hua Xia Bank. 
Also, urban credit cooperatives were established, and a more diversified 
banking system catered better for individuals and SMEs (Girardin & Ping, 
1997). In 1990, stock exchanges were created in Shanghai and Shenzhen. By 
the end of 1992, there were 9 JSCBs, 12 insurance companies, and 387 trust 
and investment companies. The Chinese government opened 714 cities, in 
about a third of the provinces, for foreign investors. It restricted foreign banks 
to certain businesses, and their basic function was to introduce overseas funds 
to support foreign enterprises in China (Wong & Wong, 2001). 
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However, during the 1990s, state guidance and influence ensured that the 
banks supplied the financial requirements of state-owned enterprises, which 
felt little incentive to pay back their debts, thereby leading to huge levels of 
non-performing loans. The government helped those banks in financial 
difficulties to write-off bad loans, or routinely it paid off any outstanding debts 
up to a half billion Yuan; larger amounts required approval from the State 
Council (Cull & Xu, 2000). Therefore, Chinese banks had no incentive to 
compete with each other. In summary, SOBs were not independent from 
government-set policies and could not make their own lending decisions 
(Bonin & Huang, 2001).  
 
After the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 
1992, the government formally set out plans for developing a ‘socialist market 
economy’, and, consequently, further reforming the banking sector. The State 
Council issued its Resolution on the Financial System Reform, in December 
1993, and declared its agenda for the reform of the financial system: (1) the 
establishment of an independent body for macro-economic management by 
the PBC (under the direction of the State Council, but independent from local 
governments); (2) the founding of policy banks; (3) the transformation of 
state-owned specialized banks into commercial banks; (4) the development of 
open, competitive, and well-managed financial markets; (5) the reform of 
foreign-exchange controls; (6) the issuance of guidance for the emergence of 
non-bank financial institutions; and (7) the promotion of a financial service 
infrastructure and system (Wu, 2005). 
 
Then, in the third period of bank reform from 1994 to 2001, the main tasks 
were removing the restrictions on the state-owned specialized banks, 
permitting them to operate in all areas of banking and encouraging inter-firm 
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competition. The objective was to transform banks into market functioning and 
profitable organizations. In 1994, the Chinese government established three 
policy banks, which were the Agricultural Development Bank of China, the 
China Development Bank, and the Export and Import Bank of China to take 
over the long-term development finance and policy-based lending previously 
performed by the four state-owned banks (Chang, 2010). The 1995 
Commercial Bank Law officially confirmed PBC as the central bank, and 
directed the state-owned banks to become ‘commercial banks’. The legislation 
provided the legal basis for the restructuring that created the SOCBs, and 
regulated that they were responsible for their own profits and losses. It 
encouraged the investment of foreign banks, and the establishment of regional 
joint stock commercial banks as a tool for increasing competition and 
accelerating the reform of the industry (Chen & Thomas, 1999). 
 
The SOCBs still had to deal with a large number of non-performing loans 
(NPLs), and the government drew up plans to clear their balance sheets. In 
March 1998, the National People’s Congress designated financial reform as 
one of three policy reform goals for the next three years. The Congress’s 
Standing Committee of the National People’s passed a plan submitted by the 
State Council to issue special government bonds that would be used to inject 
capital into the SOCBs. At the end of 1998, Chinese government transferred 
more than RMB 1.4 trillion in bad debts held by the SOCBs to four state-owned 
asset management companies (AMCs) (Yeung et al, 2012). By the end of 
2001, the two-tier banking system almost took shape, with the People’s Bank 
of China at one level, the policy banks and state-owned banks, joint-stock 
commercial banks, local commercial banks and foreign banks at another level. 
However, Chinese banks still suffered high levels of non-performing loans and 
low returns on investment and business practice was slow to change, due to 
they supported the restructuring of more than six thousand SOEs, provided 
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RMB 800 billion of policy loans, and lost RMB 316 billion from their loans 
during 1995 to 2002 (Ping, 2005). 
 
The fourth period of banking reform occurred from 2002 onwards. After joining 
the WTO in December 2001, China was committed to opening up the financial 
and banking system completely within five years, necessitating the 
acceleration of reform. The Chinese government had the Second National 
Financial Work Conference to consider how to build an efficient, financial 
system in 2002. The conference defined several problems, which were the 
incomplete supervisory system, the inefficiency of financial institutions, a weak 
legal framework to protect and regulate the rights and interests of financial 
institutions, a lack of employees with specialized financial knowledge and skills, 
and low technological innovation (People’s daily, 2002). In 2003, the Chinese 
government established the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
to oversee industry regulation and the process of reform in Mainland China, 
excluding therefore Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. The objectives were to 
protect the interests of depositors and consumers through prudential and 
effective supervision; to maintain market confidence; to enhance public 
knowledge of modern finance through customer education and information 
disclosure; to combat financial crimes; to promote financial stability and 
facilitate financial innovation; to enhance international competitiveness; to set 
supervisory and regulatory boundaries, and refrain from unnecessary controls; 
to encourage fair and orderly competition; to clearly define the accountability of 
both supervisor and supervised institutions; and to employ supervisory 
resources in an efficient and cost-effective manner (CBRC, 2005c).  
 
As government policy in practice left SOCBs with intractable debts, by the end 
of 2002, 51.2 per cent of some 62,000 SOEs had failed to repay bank loans 
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(Luo, 2003). In October 2003, at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central 
Committee of the China CPC, it was officially permitted to change SOCBs’ 
ownership structure, and to further reform Chinese banks. The Central 
Leading Group was established to plan for their reform, and to improve 
corporate governance and management efficiency. The government used four 
means to restructure the SOCBs: capital injection, granting the banks approval 
to issue subordinated bonds to supplement their capital, the disposal of NPLs 
through Asset Management Companies (AMCs), and permitting the 
introduction of foreign strategic investors. Chinese banks needed to reduce 
redundant employees and to close unprofitable branches. Although the 
Chinese government had established policy banks, the SOCBs still needed to 
provide credit for public projects, through guidelines from the CBRC. In 
December 2003, the Chinese government began the second capital injection 
to SOCBs. It established the Central Huijin Investment Company (Huijin), 
funded from the earnings and reserves of the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE). The main shareholders in Hujin are SAFE, the PBC and 
Ministry of Finance (Cheng et al, 2006). In an uncertain and unstable 
environment, Huijin was expected to become an influential shareholder of 
SOCBs and to urge them to improve their corporate governance and generate 
profits. Many of Huijin’s key personnel came from the PBC Financial Stability 
Bureau, and Huijin’s president, Xie Ping, was the former director-general of the 
Bureau. In December 2003, Huijin injected US $45 billion into BOC and CCB. 
Then, it provided RMB 3 billion for Bank of Communications in June 2004, and 
US$ 15 billion for ICBC in April 2005. Huijin injected RMB499.6 billion 
(US$60.40 billion) into BOC, CCB, ICBC and BOCOM in total, and it offered 
official foreign exchange reserves (chiefly as U.S. dollar investment) and 
borrowing (in Renminbi) (Wang, 2004). The Chinese government through 
Huijin still exercised indirect control over the major state-owned banks. For 
example, it held over 50 per cent of ICBC shares (Shih, 2005). 
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In order to accelerate the reform of state owned banks, since 2005, the 
Chinese government transformed three SOCBs, allowing a minority foreign 
ownership, and enabling them to go public with part of the shareholding. CCB 
and BOC were listed on the Hong Kong stock market, in 2005 (Berger & Zhou, 
2009), and BOC appeared on the Shanghai stock market in 2006. In the same 
year, ICBC was listed both in Shanghai and Hong Kong. It was expected that 
listing would bring or imply a better corporate governance structure since the 
stock exchange rules necessitated internal changes and some public scrutiny. 
The Chinese government would try to attract foreign investors to promote 
international standards and ‘best practice’, although the CBRC restricted 
foreign banks to selected banking activities in specific locations. Listing 
moreover enabled foreign investors to purchase the shares of Chinese banks. 
A cap of 25% of total shares in any domestic bank could be sold to overseas 
interests, with any one investor allowed between 5% and 20%, subject to 
regulatory approval (Zhang, 2005). These deals were consummated in 2006. 
While banks opened up to foreign investors, they went public with sales of 
shares through their IPOs, while retaining their majority state owned bank 
status. Three of the Big Four that took on minority foreign ownership promoted 
very large IPOs soon afterwards.  
 
Even after several efforts at reform, the change agenda remained lengthy: 
corporate governance and supervision; greater reliance on market forces and 
profit goals; and a more supportive legal system and improved asset quality 
(Hope & Hu, 2006). The governance structures of Chinese banks remained a 
topic of concern. There are too few independent directors, and a paucity of 
effective board committees, particularly those for risk management and audit. 
Whether financial statements in China reflect realities are questionable, and 
are usually substantially short of international standards. The CBRC and 
Chinese government tried to attract foreign investors to help improve the 
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corporate governance of Chinese banks. While foreign partners might help to 
improve governance, their limited representation on boards and their lack of 
influence on management decisions inevitably restrained their impact. One 
aim of improved governance is to enable decisions based on commercial 
considerations, rather than being influenced by government or bureaucrats. 
CBRC introduced a requirement for independent, executive boards to oversee 
the work of senior management. Another important element of reform is 
building the legal and regulatory system for banks, but uncertainty for the 
industry continues. In which case, banks remained reluctant to lend 
extensively to private enterprises. Even where banks are able to lend against 
collateral, pursuing claims in the event of default is expensive and time 
consuming, and offers no guarantees of success. Better performing financial 
markets need significant improvements in the wording of the legal code and in 
its enforcement. Finally, the CBRC has the powers to enforce changes in 
organization and practice on the banks, in the interests of reform, but the 
dilemma is that the needed use of such powers runs counter to the notion of 
banks themselves making decisions in response to market forces.  
 
One of the big issues during the progress of Chinese bank reform has been 
dealing with non-performing loans. In 1997, the proportion of non-performing 
loans reached 24 percent of the total loans held by the four state owned banks 
(Dai 1998; CCER 1998). The total outstanding loans were Yuan 6,610 billion 
for all state commercial banks during the mid-1997. The total bad debts were 
Yuan 317 billion, which was more than the banks’ total net assets. About 5 per 
cent of their deposits were held by government organizations and 25 per cent 
of their deposits were held by SOEs, and so the banks were not in a position to 
pay out these deposits if requested (Huang, 1998).  
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One of the important tasks for banking sector reform was clearing up poor 
balance sheets. One of the ways for the Chinese government to support the 
Chinese banks in reducing non-performing loans was capital injection. In 1998, 
the PBC required Chinese banks to improve their assets and liabilities 
management practices. In this year, the total amount of capital injection to 
Chinese banks was RMB 270 billion (US$ 32.5 billion), which was about 3 per 
cent of China’s GDP or 55 per cent of central government annual revenues 
(Green, 2005). In the meantime, the MOF helped SOCBs to issue bonds as a 
way of obtaining a capital injection (MOF, 2006).  
 
In 2003, the Chinese government established the Central Huijin Investment 
Company (Huijin), using foreign exchange reserves held by the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). In total, Huijin injected RMB 
499.6 billion (US $ 60.4 billion) to the four banks (BOC, CCB, BOCOM and 
ICBC). In December 2003, it provided US$ 45 billion to BOC and CCB. In June 
2004, it issued RMB 3 billion to BOCOM, and, in April 2005, it injected US$15 
billion into ICBC. Another round of capital injection started from January 2004. 
The PBC used its international exchange reserves to assist BOC and CCB and 
divided US$45 billion equally between them. Similarly, Huijin provided US$15 
billion and the Ministry of Finance another US $15 billion to the ICBC. 
Furthermore, ICBC’s balance sheet was boosted by another US$85 billion 
from other AMCs and other public sources (Hope and Hu, 2006, MOF, 2010). 
In January 2004, the PBC gave another US $45 billion to boost the capital 
adequacy ratios of China Construction Bank and Bank of China, clean their 
balance sheets, and allow them to list their shares on the stock market. Since 
January 2005, the PBC and the CBRC also coordinated with various levels of 
local government to help write off the bad loans of local commercial banks, 
and to close down some insolvent local banks and credit cooperatives (CBRC, 
2005d). 
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One of the key reasons for large amounts of capital injection into Chinese 
banks during 2003 to 2005 was preparing for public listing. From 2005 to 2007, 
CCB, BOC, ICBC and BOCOM were listed on stock exchanges. Initially, the 
Chinese government wanted the banks to be listed in the Hong Kong stock 
market, as they recognized that the standards for qualification and disclosure 
would be more strict than in a domestic market and at recognized  
international levels. Also, the Shanghai stock exchange market was sluggish 
from 2001 until 2005 (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2005). Therefore, both CCB 
and BOCOM listed on the Hong Kong stock market. However, the move was 
criticized for not giving opportunities to the domestic investor. Therefore, later 
on, both BOC and ICBC listed in Hong Kong and Shanghai, and CCB and 
BOCOM too offered shares in Shanghai. 
 
When the four state banks were preparing for listing, the MOF wrote off all 
NPLs held by BOC and CCB, which made Huijin their largest shareholder. 
However, the MOF did not write off all of the NPLs at ICBC, although the MOF 
and Huijin are its largest shareholders. Therefore, in practice, the MOF still has 
indirect control over major state owned banks through Huijin or, in some 
instances, direct control. 
  
The Chinese government established four asset management companies 
(AMCs) to help with bank NPLs. The capital of AMCs was mainly from the 
MOF, the PBC, and their bond issues. Formally, the AMCs operated 
independently, but had only one shareholder, which was the MOF. The MOF 
allowed each AMC to deal mainly with one SOCB. Due to most of the 
employees being originally from the four state owned banks, AMC personnel 
largely handled the NPLs of their former banks. By the end of 1998, the total 
amount of NPLs purchased by AMCs from SCOBs was RMB 1.4 trillion, which 
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was 21 percent of the loan balance of the SOCBs. From 1999, those NPLs 
were transferred to the four AMCs (Cinda, Huarong, Great Wall, and Orient). 
The loans, worth $168.2 billion, have been written off, as far as the Big Four 
are concerned (CCER, 2000). 
 
The four state owned asset management companies took the main part in the 
restructuring of non-performing loans at Chinese banks. According to the 
regulations on the practice of debt-for-equity swaps, issued in 1999 by the 
China Economy and Trade Commission and the People's Bank of China, 
Chinese banks needed to transfer their non-performing loans to the AMCs 
(Luo, Zhang and Zhu, 2011). The Ministry of Finance and the PBC launched 
“The guideline for better practice of debt-for-equity swap in state owned 
enterprises” (2003). The MOF regulates that the four AMCs could engage in a 
broader range of asset management activities, rather than providing support 
for SOEs. In addition, the MOF sold a minority interest in the AMCs to selected 
domestic investors. 
 
In the late 1990s, in order to deal with non-performing loans, the Chinese 
government made efforts to improve the loan classification system. China’s 
State Council decided to classify bank credit assets by international standards 
in order to improve loan quality and financial risk management. In 1997, the 
Chinese government put loans into four categories based on the time run for 
overdue payment, which were  “normal”, “overdue”, “inactive”, and “loss” 
(Huang and Yang, 1998). In 1998, the MOF issued Chinese banks worth Yuan 
270 billion (US$33 billon) to help them recapitalize and restructure. Later on, in 
1999, the PBC produced a new set of guidelines and further classified loans 
into five categories, based on their financial risks, which were “passed”, 
“special mention”, “substandard”, “doubtful”, and “loss” (CCER, 2000). From 
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that date, four state asset management companies have taken over 1.4 trillion 
Yuan (US$169 billion) in bad debts from Chinese banks. By the end of 2002, 
the NPLs of the big four banks were 2.6 trillion yuan (US$300 billion), which 
still accounted for 23.7 percent of their total loans. 
 
The legal situation in China has improved, particularly since the late 1990s, 
when it revised its legal system in order to join the WTO. However, changes to 
the laws and regulations did not keep pace with the needs of economic reform 
and development. In terms of the Chinese banking sector, there were 
problems such as an inadequate credit registry, the enterprise insolvency law, 
weakness in criminal liability investigation for financial frauds and irregularities, 
and the legal framework governing financial institutions and business. For 
example, China issued the Provisional Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 1986, 
implemented from 1988 onwards. However, the law only covered SOEs, and 
there were no regulations and solutions for private firms facing bankruptcy. 
Even so, the implementation of the Law was not effective, even for SOEs. Fu 
and Heffernan (2009) state that one of the reasons leading to the low 
efficiency of Chinese bank reform was the lack of clarity about bankruptcy 
procedures, which resulted in large amounts of bad debt to SOEs. During SOE 
reform, there was neither effective regulation nor a legal framework to guide 
their restructuring. The Chinese government continued to over-rely on state 
owned banks to provide loans to indebted SOEs, and then used the AMCs to 
write off NPLs for Chinese banks. 
 
As a result, the National People’s Congress approved a new Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law in August 2006, and implemented it in June 2007. The new 
version of the bankruptcy law covers both SOEs and private firms. It also 
covers Chinese companies operating overseas and foreign companies 
	   37	  
operating in China. Herd, Pigott and Hill (2010) state that the implementation 
of the reformed bankruptcy law was more effective than previously. The law 
provides clearer guidelines on the conditions for listing on the stock exchange, 
as well as clarifying the governance structures and the responsibilities of 
directors, senior management and key committees. The revised law has the 
aim of bringing China’s financial markets into international practice. 
 
One key objective of the reform process initiated by the CBRC is to formulate 
appointments and procedures, and to make decisions based on performance. 
In other words, it seeks to replace the established practice of ‘guanxi’. Guanxi 
is an important form of relationships when doing business in China (Yang, 
1994; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Luo, 1997). Jacobs (1979) states that ‘guanxi’ has a 
strong influence on Chinese life and society, and complicates its social 
environment. He further states that guanxi is a set of ‘particularistic ties’ rather 
than a ‘relation’ or ‘relationship’. Lo & Otis (1999) argue that guanxi reflects the 
political culture and personal networks. Therefore, with so many arguments 
about ‘guanxi’, it has both positive and negative connotations. Some people 
might connect guanxi with corruption and bribes, which historically have been 
prominent in China’s social system (Fan, 2002). 
 
Yeung & Tung (1996) contend that ‘guanxi is the establishment of a 
connection between two independent individuals to enable a bilateral flow of 
personal or social transactions’. There are different types of ‘guanxi’ between 
family, friends and businesses. In this research, it refers business to ‘guanxi’ 
as related to business (Fan, 2002). Fock & Woo (1998) consider that ‘guanxi’ 
is a source of sustainable competitive advantage, as does (Tsang, 1998). 
Davies et al, (1995) argue that people who have a good guanxi network are 
assisted in gaining information from government, and that guanxi can improve 
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the efficiency of firms. However, Tsang (1998) argues that building ‘guanxi’ 
could be time consuming and high in costs. In order to build or maintain 
‘guanxi’, firms need to provide certain benefits to people in their network (Fock 
& Woo, 1998). For example, they may have to pay the expense of trips under 
the guise of training (Tung & Worm, 1997). Some argue that guanxi is a form 
of bribery or unfair competition (Fan, 2002; Dunfee & Warren, 2001). Cateora 
& Graham (1999) state that building guanxi in China costs about 3-5% of 
operating costs, or even more. Fan (2002) argues that there is no guarantee of 
success in business when investing time and money, and that guanxi can be 
seen as an investment. Tung & Worm (1997) believe that guanxi is based on 
personal contacts, rather than with a firm overall, and that guanxi will be 
difficult to retain once the relevant person has left the company. Guanxi could 
be unstable, particularly in relations with government, when public officials 
leave their positions, and the guanxi will no long exist. As we will see form the 
cases in the thesis, there is a tension between the procedural and 
performance related goals of the CBRC and the fact of the continuation of 
‘guanxi’ practices. 
 
The purpose of Chinese bank reform was to lift control by government, and to 
enable management to make decisions in response to customer needs, as 
anticipated in a modern banking system. Management would bear the 
responsibility for allocating credit and offering loans with a view to generating 
profits and acquiring the best techniques for acquiring and assessing clients. 
To date, Chinese banks are still obliged to serve different classes of borrowers, 
under the guidance of the CBRC. Banks continue to be reluctant to take 
advantage of any operational flexibility they have been granted to vary lending 
rates in line with the risks and costs associated with different classes of 
borrowers. The AMCs have been allowed to compete for the management of 
NPLs built up by banks, and measures introduced in August 2005 gave the 
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PBC power to take on intractable debts. The creation of capital markets was 
meant to multiply the sources of finance, and serve the requirements of 
institutional investors, enterprises and government. Commercial banks were 
not allowed to purchase bonds from the government, policy banks, or AMCs, 
since they were needed to cover the banks’ NPLs. They were no longer 
obligated to issue loans to infrastructure companies or provincial or local 
governments. 
 
2.32 The structure of Chinese banking industry  
A comprehensive and multi-layered banking system has taken shape (as 
indicated in the Figure 2-1 below), which is guided by the People’s Bank of 
China and China Banking Regulation Commission, and operated by the 
domestic commercial banks (Wong & Wong, 2001). There are further 
non-bank financial institutions, such as trust and investment companies, and 
rural and urban credit cooperative societies, as well as foreign financial 
institutions. 
 
Chinese banks have been gradually reformed, and moved towards operating 
without being directly government-owned. However, the Chinese government 
still indirectly controls the banking sector through the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). The PBC mainly formulates and implements monetary policy. 
The CBRC is the main institution to oversee and supervise the overall 
operations of Chinese banks. The MOF mainly formulates and implements 
China’s fiscal policies and the central government’s budget; draws plans for 
the issuance of treasury bonds and other government debt; formulates and 
implements accounting regulations for business; and conducts research on 
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China’s economy and its fiscal situation. Although the MOF no longer has 
authority to intervene directly in Chinese banks or other financial institutions, it 
could still have influence through its ownership of shares. In addition, there is 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which mainly 
supervises and monitors foreign exchange transactions in China. 
 
PBC and the CBRC share responsibility for the regulation and supervision of 
banks, asset management companies, trust and investment vehicles and 
deposit-taking financial institutions. The People’s Bank of China has the task 
of formulating and implementing monetary policy (including minimum reserve 
requirements, interest rates, money supply targets and exchange rates) to 
ensure the stability of the financial system. Its tasks are to restrain inflation, 
maintain growth rates, bail out illiquid financial bodies, and regulate 
deposit-taking institutions, and it reported directly to the State Council. Among 
its duties, the last has often been overlooked, because PBC has focused on 
inflation and growth. The CBRC, when established, was charged with 
formulating the rules and regulations that would govern banking institutions in 
China. At its founding, it took several actions to promote the reform and 
restructuring of Chinese banks, particularly the big four state owned banks, 
and it helped to attract foreign investment. The CBRC was created to fill a 
need for specialized regulation of an increasingly complex banking system that 
was to be fully opened to foreign financial institutions before the end of 2006. 
Also, the CBRC encouraged domestic and private investors to buy shares in 
banks as part of its strategy to improve their corporate governance, thereby 
improving their operational efficiency. The CBRC similarly introduced 
measures to deal with the dysfunctional rural credit cooperatives and to 
develop rural (and city) commercial banks.  
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The three policy banks - the Agricultural Development Bank of China, the 
China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China – had been 
formed previously, in 1994, in order to take over functions from the new state 
owned commercial banks. Three state policy banks are mainly responsible for 
government projects. The domestic commercial bank sector includes five 
stated owned commercial banks, and national and local commercial banks. As 
we have noted, the state owned commercial banks - the Bank of China (BOC), 
the China Construction Bank of China (CCB), the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) – were 
created out of what were the four major business divisions of the PBC. The 
aim was to make them compete in every aspect of banking, and to make them 
responsible for their own profits or losses. The China Post Savings Bank is the 
fifth largest state owned bank, and it was established in 2006. The majority of 
national and local commercial banks were established during the late 1980s or 
the early 1990s. 
 
From Figure 2-1, we can see the overall regulatory structure of the Chinese 
financial services industry and its various divisions. We can see, from Figure 
2-2, that our five case studies fit under the category of ‘Domestic Commercial 
Banks’, and that the nature of their original ownership structure and the 
geographic reach of their operations at the next level differentiate them. 
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Figure 2-1: Structure of the Chinese Banking System 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Structure of Domestic Commercial Banking Sector in China, and 
the Five Cases Studies 
 
 
2.33 Foreign investment in Chinese banks 
In 1979, the Chinese government would only permit foreign banks to open 
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1999, foreign banks in that city could expand their business into provinces 
such as Guangxi or Hunan, with restrictions being progressively relaxed (Lin & 
Xu, 2007). Yet, in order to maintain national economic independence and to 
protect domestic banks from strong competition, the Chinese government 
maintained restrictions on foreign banks (He & Fan, 2004). 
 
Since China joined WTO, and promised a further opening-up of the financial 
sector, many foreign banks attempted to expand their business activities. Their 
entry brought competition (since foreign banks have advanced technology, 
managerial skills, superior corporate governance and risk management 
procedures) as well as opportunities (foreign banks had to seek joint ventures 
with domestic firms) (Allen et al., 2006). Capabilities might be transferred to 
Chinese banks through minority foreign ownership, and ultimately facilitate the 
removal of tight state control of the industry. 
 
Foreign investors looked to access an expanding Chinese market through 
strategic alliances with local businesses, by selling credit cards, fund 
management, trustee services, insurance, and other products through their 
partners’ branch networks. Both parties had to commit themselves to a 
mutually beneficial partnership, but the objectives of foreign investors, Chinese 
banks and Chinese government might be different. 
 
After China joined the WTO, in order to protect the domestic banks, the PRC 
regulated that foreign banks needed to have a minimum of 1 million RMB 
deposits. Even in this case, foreign banks were still willing to register this 
amount of money and easily met the conditions. Foreign banks enjoyed the 
benefit of a preferential 15 per cent income tax rate until a new corporate tax 
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rate of 25 per cent was introduced for all domestic and foreign firms in 2008. 
The CBRC stated that a foreign investor could only hold up to a 20 per cent 
share of a Chinese bank, and it did not permit any significant share in more 
than two Chinese banks (CBRC, 2005b). Therefore, before investing, foreign 
multinationals would carefully evaluate the bank’s financial position, the scope 
and nature of its operations, and the management of its portfolio and risks. Any 
investor would analyse operating and funding costs, and the soundness of 
provisioning practices and loans. It would form a view of the bank’s key officers 
and their expertise, and assess the likely benefits of training and hiring other 
staff. Multinationals have therefore two entry strategies: investment in a 
‘greenfield’ bank without a history of dubious assets, or in one of the big 
SOCBs on the grounds their extensive distribution networks counterbalance 
issues of NPLs and weak governance. They might, additionally, take an 
intermediate approach. 
 
Greenfield banks, such as Bohai Bank, more easily adopt international best 
practices, yet they have limited branches and distribution network. For 
joint-stock banks and city commercial banks, there are fewer legacy assets, 
small capital commitments, faster growth, better governance, more 
transparency, and potential flexibility in the sharing of management control. 
However, these banks have a limited franchise and distribution network if 
compared to the big national commercial banks. Other common drawbacks 
are complex shareholder structures and difficult decision-making processes, 
plus unrealistically high price expectations and tougher negotiation positions. 
In the case of the Big Four, they have advantages in their immediate access to 
extensive nationwide distribution systems, as well as meaningful strategic 
cooperation in attractive business segments such as credit cards or consumer 
finance), They can significantly escalate an investor’s position in China 
through a single investment. On the downside, they have huge legacies in 
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asset quality and wieldy operational systems. Foreign investors would require 
large capital commitments to gain a meaningful stake, face uncertainties about 
their ability to influence management decisions, and cope with political 
sensitivities about protecting a national franchise.  
 
Most forms of international finance have shown an interest in investing in 
China, including universal banks, commercial banks, specialty finance 
companies, asset management firms, and insurers. Their objectives differ, as 
do the advantages and disadvantage they bring to the Chinese finance 
industry. Universal banks refer to those engaged in a wide range of financial 
services, such as consumer banking, commercial banking, investment banking, 
asset management, and insurance, and as exampled by Citigroup, HSBC, and 
J.P. Morgan Chase. They can offer Chinese banks a broad range of strategic 
and operational benefits, and impressive financial and client resources. 
Universal banks would make protection of their own brand and reputation a 
priority. For example, when in 2004 HSBC invested in the Bank of 
Communications, the fifth largest bank in China, it took a 19.9 per cent share. 
HSBC took two board seats, and helped to initiate a credit card business, with 
a plan to establish a credit card joint venture subject to regulatory approval. 
Citibank invested in Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, the ninth largest 
Chinese bank, with its franchise concentrated in the Shanghai region, and 
gained a 5 per cent share. Citibank similarly had board representation, with the 
goal of applying for a credit card joint venture, and transferring best practices 
in risk management, IT, and marketing. A possible concern is conflict of 
interest as many of their products and services will overlap and potentially 
compete with their Chinese partners. 
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Commercial banks are mainly focused on corporate and consumer banking, 
and on wealth management. For instance, the Bank of America has invested in 
CCB, and the Royal Bank of Scotland in Bank of China. Specialty finance 
companies deal with services from credit cards and consumer finance to 
commercial finance and leasing. The scope of their activities is narrower than 
that of the banks but they consequently have specific expertise. Ford Motor 
Credit, General Electric Capital, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, and 
MBNA Corporation are all prominent, and American Express invested in ICBC. 
Speciality finance companies could assist with product innovation, profitable 
niche products, and marketing.  
 
Asset management firms - such as Capital Group, Fidelity, Franklin, and 
Putnam - have expertise to complement the services supplied by the major 
Chinese banks. For example, Pangaea Capital Management invested in 
Huaxia Bank. Asset management is an under-developed business in China. 
These firms will not offer additional financial resources, and possess limited 
capacity to assist Chinese banks in restructuring themselves as competitive 
commercial banks. Insurers such as Aviva, ING and Prudential have looked for 
distribution networks in China, and Allianz invested in ICBC. Their primary 
contribution would be to develop new streams of revenue, but they would have 
little influence on bank reform. 
 
Chinese banks would also consider criteria in their choice of foreign partners: 
profile, strategic fit, management and cultural fit, core competencies, appetite 
for acquisition, and capital funds (see Table 2-1 below). 
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Table 2-1: Criteria Used by Chinese Banks in Selecting Potential Investors 
Categories  Criteria  Relevancy and Benefits  
Profile Asset size; market 
capitalization; financial 
strength and credit 
ratings 
Strong world-class 
profile, experience and 
branding reputation 
Core competencies 
 
Business mix: retail 
banking, corporate 
banking, risk control, 
wealth management 
Competencies in 
information technology, 
management 
information system, 
improving operating and 
financial performance, 
and in combining 
competencies 
Availability of 
international best 
practices 
Tangible benefits to 
Chinese banks in 
execution of strategy 
Acquisition appetite 
 
Mergers and 
acquisitions experience 
in financial services 
industry 
Experience in minority 
stake investments 
Interest in committing to 
investment in Chinese 
banks 
Willingness to negotiate 
reasonable terms 
 
Adapted from Hope & Hu (2006) 
 
In summary, Chinese banks tend to look for partners that can provide them 
with improvements in product development, technology innovation, marketing 
skills, and distribution expertise. The Chinese bank also looks for partners who 
have superior management capabilities and expertise in core competencies, 
and partners that will minimize the potential for conflict and damaging 
competition between them. 
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The Chinese government and foreign investors seem to agree that engaging 
the expertise of international strategic partners has the potential to improve 
Chinese bank performance, including the control and management of 
operations, the introduction and marketing of new products and services, and 
the enhancement of asset quality and better management of risk. While 
foreign banks have competed for customers through quality of service and 
efficiencies, Chinese domestic banks traditionally took on the task of resource 
allocation under the guidance of government, and had limited competition with 
each other. Therefore, Chinese banks had little incentive to prioritize providing 
customer service, but current regulations state that they are responsible for 
their profits and loss (Jia, 2009). As they gradually accepted the importance of 
customer service, they realized that strategic alliance with a foreign partner 
might help them to make rapid gains. Moreover, it was considered that foreign 
banks had the experience of innovating and developing a wide range of 
products to meet the needs of different customer groups. It was assumed that 
within a decade China’s middle class would be a large and influential market, 
but Chinese banks have limited experience of competing in retail services. 
Moreover, foreign banks could strategically offer a focus on the highly lucrative 
market private banking business and on the means to develop these services 
effectively. 
 
A major contribution to core competence can come through the direct transfer 
of skilled and experienced managers and technicians from the foreign investor. 
Staff can learn first hand how an international financial institution deals with all 
aspects of lending, funding, training, or containing risks. In addition, the 
multinational can provide advice on and support for information systems and 
technology. Through their participation in the business activities of China’s 
domestic banks, multinationals can transfer knowledge and help to build skills 
in marketing and product development. They will be able to assess the need 
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for specialized recruitment and training, and, if permitted, they can 
demonstrate how governance structures might function in a market-oriented 
commercial bank. 
 
However, there are limits to the number of such personnel in the employ of 
foreign partners and limits on the number willing to work in another company 
overseas. Language barriers will be a difficulty for those on long or short-term 
secondment. Visiting personnel may operate only in the headquarters of 
Chinese banks, and not at the operational branch level. Yet the nature of 
banking, the development and delivery of services may be determined by the 
very specific interaction with customers and by locally determined 
requirements, and competitive success is closely connected to building client 
networks. Foreign personnel in Chinese banks have normally been found in 
information technology, product development, and design departments and 
most frequently at the headquarters. In which case, training according to bank 
headquarters or CBRC guidelines to ensure that the skills and types of 
employees are available for the new services and systems being introduced is 
paramount. The extent to which this top-down transfer of practices and 
personnel development encourages or inhibits managerial initiative at the level 
of the branch is open to question, as is the ability of banks to evolve services 
suited to the economic and customer needs of such varied Chinese provinces. 
 
East Asian governments have used offerings of stock in state-owned 
companies as a way to secure additional capital. Better performance through 
improved governance of publicly listed companies has been at best an 
afterthought, and little concern has been shown for the interests of minority 
shareholders. China has been no exception to this general pattern. But, in the 
case of strategic investors in banks, the government has been interested in 
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boosting performance through the transfer of capabilities in human resources, 
risk assessment, information technology, marketing, and product development. 
The amount of money injected in share acquisitions has been substantial, 
especially for HSBC’s buying of 19.9 per cent of the Bank of Communications 
(US$1.75 billion), and Bank of America’s 9.1 per cent of CCB (US$3 billion). 
Entering into a strategic partnership with a foreign bank can do much to 
enhance the public image of the Chinese enterprise. Despite their huge size, 
the four main SOCBs are not well known outside China, and interactions with 
large multinationals could augment their global profile too. CITIC Banks made 
advances Latin Americans with the cooperation of BBVA.  
 
2.4 Multinationals, Capability Transfer and FDI Theory 
As we have seen, the open door policy introduced after 1978 prioritized the 
liberation of economic planning and greater use of market mechanisms in 
order to transform the level of China’s manufacturing nearer to global 
standards. Government policy focused, too, on the most developed, coastal 
provinces, and, initially, given low domestic wages and low demand at home, it 
targeted export markets. In order to transform its manufacturing, it decided on 
a policy of allowing inward FDI, and, at first, insisted on joint venture 
arrangements with state-owned enterprises in order to bring about the transfer 
of capabilities in products, processes and technology. Uneven national 
economic development, mass internal migration and low levels of home 
consumer demand were amongst the range of side effects. The next phase in 
government policy is seeking to address all these three outcomes, and, 
moreover, on improving the performance and competitiveness of the service 
sector, most notably banking. Since the mid-1990s, following its previous 
approach to manufacturing, the government in Beijing has eased controls over 
the banks, and, from 2003, it allowed foreign multinationals to invest and form 
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strategic alliances with indigenous enterprises. For two reasons, however, we 
should not assume that the approach adopted for manufacturing will or can be 
the same in the case of banking. The first reason is that, although there have 
been significant changes in the regulation of the industry, the government 
retains tight supervision of the banks, and, so far, the scale of multinational 
investment in individual concerns has been very limited. The second reason is 
that there may be fundamental questions, in FDI theory, about the differences 
between manufacturing and services, and in the nature and extent of 
international capability transfer between the two sectors. The remainder of this 
chapter will, therefore, review ideas about multinationals and their impact on 
host economies, and explore what lessons can be taken from FDI to illuminate 
recent changes in China’s banking industry. 
 
It will be important to analyse the motivations and rationale of foreign direct 
investment, which has been used to explain the ‘miracle’ of Chinese 
manufacturing success in the developed coastal provinces of Guangdong and 
Fujian, but provides only partial explanation for a service industry in the less 
developed inland provinces. We should not assume that China’s next stage of 
economic development would be achieved with the same approach or means. 
This chapter looks at FDI theory in service industries in particular, and how it 
differs from FDI theory in general. It subsequently discusses FDI in the 
Chinese banking industry. It focuses on how to transfer the ownership 
advantages of MNEs to Chinese banks, and to what extent Chinese banks can 
learn from MNEs to enhance competitive advantages.  
 
2.41 Ownership advantage and monopoly  
Hymer (1960) argues that the mere transfer of capital funds could not fully 
explain the overseas operations of firms. He was one of the first analysts to 
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identify MNEs as a special category of business, and he states that, to 
succeed in overseas markets, MNEs must have some ‘ownership advantage’ 
in technology, product or management that allows them to overcome the 
problem of being foreign. He points out that firms do just send capital across 
borders, but must invest heavily in personnel and organization, making FDI an 
operational and managerial issue too. Following, Hymer (1972) and 
Kindleberger (1983) both argue the importance of firm’s ownership 
advantages, which is the key factor for MNEs to compete in foreign markets. 
Hymer considers that firms chose to direct invested in foreign markets as the 
importance to protect and transfer the ownership advantages and the need to 
strategic control and coordinate its overseas operations.  
 
Dunning (1993a) argues that Hymer focused too much on monopolistic 
advantages, and ignored the role of MNEs in innovation and increased 
efficiency. He acknowledges the usefulness of the concept of ownership 
advantages, but says that Hymer did not adequately consider why and how 
these advantages might be transferred. He believes that more attention should 
be paid to the internalization and control of foreign value-added activities, and 
to the strategic and managerial issues confronting firms. 
 
2.42 Transaction costs and internalization theory  
Hymer (1960) emphasizes a firm’s monopoly advantages to operate abroad to 
gain oligopoly profits over local competitors, when facing uncertainties and 
imperfections in the home market. Buckley & Casson (1976) argue that Hymer 
ignores the importance of the internal activities of firms. Buckley & Casson 
(1976), base on a previous theory, integrate important ideas of internal 
coordination and transaction costs, and develop the internalization theory, 
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which further considers how firms could enhance competitive advantages 
through managerial hierarchies to improve performance. Buckely & Casson 
(1988) also suggest that MNEs could reduce costs through strategy alliance of 
acquisition, merger or joint ventures. Internalization theory considers how a 
firm operates in a foreign market in order to minimize costs and reduce market 
uncertainties. Buckley & Casson (2002) argue that the reduction of transaction 
costs explains the motivation of cross-border operations. Internalization theory 
emphasizes the existence of managerial hierarchy from parent company to 
overseas subsidiaries. However, it ignores the influence from overseas 
subsidiaries and local agency to the parent company during the internalization 
process.  
 
2.43 The Eclectic or OLI Paradigm  
Hymer considered that the firm’s monopolistic advantages were the key 
factors generating FDI activity. Buckley and Casson argue that market 
imperfection and transaction costs were key factors to explain FDI activity. 
Dunning (1980) states that neither view explains why a firm would choose to 
invest in one country rather than another. Dunning argued that the choice of 
location might have special factors to attract FDI. Dunning (1988) identify 
company’s specific ownership advantages (O), location advantages (L) and 
internationalization advantages (I) as the determine factors for the expansion 
of international activities. Dunning (1980) developed those three factors as the 
‘OLI Paradigm’. Dunning (1993a) also argues that previous studies of 
international investment did not explain why MNEs chose FDI over their 
original export strategy or licensing. Dunning, based on the OLI framework, 
explains that, when firms have ownership and internalization advantages, 
without locational advantages, firms might to choose follow exporting 
advantages; when firms had only ownership advantages, without internalizing 
	   54	  
capability, firms might choose to license to another firm with locational 
advantages in a foreign market; when firms had ownership advantage, location 
advantage and internationalization advantages, firms might choose direct 
investment in a foreign market.  
 
Dunning (1980) states that ownership (O) advantage refers to specific firm 
competitive advantages, which is not only limited to an tangible assert such as 
natural resources, but also includes intangible assets such as technology, 
information, marketing skills, management, and entrepreneurial skills. In 2008, 
Dunning updated his ideas about ownership advantages, and classified the 
ownership advantages to three types, which included ownership asset (Oa), 
ownership transaction (Ot), and ownership institutional assets (Oi). Firstly, a 
firm’s tangible and intangible assets, such as property rights, product 
innovation, and capability in marketing, were considered as asset-specific 
advantages, termed as ownership asset (Oa). Secondly, Dunning (1988) 
considered that the firms’ capability for exclusive or favoured access to inputs, 
such as labour, finance, natural resources, and information; or the capability of 
parent firms to form cooperative inter-firm relationships to reduce costs; or the 
ability to access product markets; or the capability of governing its subsidiaries 
were considered as the firm’s ownership transaction advantage, termed as 
ownership transaction (Ot). Firms can achieve size or economies of scope in 
order to enjoy monopolistic power over product markets, and so obtain 
resources at marginal costs. Thirdly, Dunning argued that the firm’s business 
activities were influenced by both external and internal factors. Formal and 
informal institutions could influence a firm’s business activity. He considered 
that a firm’s capability to enjoy the advantage of geographic differences, such 
as the government intervention or assistance; the capability to reduce or 
diversify risks caused by currency differences or fluctuations; the management 
of local political and cultural impacts, and consumer demands; the capability to 
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learn from and combine experience of local markets better to exploit the asset 
and transaction advantages were themselves also kinds of ownership 
advantages. Furthermore, Dunning argued that institutional ownership 
advantages could counterbalance competitive deficiencies in other assets. 
Dunning & Lundan (2008) says that the three types of O advantage 
dynamically influence each other.  
 
Location (L) refers to why firms place a subsidiary in a specific geographic 
area in order to gain what he describes as a locational competitive advantage. 
These locational advantages include the resource advantages, such as easy 
access to energy, resource and materials. Location advantages could also 
refer to low cost or well-educated labour in host countries. Moreover, they refer 
to physical and political infrastructure, including convenient transportation, or 
supportive industry policies. Furthermore, the potential and growing market of 
a host country was considered a locational advantage (Dunning, 2001). Raff & 
Von der Ruhr (2007) argue that marketing-seeking MNEs tend to expand their 
business where there exists a large customer base and potential market. For 
example, in service industries, such as banking, and retailing, market size and 
potential tend significantly to influence FDI flow. Resource seeking MNEs tend 
to choose locations with lower prices or scare resources. Efficiency-seeking 
FDI tends towards locations where low cost operations are possible. 
 
Much FDI research considers low labour cost in a host country to be one 
important factor, attracting FDI in traditional manufacturing industry, 
particularly in an efficiency-seeking labour-intensive industry (Pan, 2003), in 
order to provide the low cost competitive advantages. Skilled labour in a host 
country plays an important role in attracting FDI, particularly in high technology 
industry. Marketing, manufacturing, R&D, finance and administrative activities 
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require capable people. The availability of skilled labour allows MNEs to 
strengthen the ownership advantage they possess.  Market size and growth 
potential were important factors for both manufacturing and services FDI 
inflows, especially in strategies of marketing seeking. Hymer (1960) mentions 
that MNEs, which in his view operate in an oligopolistic market structure, 
where competition is intense, set up production and service operations in 
lower-cost locations that might provide the firm with the advantage it needs.  
 
The degree of international openness could influence the calculations on 
location advantage. The lower the degree of restrictions imposed by the host 
location on international trade, then the lower the cost of doing business is, a 
consideration critical to financial services (Moshirian, 1997). It follows that 
what are called institutional factors such as tax rates, depreciation schedules, 
tariff rates, capital controls, exchange rates, and government regulation could 
affect FDI inflows. For instance, in China, after WTO, the financial sector 
attracted many foreign direct investors in financial sectors, as restrictions lifted, 
and made the sector a possible avenue for investment. 
 
Dunning, inspired by Buckley & Casson’ s (1976) internalization theory, argues 
that firms through hierarchies control foreign operations, and coordinate, 
manage and leverage their ownership advantages in foreign markets in order 
reduce transaction costs, which are considered as internalization advantages. 
More specifically, an MNE’s internalization capability could help firms minimize 
costs, such as negotiating, search, moral hazard, adverse selection, and 
broken contract costs; protect the reputation of internalizing firms and limit 
ensuing litigation; capture the economies of interdependent activities; cope 
with low market demand; deal with government interventions, such as quotas, 
tariffs, price controls, and tax differences; control suppliers and conditions of 
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sale of inputs, plus market outlets; and engage in practices, such as 
cross-subsidization, predatory pricing, and transfer pricing as a competitive (or 
anti-competitive) strategy (Dunning, 2001).   
 
The Dunning’s OLI theory largely contributed to the international business 
studies. The OLI paradigm provides a theoretical framework to explain the 
motivation of MNEs to choose specifically location to expand its business. The 
main idea of Dunning’s model is that firm will engage in international 
production because it has specific ownership advantages, it can exploit in a 
specific location, and can internalize these ownership and locational 
advantages to increase profits or achieve strategic. Ownership advantages 
can be effectively transferred, exploited and protected by a managerial 
hierarchy and corporate control through a process of internalization. Also, 
locational advantages can help the firm to enhance its ownership advantages. 
Dunning realizes the importance of location advantages, However, Dunning 
overemphasizes how a parent MNE might influence its overseas subsidiaries, 
based on the headquarter-centred rationale of internalization, and ignores how 
overseas subsidiaries could begin to influence the parent firm or other 
subsidiaries.  
 
2.44 Criticisms of FDI theory 
Hymer asserts that FDI involves the transfer of managerial and other 
resources, not just finance capital. Hymer considers that FDI occurs as MNEs 
choose markets in which they own competitive advantages, for instance using 
technological or managerial knowledge not available to other firms operating in 
a given country. Hymer believes that firms with ownership advantages become 
multinationals by seeking to gain further monopoly positions overseas through 
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FDI, and that these ownership advantages overcome the difficulties of being a 
foreign business in a host economy. He left unsaid the organizational means 
that made the transfer of ownership advantages across borders possible, and 
he does not demonstrate how multinationals can develop their advantage 
(building capabilities and organization) once the initial act of FDI has taken 
place. Hymer’s theory does not identify why direct investment might be the 
preferred means of exploiting competitive advantages rather than exporting 
and licensing (Buckley, 1983, 1985, 1990; Buckley & Casson, 2002). Also, 
Hymer does not explain why MNEs chose to invest in a particular market or 
country rather than another. Furthermore, Hymer does not pay attention to 
how further ownership advantages might arise from the ability of firms to 
improve the allocation of resources or organize transactions, as experience, 
skilled management and ‘learning by doing’ begin to have impacts. 
 
The internalization theory provides a well-explained model to analyse the 
internationalization of MNEs. Buckley & Casson (1988) argue that the 
reduction of transaction costs explains the motivation of cross-border 
operations. They later suggest that MNEs reduce costs through strategic 
alliance of acquisition, merger or joint ventures, and effectively synchronizing 
production or market capabilities. Multinational firms organize their internal 
structure to avoid excessive transactions costs (Buckley & Casson, 2002). 
However, as internalization theory stresses the influence of managerial 
hierarchy from the parent company on overseas subsidiaries, it ignores the 
influence of subsidiaries and local agency on the parent company or other 
subsidiaries, especially as firms seek to be more organizationally global rather 
than parent-subsidiary in their overriding structures and strategies. 
Furthermore, it ignores the difficulties a parent company faces managing and 
internalizing the overseas subsidiaries, which are mostly locational such as 
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government, culture, regulations, poor infrastructure, human resource 
short-falls, institutions, and distance. 
 
Dunning’s OLI paradigm provides the framework to explain the motivation of 
MNEs choosing a specific location to expand its business. Dunning (2001) 
mentions the emergence of transition economies, such as China, and that they 
require modifications to the internalization idea and to the eclectic paradigms. 
Originally, Dunning considered that FDI mainly occurs to exploit the O specific 
advantages of investing firms, and that resource and capability flow went only 
from parent to subsidiary. In these cases, the strategic motive is asset seeking, 
in which subsidiaries are acquired for their capabilities, and the flow in 
resources or capabilities is from subsidiary to parent (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008).  
 
Overall, firm specific advantages have been considered as an essential 
condition for MNEs. The idea of firm specific advantage in the process of 
internalization is expressed in other theories as ‘monopolistic or oligopolistic 
advantage’ (Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1983; Vernon, 1979), and as the 
more economically positive ownership advantage (Dunning, 1977, 1980). The 
Hymer theory suggests that multinational firms’ monopolistic advantage 
enable them operate in overseas market. Dunning (1977) suggests that 
ownership advantages were developed domestically by the MNE and then 
applied overseas, although he acknowledges the growing role of asset seeking 
in later years. Buckley and Casson’s internalization theory suggests that the 
decision to invest and internationalize was not based on the extent of the cost 
of investing and operating overseas nor on ownership benefits of such 
investments and operations, but concerns the balance of total costs versus 
total benefits. This advantage might well be a non-monopolistic advantage – 
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that is, not a total advantage, but a net advantage - relative to other MNEs. 
However, FDI theories overemphasize the capability of the MNEs and its 
influence on overseas subsidiaries, and pay less attention on the impact of 
institutional, cultural and social contexts in home and host countries on a firm’s 
development. They stress the initial motivation and condition for FDI, and on 
the whole do not discuss management after the act of FDI. Furthermore, they 
ignored the fact that strategies, structures and practices might change over 
time, and the reasons for those changes.  
 
2.45 FDI theory and multinational banks in China  
The nature of the service industry differs from traditional manufacturing 
industry. However, according to some theorists, the principle of the theory is 
still the same (Casson, 1990). Sabi (1988) argue that the existing theories of 
FDI were sufficient to explain the determinants of services FDI, as does Chen 
(2009). Previous theory considers that a firm invests in overseas market so as 
to exploit ownership advantages, reduce transaction costs, or look for 
resources or markets in a particular location. In service FDI, the motivations of 
service MNEs were also driven by various factors. For example, traditionally, 
FDI was taken by service industries because firms move abroad to support or 
complement trade or overseas manufacturing clients, as an emergent strategy 
for testing ownership advantage in and entry into a foreign market (Chen, 
2009). After the initial stage, the motivation is similar to manufacturing FDI, 
which is to exploit ownership advantages in overseas market. Service MNEs 
ultimately also seek new clients, new markets or resources at a particular 
location, and exploit their own ownership advantages in foreign markets.  
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Dunning (1988) classifies the ownership advantages to three types, which 
included the ownership asset (Oa), ownership transcation (Ot) and ownership 
institutional assets. Dunning and Norman (1983) considers that the ownership 
advantages of service firms gain from their access to information and markets; 
economies of scale from spreading organizational and managerial costs over a 
larger market; and the extension of the goodwill that they posses from their 
brand names. Information and knowledge are intangible assets, which could 
provide service firms with their major competitive advantages (Dunning, 1988), 
such as, in banking industry, knowledge derived from experience in products, 
markets, clients, operational routines, and culture (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Jones, 
1997; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Those ownership advantages from 
service firms could also be classified within the OLI framework, as other 
industries.  
 
Most services need to be produced when and where they are consumed. 
Service firms need localized services or person-to-person contact for 
exchanging highly confidential information or for adapting to rapidly changing 
customer needs. Traditionally, many services MNEs expanded their business 
overseas after following their client from the home country. Servicing 
home-based customers in host countries is an important factor for services 
FDI inflow. The existing client resource was considered as a local factor to 
attract the service MNEs to operate its service in a particular market rather 
than others (Li & Guisinger, 1992). For market seeking or resource seeking, 
service firms can choose to expand their business in an overseas market. For 
example, many multinational retailers such as IKEA and Wal-Mart chose to 
enter China for its growing consuming market. Those location advantages for 
a service firm could also be classified in the OLI framework, as other 
industries.  
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In service industries, organizational learning, quality of managerial resources, 
and internal coordination were important factors for MNEs expanding overseas. 
But regulations and legal requirements may raise transactions costs and limit 
international trade in services. An effective managerial structure or business 
strategy could help to reduce transactions costs in foreign markets. For 
instance, Cho (1986) suggests that multinational banks believes that the 
transfer of capital, management, and technological assets of a bank from one 
country to another can only succeed if those assets are integrated with local 
knowledge of markets, policies, regulations, consumer behaviour, and the 
same condition applies where multinational banks seek to create new 
competitive advantages in a local market. The process would constitute 
localization but would also, as classified in the OLI framework, require the 
internalization of mixed practices in the overseas markets, a pattern familiar to 
other industries.  
 
Overall, existing FDI theories were sufficient to explain the international 
activities of service FDI. However, the existing FDI theories overlook the 
influence of overseas subsidiaries and local agency on the parent company 
during the internalization process, and ignore the difficulties faced by the 
parent company managing and internalizing overseas subsidiaries. They 
mainly focus on the flow of capabilities to overseas subsidiaries. However, in 
service industries, the need to adapt services to meet local markets and 
consumer behaviour will usually be greater than in manufacturing industry. 
Thus, there is a gap between existing FDI theories and service FDI, which are 
how multinational service firms respond and adjust their strategies and require 
the active involvement or local agency of subsidiary management to develop 
service products and networks in host country markets. 
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Cho (1986) considers that access to skilled personnel, managerial resources, 
favourable financial sources, efficient banking networks, knowledge and 
experience in multinational operations, expertise with a particular customer 
type, differentiation of banking products form the main ownership advantages 
in banking industry. Gray & Gray (1981), Casson (1990) and Cole (1998) state 
that the bank-client relationship and product development were particularly 
important as the main ownership advantages in multinational banking. Casson 
(1990) suggests that increasing FDI in manufacturing created demands for 
corporate banking overseas. Multinational companies prefer to use their 
long-term relationship banks with the same home country language and 
culture in order to reduce uncertainty, and the transaction costs generated by 
uncertainty (Engwall & Johanson, 1990). The nature of banking products 
suggests that it was the fear of losing existing banking relationships to a 
competitor bank that results in banks accompanying their clients abroad 
(Williams, 2002). The motive is not necessarily to earn profits in the new region 
but to prevent loss of an existing client (Kindleberger, 1983). Ellis (2000) 
argues that the bank-client relationship is one of the key elements in any 
bank’s strategy. Cole (1998) contends that expanding banks must prioritize 
product development. Product adaptation and localization are important 
features of product innovation in multinational banking. A bank’s innovative 
capability is related to its in-depth understanding of a local market and 
marketing abilities, as well as its product innovativeness. Multinational banks 
need to differentiate or innovate, by positioning products in a particular market 
or customer group. Also, Chinese local banks, coming from a state controlled 
and non-competitive market structure, are being forced to innovate and 
differentiate. 
 
Location factors in multinational banking include differences in regulatory 
structures, the desire of investors to separate currency from political risk, 
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following existing clients, information collection, effective interest rate 
differences, different economic situations, skilled labour, and size of potential 
market. In China, the government and regulatory institutions and cultural 
factors were considered especially important elements, influencing the 
investment behaviour of foreign banks. The China Banking Regulatory 
Commission imposes strict regulations on the operation of multinational banks 
in China, and many foreign companies found the situation operationally difficult 
(Chen, 2009). Moreover, it is hard for foreign banks to expand their business 
amongst Chinese clients as they lack networks based on personal contact 
(guanxi).  
 
Given the huge market size, multinational banks chose strategic alliances or 
joint venture as their entry mode, achieving quick access to local market 
resources and knowledge. Chinese banks are willing to cooperate with foreign 
banks to learn experienced managerial methods, advanced technology, and 
product development. China’s institutions largely determine the entry mode of 
foreign investors, too. Casson (1979) argues that internalization factors were 
the availability and cost of fund transfer within multinational banks; efficient 
customer contacts; transfer pricing manipulation; improved networks for 
information gathering; and potentially reduced earning variability. For foreign 
banks operating in China, how to cooperate with a local Chinese partner 
became critical. 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary  
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has been linked correctly to the 
success of the manufacturing sector and the export of industrial goods. The 
banking sector has similarly experienced reform since 1978, but, in its case, 
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change has been less complete, with the result that the Chinese government 
decided to appoint the CBRC to accelerate the development of capabilities 
and competitiveness amongst banking firms. During the period that followed, 
four of the five state owned banks have changed their ownership structure and 
have successfully been listed on the stock market. Large sized nationwide 
commercial banks such as CITIC have been restructured, as have medium to 
small sized regional banks. Capital and asset structures have been 
strengthened, although the quality of corporate information continues to be 
questioned.  
 
However, compared to world leaders, major Chinese commercial banks are 
still weak in terms of asset quality, business profitability, and service 
diversification. There is a long agenda to build a well-functioning financial 
system: enhancing the corporate governance of commercial banks; founding a 
reliable credit culture; skilled and qualified personnel; product development; 
and technological innovation. The Chinese government realized that foreign 
strategic investment would speed the restructuring and modernizing of an 
ailing banking sector, by bringing equity capital, risk management techniques, 
new products and services, and international standards of governance. The 
foreign investors were attracted by China’s rapid economic growth; the 
enormous market potential; and the opportunity to leverage a local bank’s 
name recognition, customer base and distribution networks. The CBRC 
encouraged foreign banks to establish strategic alliances with Chinese banks. 
With respect to the Big Four firms, the Bank of America invested in CCB, and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland invested in BOC; and, in the same year, Goldman 
Sachs, Allianz and American Express signed a memo of understanding with 
ICBC, agreeing to acquire a stake. The CBRC acknowledged that investing 
multinationals brought improvements in corporate governance, cost control, 
operation technologies, and growth sustainability. By 2006, there were 14 
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authorized financial institutions, which established 191 branches, 61 branch 
offices and 242 representative offices, either wholly owned subsidiaries, or 
joint ventures (Chen et al, 2009). 
 
However, factors frustrated the expectations of both the Chinese banks and 
the multinationals: long-standing problems of corporate governance, 
disclosure standards, asset quality, internal control in domestic firms, and the 
consequent increased caution by the foreign investors and decreased 
business cooperation. As a result, looking at the prospects of inward 
investment by financial multinationals, we can ask to what extent foreign 
investors could serve as the catalyst for improving the performance of Chinese 
banks. 
 
FDI theory tends to focus on the specific ownership advantages of MNEs, or 
on the locational advantages of nations, and less on how host economy 
contexts influence the firm’s development over time. Policy restrictions and the 
local cultural and business environment result in many uncertainties, and 
affect the development of foreign banking in China. Yet the huge business 
opportunities in the Chinese market still attract many multinational banks. The 
success of investments is related to the extent their knowledge and resources 
can be transferred and client networks are forged. To aid these processes, 
multinational banks tend to form strategic alliance with local banks. Chinese 
local banks in turn try to enhance competitive advantages by learning from 
foreign banks. The practical difficulties encountered raise questions as to what 
extent foreign banks do or can transfer ownership advantages to a Chinese 
partner, and about how Chinese local banks effectively gain competitive 
advantages through their joint venture. Can we in fact discern the impact on 
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operations at provincial and branch level? Furthermore, how does strategy 
change over time? 
 
This research examines theories and ideas relevant to explaining the 
development of the Chinese banking sector in the last ten years and the 
planned role of reformed banks (incidentally but crucially linked to the next 
stage of the country’s development). It considers the changing nature and 
structure of Chinese banking regulation, the use of inward FDI by 
multinationals with best practice know-how, and the extent to which they have 
or are able to transform firm level capabilities. As well as the topic of Chinese 
banking not being deeply researched, the existing literature so far does not 
combine these different perspectives to explain developments in China’s 
banks. This study will analyse the development of banks, in a transition 
economy such as China, where both government policy and regulation and 
FDI are being used to transform an underperforming but highly vital industry. 
The fieldwork therefore will be based on interviews with managers at the 
operational level in Hunan province for the banks chosen for study. It will 
investigate the extent and cause of change in product development for 
business and retail customers, customer service and relationships, marketing, 
and human resources and re-training. The evidence will provide the basis for 
assessing the importance of changes being introduced into Chinese banking, 
and the emergence of new local capabilities in response to policy initiatives 
and economic needs. The acquisition or development of capabilities can 
emerge from different sources, including global or overseas best practice. In 
asking how the Chinese banking industry can acquire and develop new 
capabilities, the thesis reviews first the possibility of imitating the path followed 
by much of the country’s manufacturing: learning through inward FDI and joint 
ventures. It is, theoretically, possible to transfer capabilities from a 
multinational to an overseas subsidiary or partner in services as well as 
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manufacturing, and this is especially true of internal capabilities such as 
systems, managerial knowledge, or technology. Nonetheless, services are 
more reliant on building networks external to the firm and on developing their 
services in conjunction or in response to local customers, that is they are 
relatively more location specific and context driven. Service firms may need to 
prioritize the creation of intangible capabilities in skills or knowledge with which 
to create locationally specific and responsive products or services. Moreover, 
while the potential for cross-border alliances can be positive, banking in China 
remains subject to a high degree of government control and regulation. The 
evidence suggests that multinationals have established relations as investors 
with the headquarters of banks, but that institutional arrangements have 
limited the levels of investment and the impact of the multinational transfer of 
capabilities at the local or operational level. We need to compare, therefore, 
the influence of FDI and multinational capability transfer alongside the 
influence of the CBRC, and, as improvement occurs, whether firm level 
strategy and management and market and technological factors have an 
increasing role in the development of firms. 
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Chapter 3 
Government, Institutions and Strategic Capabilities 
 
Following quickly from the creation of the three policy banks, the 1995 
Commercial Bank Law of China enabled every firm to compete in all sectors of 
the banking industry, prohibited local governments from intervening in the 
commercial decisions of banks, and allowed foreign multinational banks to 
enter China through the formation of joint ventures. While many banks did take 
the opportunity to diversify, local governments still interfered in banks from all 
sectors of the industry, and foreign multinationals remained uncertain about 
operating a business in China and a result proved to be reluctant investors. 
The decision to join the WTO, in 2002, was a turning-point: the Chinese 
government established an institution, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, to supervise the banking sector more effectively, to provide 
regulatory protection against foreign competition for the short-term, and over 
the longer term to enhance the capabilities of domestic firms so that they 
would be in a position to compete in a more market-orientated scenario. 
 
From 2003, the CBRC encouraged the banks to form strategic alliances with 
foreign multinationals from which they could learn management know-how and 
advanced technologies. At first sight, the policy seemed to imitate the joint 
venture policies, which had underpinned the growth of the manufacturing 
sector, but in fact the restrictions on ownership and the influence on 
decision-making were more strictly controlled. Moreover, the investment and 
commitment of the foreign multinationals declined within a few years, but the 
influence of the CBRC as an agent of change within the industry grew. 
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As a late developing economy, the state has played a key role in China’s 
modernization, by implementing five year industrial strategy plans, reforming 
state owned enterprises and employment contracts, and facilitating and 
overseeing inward investment by foreign multinationals. The concept of the 
developmental state is important in our understanding of China’s economic 
transformation, and, in Asia, government has undertaken an essential role in 
the early stages of industrialization in matters of technology, infrastructure, 
skills, and finance. One key component of industry strategy is the control and 
regulation of banking and finance to ensure the flow of cheap capital to major 
industrial and infrastructure projects. The developmental state has to create a 
set of viable institutions that can help and not stall the process of economic 
transformation. In China, the big four state-owned banks were given 
responsibility for supporting different areas of national development, but it was 
becoming evident that they and the local banking system had systemic 
weaknesses, which had the potential to undermine the country’s long term 
prospects. 
 
Government is the most important institution in any nation, as well as being the 
overseer of a country’s institutions. In addition to passing laws and setting 
regulations, it controls or shapes the destinies of finance, education, and the 
labour market, with the result that it has the power to influence the nature of 
management and business. Furthermore, in developing economies with weak 
market mechanisms, its influence is necessarily more direct and extensive. For 
a highly influential body of management theory, it is the national institutional 
factors that are the most fundamental influence on the organizational 
characteristics of firms and on the behaviour of entrepreneurs or managers. 
Ultimately, they explain why business practices differ between nation states. 
But empirical work is needed to show exactly how the interaction of institutions 
and firms can lead to improved performance. In institutional analysis, there is a 
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lack of case evidence on both institutions and firms, and nothing of note that 
directly shows the interaction of reforming institution and firm. While, as 
happened significantly in China, FDI can be used to transfer management 
know-how and technology to indigenous companies, there is a need to trace 
how institutions can facilitate the process and to show how firms can increase 
their capabilities. The aim of economic development, moreover, is to promote 
indigenous firms and skills, and not to remain reliant on foreign technology and 
management. What type of institutions and firms are required to achieve this 
ultimate goal? 
 
In China’s banking industry, regulations have determined the entry mode, the 
strategic choices of foreign banks, and the areas of business activities open to 
national or local banks. The CBRC has become the prime institutional 
instrument of the central government, prohibiting the interference of local 
governments, and seeking to replace the influence of other government 
agencies or state owned enterprises. It attempts furthermore to guide the 
relationship of banks with foreign investors, which were not allowed in 2003 to 
found subsidiaries. There exists a large and important management literature 
on national institutions, and the ways in which institutions can determine the 
nature of firms and their practices. In the next section, we will survey this body 
of literature, and ask to what extent its premises can explain the firm-level 
characteristics and the development of banks in China. One aim of this thesis 
is to explore directly the links between institutional ideas and the enhancement 
of firm-level capabilities, and this chapter will explore too the literature on 
strategic management, firm resources, and capabilities. We can examine how 
effective a top-down institutional process has been in innovating management 
practice and diversifying firm-level capabilities. In the last chapter, we 
considered the impact of FDI and transferred capabilities on economic 
transformation, and the extent to which this process could explain Chinese 
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banking. National institutionalist literature by its nature has found it difficult to 
accommodate international factors or the impact of powerful multinationals. 
This thesis will consider elements of the debates on institutions and FDI that 
have been comparatively overlooked, and it will consider to what extent 
institutional pressure, multinational investment, or firm-level strategy and 
agency can account for the evolution of Chinese banking in the period since 
2003. 
 
3.1 Institutions and Institutionalism  
One of institutionalism’s origins lies in long-term economic analysis that asks 
the fundamental question why some countries industrialized and developed 
and others did not. Those countries, which established systems of government 
and law that allowed entrepreneurs to capture the benefits of their activities 
and so avoided rent seeking flourished. In other words, they provided the 
conditions that allowed markets to function effectively. Davis & North (1971) 
consider an ‘institutional framework’ as ‘the set of fundamental political, social, 
and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange, 
and distribution’. North (1990) states that institutions are ‘the rules of the game 
in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction.’ He further explains that the institutional framework signals 
to organizations, which choices are acceptable and supportable, and 
institutional influences are mixture formal and informal constraints. DiMaggio & 
Powell (1983), however, reject the rational-actor model, and coined the phrase 
new institutionalism or neo-institutionalism to look at how firms must conform 
to the social norms. Scott (1995) follows this line of reasoning and considers 
institutions as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour.” Formal constraints 
include political rules, judicial decisions, laws, and economic contracts. 
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Informal constraints refer to socially sanctioned norms of behaviour, which are 
embedded in culture and ideology. It is because markets are imperfect that 
institutional norms are part of the realities of firm strategies and practices 
(Harriss, Hunter, & Lewis, 1995). 
 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1987) also take the view that a set of 
values and norms exist outside of firms and influences how the firm is 
managed and structured. Many scholars consider that firms who adapt to 
institutional pressures tend to obtain more scarce resources and show a 
higher survival rate than those that do not (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Singh, 
House & Tucker, 1986). Furthermore, and especially in the context of 
emerging markets where institutional change can be more common and more 
pronounced, those firms that respond to such changes are more likely to 
survive. Greenwood & Hinings (1996) argue that developments in the 
institutional context require adjustments in ‘value commitments’ inside 
organizations leading to organizational change. When institutional change is 
too dramatic or sudden, it is difficult to acquire the needed new value 
commitments and to find the right new organizing template. A key core 
competence for a firm, therefore, is an ability to adjust to transformations in 
external conditions, and to assimilate new external information based on 
experience of the previous context. 
 
Neo-institutionalism focused on the formal and informal nature of national 
institutions and how they shaped firms. Organizational practices evolve over 
time through the actions and interests of those involved, and may become path 
dependent (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kostova, 1999; Szulanski, 1996). But it is 
institutions that determine the nature of organizational practices and induce 
high levels of homogeneity (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). DiMaggio & 
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Powell (1983) define three forces that account for institutional pressures, 
which are coercive, mimetic and normative forces. Coercive forces involve 
matters of law and obligation, while mimetic highlight the tendency of one 
organization to copy the successful practices of another. Normative forces 
deal with the desire to aspire to established social norms, and can refer to a 
kind of professional socialization and the acceptance of standard 
organizational models. It would follow that the subsidiaries of multinationals 
would be subject to national institutionalist pressures and in the long term 
adopt the practices of local firms. Similarities in practices across organizations 
would be expected as a result of isomorphic pressures (Eden, Dacin &Wan, 
2001; Gooderham, Nordhaug & Ringdal, 1999). What the neo-institutionalist 
perspective overlooks, however, as we shall investigate later, is that home and 
host country factors determine the nature of multinational subsidiaries. 
 
Whitley’s national business systems approach differs in that it begins with an 
analysis of firms rather than institutions. He describes a national business 
system a ‘relatively stable and cohesive configurations of firms and markets 
whose characteristics are, to a considerable extent, mutually interdependent 
and reinforcing. By definition, then, they do not change frequently or rapidly’. 
He then adds: Since national business systems ‘become established in 
particular institutional contexts and are interdependent with dominant 
institutions, substantial changes in business systems are unlikely to take place 
in the absence of major institutional changes’. Although the analysis is not 
top-down, the main point is that firms are deeply embedded in their institutions, 
and the idea that institutions determine the structure of firms and the nature of 
management practices remains, as in the case of the neo-institutionalist idea 
(Whitely, 1999). As each nation and its institutions differ, they explain why 
each business system varies to an important degree (Whitley, 1992; Whitley, 
1999; Whitley. 2000; Morgan & Whitely, 2003; Hill, 1995). The national 
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business system approach – sometimes called European Institutionalism – is 
associated with the societal effect approach (Sorge, 1991). Critics have noted 
how both institutionalism and the national business systems approach depend 
on an institutional determinism that ignores the human agency of 
entrepreneurs and managers and the influence of firms on institutions and 
markets. They allow little scope for firm level, industry or regional variations, 
and offer little explanation of how institutions themselves change over time 
(Smith, McSweeney & Fitzgerald, 2008). The variety of capitalism (VOC) 
approach incorporates the importance of human agency and firm-level action 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001), but nonetheless the flow of determinant influences is 
one way and top-down, that is from the national institutions downwards to 
business. 
 
One further point of criticism is that, if institutions exert such strong isomorphic 
pressures, then from where do sources of innovation and changes emerge. 
Moreover, how can the emphasis on the power of national institutions 
accommodate the fact of international influences and global best practice? In 
particular, the subsidiaries of multinationals have the duality of cross-border 
integration and national responsiveness, and they must deal with the parent 
company control with its home nation influences and with host country 
institutions. In their later institutionalist writings, there was some attempt to 
accommodate these issues while retaining the central perspective. 
 
For example, Whitley (2000) considers how home and host business systems 
will shape the transfer of business capabilities by a parent multinational to a 
subsidiary. He specifies four outcomes, depending on the relative strengths of 
host institutions and multinational practices, with some subsidiaries showing a 
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better fit with local or international practices, but where some adjustments are 
required. Whitley argues that the transfer outcomes could be influenced by the 
degree of institutional difference between home and host. When there is less 
difference between home and host institutional contexts, the organization 
forms and practices could transfer to the subsidiary wit minor alterations. 
When there are high institutional differences between home and host 
institutional contexts, however, the subsidiary firms tend to adopt local practice. 
While, therefore, Whitely allows for multinational influence on subsidiary 
practice, in the long term it is the national business system that will be 
determinant. Similarly, the societal effect approach sees that the host country’s 
institutional context could eventually transform the transferred business model 
once characterized by the home institutional system (Sorge, 1991). 
 
Morgan, Whitley & Kristenson (2001) and Morgan & Whitley (2003) present a 
range of transfer scenarios, depending on the strength of local institutions, or 
the ability of a multinational to achieve high degrees of cross-border 
integration. Strong institutions and low integration levels will see institutions as 
determinant, and weak institutions and high integration will bring the opposite 
result. Moreover, strong institutions and high integration levels will generate 
extensive examples of hybridity and variation. The degree of institutional 
difference between home and host economy explains the ease with which 
capability transfer occurs, and so large institutional differences imply greater 
transfer problems and more hybrid and innovation forms. Morgan (2003) 
proposes the concept of ‘transnational space’ which MNEs can create in their 
host country operations and within which they can develop innovative 
organizational forms. Institutions may still act nonetheless as constraints on 
the diffusion of international practices (Child & Tsai, 2005; Kogut, Walker & 
Anand, 2002). 
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While some authors have argued that institutional pressures in the host 
economy are the major factor determining subsidiary practices, others take the 
view that powerful multinationals and globalizing forces are increasing 
impactful (Beyer & Hassel, 2002; Morgan, 2003; Morin, 2000). Some authors 
have looked at subsidiaries rather than institutions or the parent multinational 
to explain the nature of management practices. While institutional and parent 
multinational influences can be strong, it is the agency and interests of 
subsidiary managers that explains the wide variety of management practice 
outcomes and numerous examples of hybridity. The power of subsidiaries is 
related to its capabilities and to its hold over valuable or scarce resources to 
which the multinational seeks access (Birkinshaw, 2000).  
 
Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) accept that MNEs face both isomorphic 
pressure from the local institutional environment and cross-border pressure to 
achieve internal consistency within their organization. They state that the 
organizational structure and practices of subsidiaries could vary depending on 
the degree of pressure from local factor and the effort of the parent company to 
exercise control. Kostova (1999), Kostova & Zaheer (1999), and Kostova & 
Roth (2002) argue that Rosenzweig and Singh focus on transfer outcomes and 
ignore the transfer process, which will be affected by ‘institutional distance’ 
(the degree of difference between home and host institutions) and ‘institutional 
duality’ (the extent a subsidiary must comply with parent company practices as 
well as operating in the institutional context of the host country). Kostova & 
Roth (2002) refer to the ‘institutional profile’ of the host country (such as 
government policy, and legal requirements) and ‘relational context’ (the 
relationship between multinational and subsidiary), which will both affect the 
process of capability or practice transfer. Other relevant factors are the 
relationship between MNCs and their host environment as determined by 
notions of legitimacy and degrees of liability in being foreign (Kostova & 
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Zaheer, 1999; Lawrence, Hardy & Phillios, 2002; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 
1997). 
 
Rosenzweig & Singh (1991), Kostova (1999) and Kostova & Roth (2002) 
question the homogeneity of business practice implied by institutionalism in 
the long term, although they accept that context will cause adjustments to 
transferred business models. Westney (1993) argues that the transfer process 
can create innovation with firms. He defines four types of transfer process, 
which are ‘elimination’, ‘internalization’, ‘functional equivalents’ and 
‘organization creation’. Elimination refers to the host country factors forcing a 
rejection of the transferred model or altering others that are not wholly suitable. 
Functional equivalence refers to those parts of the original model that can be 
transferred because they can still operate in the host nation. Internalization 
refers to transferring elements of the original model appropriate to the host 
context, and simultaneously altering others. Organizational creation refers to 
the host country supporting the transfer of the multinational’s model, which 
would require the powerful firm with needed capabilities that will help transform 
the local economy. Westney notes that the uncertainties of home and host 
factors or lack of knowledge can influence organizational practices and forms 
and bring about the hybridization of transfer outcomes. In other words, there 
are intended and unintended processes. He contends that firm could create 
innovations when facing pressures from local and home contexts to create the 
best practice. He considers too that parent company make the strategic choice 
to alter their original model in order to meet local requirements and as a 
consequence may achieve innovations. Institutionalism views institutions as 
determining organizational structure, management practices, strategic choices, 
the entry mode of MNEs, and the process of capability transfer to foreign 
owned subsidiaries. It tends towards the hybridization of transferred practices 
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based on both home and host country’s institutional variations, cultural 
differences, market differences and the level of economic development. 
 
Institutionalism sees business as ultimately homogenous within a single 
context, and underplays differences between regions, industries and firms. Its 
tendency to determinism leaves little room for agency, or for firm level strategy 
and differentiation. The transfer of capabilities by multinationals suggests at 
least the possibility of hybrid outcomes in managerial practice, as the original 
model accommodates host country institutions or subsidiary level agency. 
Peng & Heath (1996) and Peng (2000) consider that, since no firm can be 
immune from the institutional framework in which it is embedded, then an 
institution-based view of business strategy is necessary. Peng (2003) states 
additionally that the internal growth of firms can be institutionally constrained in 
emerging economies, and, as a result, firms depend on organizational and 
personal networks, as witnessed by the prevalence of guanxi in China. Peng 
(2002) defines ‘institutions’ as those factors related to the dimensions of 
national context such as culture, government, and social interactions’, and 
both formal and informal institutional influence play important roles. In 
particular, he explores the relationship between institutions and multinational 
practice transfer, and how the process of practice transfer shapes the 
relationship between the headquarters and the subsidiary. He focuses on the 
firm, and analyses institutional forces as external factors in the evolution of 
practices and strategies. He allows for the notion of the large-scale 
transformation of national systems through institutional transition (Peng, 2000, 
2002, 2003). 
 
Oliver (1991) argues that institutions can facilitate strategy, and holds that 
firms with adaptive abilities can move beyond institutional constraints. Firms 
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can change their institutional environments by developing strategic responses 
instead of adapting passively. On the other hand, in transition economies, 
institutional patterns from the previous system may continue to shape firm 
practice, a form of institutional inertia (Peng, 2000; Newman, 2000; Whitley & 
Czaban, 1998). Management theorists pay attention to institutional 
frameworks because they have a large influence on corporate and managerial 
behaviour, and, potentially, on key strategic decisions or developments. It is 
interesting, therefore, that strategic management theorists have overlooked 
institutional influences on strategic choices, and not adapted their approaches 
to the circumstances of transition economies in particular. They have tended to 
consider the ‘task environment’, taking account of market conditions or 
technological drivers, but not institutional features. Child (1972) states that 
business strategy needs to ‘recognize the exercise of choice by organizational 
decision makers’. Therefore, institutions have to be treated as independent 
variables. Strategic choice is the result of the dynamic interaction between 
institutions and organizations, as well as the industry conditions and firm 
specific resources that traditional strategy research has emphasized (Barney, 
1991). Strategic calculations must look too at the formal and informal 
constraints of a particular institutional framework (Oliver, 1997; Scott, 1995). 
 
More recent views of strategy – most obviously, the resource based view or 
RBV – asserts that firms develop internal capabilities and resources that can 
overcome environmental or external constraints, as well as the threat of 
competitors. A market-based institutional framework – as in the case of the US 
- can be contrasted to that of a government-led institutional framework 
prevailing in emerging or transition economies; where institutions or markets 
are underdeveloped or do not function fully, a personal relationship-based 
framework (guanxi in China) may also be relevant. Institutionalism has focused 
on the influence of institutions on organizations, and we can view these 
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influences as determining strategic choices. The determining nature of 
institutions on business organizations and strategies may be especially 
important in Asian contexts, and even more so in the case of China, where the 
central and provincial governments are deeply involved in the running of the 
economy, and where political contacts and personal networks are important to 
all entrepreneurs and key managers (Hollingsworth et al, 2000). Research on 
Asian economies has shown that institutions matter especially, and that more 
needs to be done to specify exactly how they matter, in which contexts, to what 
extent, and in what ways. Institutionalism involves the rejection of 
rational-actor or an efficiency-orientated model, but research into Asia in 
recent years has attempted to merge the two approaches, assimilating 
differing perspectives of North and Scott (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Although 
we can debate the mechanisms, the degree of influence, and the need to 
consider other factors, institutions must have an impact on the structure, 
practices and efficiency of businesses (Oliver, 1997; Scott, 1995). As we shall 
see in the instance of China’s banking industry, institutional factors are 
strongly influencing the development of firm-level capabilities. 
 
Child & Lu (1996) believe that institutional realities – as well as other factors – 
slowed state owned enterprise reorganization and economic reform in China. 
Most studies of institutional change on the internal operations of firms in China 
have concentrated on state owned enterprises (Lau, Qian & Roland, 2000). 
Such an interpretation runs counter to the developmental state model, in which 
the state as a set of institutions must act as a market substitute to initiate the 
process of investment, technological enhancement, industrialization and 
growth. In emerging economies, we can argue that institutions are 
comparatively strong in relation to organizations and firms, and that, as 
markets mature, then transaction costs and concepts in strategic management, 
most obviously the RBV, become more relevant. Jefferson & Rawski (1994) 
	   82	  
aver that industry reform in China was the result of a market-led withdrawal of 
government controls, and increased property rights that provided the incentive 
for change. In reality, emerging economies often show elements of 
marketization and privatization mixed with strong institutions and regulations, 
and both have the potential to shape the business strategies of enterprises. 
Moreover, different institutions change at different rates, and so the effects can 
be complex. There is a tendency in analysing institutional influences to see 
institutions as static in relation to dynamically developing firms, but institutions 
constantly evolve, sometimes by design, and can have either a positive or 
negative impact on the strategic capabilities of firms. 
 
How, therefore, can we explore the connection between institutions and 
strategic choices? Emerging economies and China in particular are sound 
testing grounds to explore the interaction of institutions and firm-level strategy. 
We can look at how multinationals act within host economies in the light of 
institutional change, and how local firms can build a sustainable competitive 
advantage in response to institutional initiatives. It is likely that to achieve the 
most favourable research results that longitudinal and case based approaches 
would be necessary. Furthermore, as we can expect the interactions between 
institutional change and firms to produce varied results, then there is an 
advantage in focusing on one institution but on several case firms. Hoskisson 
et al. (2000) note the role of the RBV in understanding emerging market 
contexts, in which existing managerial skills or technologies may not fulfil the 
transition to a market economy. The issue then is how do firms acquire such 
resources? In the meantime, domestic firms remain vulnerable to international 
competition or to FDI by multinationals. Yet joint ventures and strategic 
alliances may, they suggest, be the means of expanding firm-level capabilities 
(Hitt et al, 2000). The emphasis in the extant literature remains on institutions 
being a constraint and on global or overseas factors being a source of 
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economic change. The model portrayed has validity in many contexts, 
including industrialization since the open door policy from 1978 in China, but, 
as we have indicated, the interactions between institutions, firms, and 
multinationals in the banking sector are more complex. For the next step, we 
will discuss the concept of strategic capabilities, strategic capabilities in the 
service and banking sector, and the capabilities banks in China are seeking to 
develop. Subsequently, we can ask which factors are shaping the strategic 
development of China’s banks, and to what extent these factors are 
multinational, institutional or management led. 
 
3.2 Strategic Management  
This section will discuss the early development of strategic management and 
its main theories and frameworks: briefly surveying the design school’s SWOT 
analysis and the positioning school’s five force’s framework, the generic 
competitive strategies, before analysing the Resource Bases View and 
Dynamic Capability approaches at greater length. 
 
3.21 The prescriptive schools 
Mintzberg et al. (1998) describe how the prescription schools are more 
concerned with the formulation of strategies than the nature of the strategies 
themselves. The prescriptive schools are amongst the early writings on 
strategic management, and they introduce many strategic management terms, 
such as competitive advantages, competitive strategies, industry analysis, and  
the SWOT. The following paragraphs will discuss the design school and the 
positioning school. 
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3.22 The design school 
The design school is considered as the foundation of strategic management 
theories as most of the key strategic management terms were introduced by 
this school during the 1970s, such as distinctive competence and competitive 
advantage. ‘It provides the central notion that underlies the prescription in the 
field of strategic management, namely that strategy represents a fundamental 
fit between external opportunity and internal capability’ (Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
One of the key concepts of the design school is the SWOT framework: 
strength, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Johnson et al., (2005) state 
that the SWOT analysis provides the key terms of the business environment 
and the strategic capability of an organization that are most likely to influence 
on strategy development. This framework is founded on matches between the 
internal environment, the firm’s strength and weakness, and the external 
environment, its opportunities and threats.  
Figure 3-1: Design School’s Perspective on Strategic Formulation  
 
Source from: (Andrews, 1971) 
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The SWOT analysis provides a framework for firms to evaluate its strengths 
and weaknesses, as well as the external environment according to which it 
should implement and adjust its strategy. The SWOT made a great 
contribution to the theoretical development of strategic management by 
arguing that strategy represents a link between external factors and internal 
factors. However, there are two main disadvantages of the SWOT framework. 
One is that it does not help to identify the priority of any of the factors (Johnson 
et al., 2005). Grant (2002) states that it could be difficult in practice to 
distinguish between strengths and weaknesses and between opportunities 
and threats.  
 
3.23 The positioning school 
The positioning school developed the external framework to analyse how it is 
the basis of firm competitive advantages: it considers the attractiveness of an 
industry in which a firm competes and its relative position in that industry from 
which it can derive the greatest competitive advantage. Porter introduces two 
frameworks: the five forces framework and the generic competitive strategies. 
Porter’s five forces include the bargaining power of buyers, the bargaining 
power of suppliers, the intensity of rivalry, the threats of new entrants and the 
threats of substitutes (Porter, 1980). Porter’s five forces presents a tool for 
firms to analyse the external environment to help firms to face treats from 
within its industry. 
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Figure 3-2:  Five Forces Framework  
 
 
Source from: (Porter, 1980) 
 
However, there are weaknesses in the five forces model. Firstly, it 
overemphasizes the influence from the external environment, and puts less 
emphasis on internal factors. Secondly, similarly to the SWOT analysis, it 
helps to present all the relevant external factors; however, it does not identify 
the importance of any factor in a particular case. It also does not point out how 
a firm can overcome its disadvantages, which in Porter’s model are by their 
nature deeply embedded (Johnson et al., 2005). Thirdly, the Porter’s five 
forces underplay other important external factors, which could influence an 
organization’s development, such as the influence of government.  
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The premises of the positioning school focus on firm profitability, which are 
influenced by the growth, and profitability of industries, as well as by the 
strategic position of any firm within an industry. Porter (1985) states that a 
firm’s relative position within its industry determines its profitability is above or 
below the industry average. There are three generic competitive strategies: 
cost leadership, differentiation and focus that a firm could follow to have better 
than average performance in its industry. Porter (1985) states that ‘if a firm 
could achieve and sustain overall cost leadership, then it will be an 
above-average performer in its industry provided it can command prices at or 
near the industry average’. Porter (1985) argues that ‘a firm that could achieve 
and sustain differentiation will be an above-average performer in its industry if 
its price premium exceeds the extra costs incurred in being unique.’ The focus 
strategy asks the firm to choose either cost leadership or differentiation in a 
narrow segment of the market to pursue superior profits. One of the most 
important contributions of the positioning school could be its idea of strategic 
choice.  
 
There are limitations in the generic competitive strategies. Firstly, Porter 
considers the cost leadership strategy to help firms to gain competitive 
advantages. Bowman (1991) argues that the generic competitive strategies do 
not give a clear boundary between ‘low price’ and ‘cost leadership’. He further 
explains that competitive strategy should combine price and customers 
perceived use-value’ rather than choosing lowest costs with average prices. 
Secondly, Porter argues that a firm could choose one of three strategic 
choices. Miller (1992) argues that he does not explore the possibility and 
necessity of moving from one strategic choice to another. Furthermore, Miller 
considers that ‘ strategic specialization may leave serious gaps or weakness in 
product offerings, ignore important customer needs, be easy for rivals to 
counter, and, in the long run, cause inflexibility and narrow an organization’s 
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vision’. In practice, firms do adopt mixed strategies, and the combination of 
differentiation and cost leadership could be considered as a hybrid strategy. 
Thirdly, Schmaleness (1985) and Rumelt (1991) state that Porter 
overemphasized the importance of external factors and industries in 
determining firm performance. Opportunities and threats in external 
environments take precedence over the internal questions of resource and 
capability impacts. They both highlight the importance of firm-specific features 
influencing firm performance. Firm strategy needs to consider both external 
and internal elements.  
 
3.3 Resource Based View 
3.31 The development of RBV 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, strategic management concentrated on how 
firms should respond to external factors, such as competition within an 
industry, consumer demand, or technological advances, and how firms adjust 
product development, operations, marketing and support services accordingly 
to achieve a sustained competitive advantage. Firms respond strategically to 
opportunities and threats outside the firm in an industry by identifying and 
utilizing the resources they control, and, as a result, it is the external 
environment that influences a firm’s development. By the 1980s, researchers 
began to question the idea that firms developed resources and capabilities 
predominantly in response to external factors, especially since such a 
mechanism would not explain why a firm might produce resources and 
capabilities that are rare or unique when compared to a rival operating in the 
same environment. The Resource Based View seeks to provide an answer by 
concentrating on how firms evolve their internal capabilities, and, in a reversal 
of previous interpretations, on how the resulting competitive advantage has an 
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impact on the external environment. As we will see, if we look at trends in the 
Chinese banking sector, the strong institutional framework affects firms 
similarly, but the long-term objective is to create differentiated firms with their 
own competitive internal capabilities. 
 
The RBV School can trace its origins to the seminal paper written by Coase 
(1937), which explained the rationale behind firm growth through transaction 
cost analysis, although the work of Penrose (1959) more obviously shows the 
historical antecedents. Penrose interprets the firm as a set of resources. She 
argues that expansion involves either exploiting existing resources or looking 
for new ones. It follows that a lack of resources - such as labour, machinery, or 
finance – will limit growth. For Penrose, the key resource for expansion is 
managerial capacity, just as the fundamental block on expansion is the lack of 
managerial capacity. Chandler, in his historical analysis of the emergence of 
large corporations in the US, and then in Britain and Germany, also 
emphasizes the key role of management in the growth of the firm and in the 
effective supervision of mass manufacturing and marketing (1962, 1977, and 
1990). Williamson (1975) developed transaction cost analysis to understand 
the growth of large-scale firms, and considers resources to be physical capital 
(plant, equipment, raw materials), human capital (training, experience, skills), 
or organizational capital (formal reporting structure, coordinating systems). 
 
Wernerfelt (1984) is the first person to use the phrase ‘resource based view’. 
He divides resources into the two categories of tangible assets, such as plant, 
technology, or capital, and intangible assets, such as brand name, in-house 
knowledge of technology, skills, or trade contacts. Wernerfelt mentions the 
concept of first mover advantages. In some cases, a firm can own a resource 
that gives it a positive position over those firms that do not own the resource at 
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a particular point in time. In these situations, a resource holder enjoys the 
protection and advantage of a resource position barrier. However, Wernerfelt 
does not illustrate how to exploit existing resources nor how to develop new 
ones. Furthermore, he does not show how to manage the firm’s resources 
over time. He does not point out how to set up a structure or system, which can 
help a firm to execute its strategy. 
 
Barney (1991)’s contribution to the RBV is to clarify how a firm can use its 
resources to attain and sustain a competitive advantage. He makes this link by 
formalizing the VRIN framework, which stands for value, rarity, imperfect 
mobility and non-substitutability. He has two fundamental assumptions: that a 
firm develops heterogeneous resources to differentiate itself from competitors 
and that these resources are imperfectly mobile between firms. Barney argues 
that a firm’s resources can influence strategy as well as its development. To 
achieve this outcome, a firm resource must have four attributes: it must be 
valuable, in that it exploits opportunities and/or neutralizes threats within a 
firm’s environment; it must be rare among a firm’s current and potential 
competitors; it must be imperfectly imitable by other firms; and it cannot have 
strategically equivalent substitutes within other firms that are valuable unless 
they are also themselves rare or imperfectly imitable. Barney, therefore, 
develops ideas on the resource based view based by stating that firms within 
an industry (or group) may be heterogeneous with respect to the resources 
they control, and that these resources are imperfectly mobile across firms, with 
the result being that heterogeneity can be long lasting. 
 
Grant (1991) states that resources – from capital equipment and skills to 
brands - are inputs into the production process, but he adds that productive 
activity requires the coordination of teams of resources. He argues that a 
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capability is the capacity for a team of resources to perform a productive 
activity. Grant offers a comprehensive categorization, differentiating between 
financial, physical, human, technological, reputational, and organizational 
resources. He notes in addition differences between tangible resources, such 
as equipment or finance, and intangible ones, such as skills or brands, with 
tangible resources being much easier to transfer, imitate or replicate than 
those that are intangible. His next step is to define the relationship between 
capability and resource: ‘a capability is the capacity for a team of resources to 
perform some task or activity. While resources are the source of a firm’s 
capability, capabilities are the main source of its competitive advantages’. The 
RBV explains how resources and capabilities are connected to a firm’s 
competitive advantages. Not all resources can help firms to gain competitive 
advantages, implement valuable strategies, or improve effectiveness and 
efficiency, unless, as we have seen, they are inimitable and non-substitutable 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986). Grant is additionally concerned with 
sustained competitive advantages, which is affected by the four factors of 
durability (not prone to obsolescence), transparency (extent to which a 
capability can be understood or imitated by a competitor), transferability (the 
ease with which a capability can be acquired by a competitor), and replicability 
(the fact that some capabilities cannot be easily copied in another context or 
by another firm). Grant, finally, notes that the RBV deals with the deployment 
of existing resources, and that there is a need in the long-term to generate new 
resources. 
 
Fahy (2000) follows Barney and Grant in seeing the RBV as the need for 
management to identify, develop and deploy key resources in order to 
maximize returns, and in emphasizing the importance of what he terms 
sustained competitive advantage (SCA). Fahy, nonetheless, is wary of the 
confusion created by the different uses of terminology, and, to resolve this 
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problem, he distinguishes three distinct sets of resources - tangible assets, 
intangible assets, and capabilities. Tangible assets refer to the fixed and 
current assets of an organization which have a fixed long-run capacity, such as 
plant, equipment, land, stocks, and bank deposits, or capital good generally. It 
is relatively easy to measure the value of tangible assets, in which the 
ownership of the firm is apparent. In terms of generating long-term advantages, 
tangible assets are transparent or easily understood or imitated by rivals, and 
they are relatively weak at resisting duplication efforts. Intangible assets 
include intellectual property, such as brand, company reputation, trademarks, 
patents, company networks, and databases. It is difficult to measure the value 
of intangible assets tend to be difficult to measure. Many capabilities are 
interaction based, and, for that reason, they tend to be even more difficult to 
duplicate and measure. The inherent complexity and specificity of their 
accumulation hinder imitability and substitutability, at least in the short run. 
Capabilities involve teamwork, organizational culture, trust between 
management and workers, individual or group employee skills, and 
organizational routines, and it is through capabilities that the entire firm’s 
resources are coordinated. Some individual skills may not be highly inimitable 
and non-substitutable, but complex organizational routines and interactions 
most certainly are. Resources become a potential competitive advantage 
when applied to an industry or a given market, but they do not confer a 
sustainable competitive advantage by themselves. Fahy emphasizes the 
emergence of management as a resource in identifying, developing and 
deploying the three types of resources appropriate within any particular market 
environment, and creating the SCA that generates a superior performance in 
market share, sales, returns, or profits. Theorists define a firm’s given 
resources as leading to competitive advantages, and competitive advantages 
as stemming from resources. One way out of this difficulty is to look at how the 
firm creates new resources over the long term. Arguably, factors such as the 
complex interconnectedness of resources and causal ambiguities can explain 
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the inimitability of resource accumulation by a specific firm. However, it is 
possible that a firm develops out-dated technologies or its responses within 
industry sector in decline make it less flexible. In which cases, path dependent 
resource trajectories can turn into disadvantages. 
 
There are various definitions of competitive advantage, but the concept 
essentially concerns the advantage a firm has over competitors in a given 
market or industry (Day & Wensley, 1988; Kay, 1993). Porter (1985) says, 
however, that a sustained competitive advantage (SCA) is one that is shown to 
last a long period of calendar time. Others regard see the idea of calendar time 
as demonstrating rather than explaining SCA, and concentrate on the danger 
of any competitive advantage being easily duplicated and consequently 
short-lived (Lippman & Rumelt ,1982). When a firm is said to have a SCA, it is 
implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented 
by any current or potential competitors, and implies that other firms are unable 
to duplicate the benefits of this strategy (Barney, 1991; Barney, McWilliams & 
Turk, 1989). One firm’s sustained competitive advantages limit both 
opportunities for current competitors and for potential competitors interested in 
entering the industry. When all efforts to duplicate an advantage have ceased, 
its sustainability is validated (Barney, 1991). 
 
Clulow, Gerstman & Barry (2003) consider that Fahy’s framework can be 
applied to financial service industry. Tangible assets could be buildings, which 
can be imitated, and personnel, which, since people can move between firms, 
is not imperfectly mobile, and their competitive advantage has the potential of 
being short lived. Intangible assets could be client trust, networks and 
reputation, which are difficult to imitate because they result from accumulated 
firm-specific activities, and accrue over time. Intangible assets may facilitate 
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the acquisition of tangible resources, for example, when personnel seek to join 
a firm with a high reputation. Capabilities could be team-embodied knowledge, 
organizational culture and history, which are also difficult to imitate. Clulow, 
Gerstman and Barry consider capabilities to result from team interaction and 
established organization routines, and, within financial services, therefore, it is 
not easy to replicate knowledge, experience, and judgment, even when 
personnel transfer to another firm. 
  
The RBV emphasizes internal firm level capability as determining competitive 
advantage as opposed to aligning capabilities in response to the external 
environment. From the RBV, a firm’s resources and capabilities determine 
business strategy and long-term competitive success. A firm evolves its 
strategy by developing and exploiting the internal resources and capabilities 
that allow it to be competitive. It could be argued that in manufacturing firm can 
make a product by utilizing its internal resources and capabilities without 
interacting directly with a customer. However, in delivering a service, a firm 
has to interact with a customer directly, and so it requires greater attention to 
developing resources and capabilities externally. For example, an automobile 
firm can train personnel in manufacturing processes in accordance to set 
routines, internal to the business, but a major part of human skills in services is 
concerned with client interaction and responding to more specific requirements. 
Networks, client relationships and reputation depend, amongst other things, on 
the very fact of interaction between personnel resources and clients. 
 
In the Chinese banking sector, in which the market environment is highly 
regulated, the banks have little flexibility in deciding how to respond to external 
developments. Chinese banks seek to improve their internal resources such 
as experience, innovations, managerial ability and technological know-how in 
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order to secure and increase their position within this controlled if changing 
environment. Since tangible assets such as personnel are not perfectly 
immobile, they do not offer sustained competitive advantage, but intangible 
assets in client networks, trust and reputation do offer that possibility, being 
firm-specific, difficult to imitate precisely, and accrued over time. Capabilities in 
team-embodied knowledge, organizational culture and history are similarly 
hard to imitate. Lippman & Rumelt (1982) argue that physical technologies or 
tangible assets tend to be imitable, but human assets tend to be hard to imitate 
because of scarcity, specialization, and tacit knowledge. 
 
In the retail-banking sector, there is relationship between interaction with 
clients and the building of internal capabilities. Discovering the cause of 
change in banking strategy and practice in China remains problematic, 
however. Chinese banks have also interacted with strategic FDI partners in 
order to enhance their capabilities, and they must respond to the policies of the 
China Banking Regulation Commission, which seeks to encourage higher 
levels of competitiveness. We can also see the government and the CBRC as 
an external and interacting institutional force for change on the internal 
capabilities of the banks, as might their efforts to build client networks and 
reputation. 
 
Resources such as client relationship, networks, brand reputation, technology, 
product, information, employees’ experiences are particularly important in the 
service industry. In later sections, we will need to detail these resources, and 
consider how their interaction with each other may be associated with hard to 
imitate capabilities and sustained competitive advantage. The framework 
provided by Fahy (2000) – the division of resources into tangible assets, 
intangible assets and capabilities – seems particularly suited to explaining 
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bank strategies. Because of the service or banking industry context, therefore, 
as well as the institutional context of the Chinese banking sector, some 
adjustment of the traditional RBV of strategy may be needed. As well as 
tracing the causes of strategic change, moreover, we need to look at how the 
banks have shifted from one level of capability to another over time, for which 
the Dynamic Capabilities Approach will have useful insights. In industries such 
as banking industry, it is difficult to define sustainable advantages, and 
competitive moves are rapidly imitated. For the purpose of discussion in this 
thesis, sustained advantage does not refer to a particular period of calendar 
time nor does it imply that advantages persist indefinitely (Gunther McGrath et 
al, 1995), but it depends on the possibility and extent of competitive duplication. 
How successful have Chinese banks been in developing inimitable capabilities 
and resources, and are we able to show that they can have a long-term effect 
on the evolution of this industry? 
 
3.32 Limitations of RBV 
Later work on the RBV attempts to deal with the links between a firm’s 
resources, capabilities and competitive advantages, but questions remain 
about definitions and about showing specifically how the interaction of 
resources, capabilities and competitive advantages affects the strategic 
development of a firm. By turning attention to the internal dimensions of a firm, 
the RBV ignores the impact or influence of the external environment, and, 
while it does provide some indication of what is meant by sustained 
competitive advantage, the processes by which particular resources might 
provide competitive advantage over time are not clearly delineated (Priem & 
Butler, 2001). The RBV deals with the use of resources and capabilities at a 
point in time and with the generation of competitive advantage. Therefore, the 
RBV has not fully explained how and why certain firms have a competitive 
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advantage or can maintain a competitive advantage in situations of rapid and 
unpredictable change. In summary, there are concerns about the lack of 
empirically grounded research that proves which resources actually contribute 
to competitive advantage through the implementing of suitable strategies 
(Mosakowski & McKelvey, 1997; Williamson, 1999; Priem & Butler, 2001). 
 
Prahalad & Hamel (1990) take a particular interest in the bundling of resources 
which most RBV scholars classify as yet one more capability amongst others. 
They do this because they regard the bundling of key resources as the 
constituent of what they term ‘core competences’. Core competencies refer to 
the integration of skills, knowledge and technology that enable an organization 
to provide a particular benefit to customers. They further define core 
competence as the consequence of the ‘collective learning of the organization, 
especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple 
streams of technology’. Others support them by depicting these core 
competencies as a major source of competitive advantage (Nelson & Winter, 
1982; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990). Prahalad and Hamel’s statement can alleviate 
a critique of the RBV - the lack of specificity - because the core competence 
perspective specifically focuses on the bundling of skills and technology as a 
core competence leading to competitive advantage. As with the RBV, rival 
firms must find such core competencies difficult to imitate (Reed & DeFillippi, 
1990). The core competence concept, on the other hand, shares some of the 
problems detected in the RBV: the inattention to the influence from external 
factors and the process of organizational learning over time. Core 
competences cease to be competitive if changes in the external market are 
extensive and if a firm fails to learn and adapt overtime. The RBV only 
considers a firm’s resources and competitive advantages at a point in time, 
and fails to consider the processes through which specific resources provide 
competitive advantage over a sustained period (Priem & Butler, 2001). The 
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idea of core competence suffers from one of the drawbacks of the RBV, 
namely lack of empirical demonstration. 
 
Barney et al. (2001) discuss that the resource based view (RBV) could be 
applied to a wide range of management areas such as strategy planning, 
human resource management, marketing, organizational behaviour and 
international business. For example, the RBV might provide a theoretical 
explanation of a firm’s diversification strategy, by pointing to the need for firms 
to develop new products and enter new markets where the resource 
requirements are matched by resource capabilities (Andersen & Kheam, 1998; 
Foss & Eriksen, 1995). Nonetheless, the precise mechanisms and illustrations 
of these processes in practice are not fully proven. The RBV has contributed 
most in the past years to the area of strategic human resource management 
(SHRM) (Wright, Dunford &Snell, 2001). As a result, people are seen as an 
important resource for a firm’s development, and there is a convergence of 
strategy and HRM issues. The RBV would argue that specific human capital 
skills contribute to the competitive advantages of firms, and that individual 
employee behaviour could improve or detract from a firm’s SCA. Wright et al. 
(2001) suggest that core competence or capabilities serve as a bridge 
between the emphasis in the strategy literature on who provides sources of 
competitive advantage and the focus in the HRM literature on the process of 
attracting, developing, motivating, and retaining people. So far, there is no 
empirical research to test whether HRM practice is path dependent, causally 
significant to a firm’s development, able to impact the skills and behaviour of 
firms, difficult or easy to imitate, or closely linked to competitive performance. 
 
In the area of marketing, Fahy (2000) suggests that, from the RBV, customer 
demand and opinions are important resources that could help to create 
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competitive advantages. For instance, customer demand is a resource that 
could help a firm to develop products. However, further work is required to 
identify how particular market-based assets and capabilities generate and 
sustain specific forms of customer value. So far, few researchers have 
touched the areas of corporate governance through the RBV. From one 
perspective - the issue of ownership - corporate governance is concerned with 
a dimension that is external to the firm, and as a result those interested in the 
RBV have tended to overlook this aspect. The other perspective focuses on 
the internal dimensions of firms, and RBV scholars have debated whether 
corporate governance could be a source of competitive advantage, and they 
have specifically considered the operation and effectiveness of boards (Short 
et al., 1999). 
 
Peng (2001) argues that the RBV could support international theory that seeks 
to explain market entry strategies and other dimensions of a multinational 
corporation, including strategic alliances, international management structures, 
and emerging market strategies. For example, in analysing the motivations 
behind a strategic alliance, local firms might aim to acquire certain resources 
not available to their domestic rivals, while a multinational might tend to 
acquire certain resources to assist international diversification. Some scholars 
investigate the linkages between the RVB and the institutional environment. 
Oliver (1997) argues that the institutional environment could have an important 
impact for firm business strategies. Peng (2002) emphasizes the importance of 
institutional factors in emerging economies. He argues that none of the 
internationalization studies he reviewed directly measures organizational 
learning as an intangible resource. In empirically grounding the RBV, 
management information systems, ethics and corporate social responsibility, 
and organizational behaviour would all gain from further investigation. 
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3.4 Dynamic Capabilities 
The RBV is concerned with the importance of specific resources in creating 
competitive advantages that contribute to a firm’s development. It does not 
clearly explain how firms could achieve competitive advantages by 
implementing a fresh value-creating strategy, which cannot be easily 
duplicated by competing firms, because of the development of valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable resources. There is no general agreement on 
what constitutes the best single approach to the development of SCA. 
Therefore, Teece at al., (1997) suggest the idea of the dynamic capability 
approach (DCA). 
 
The DCA refers to the abilities of a firm to achieve new competitive 
advantages, or, as Teece et al., (1997) state, the ‘dynamic that refers to the 
capacity to renew competences to achieve congruence with the changing 
business environment’. They continue: ‘innovative responses are required 
when time to market and timing are critical, the rate of technological change is 
rapid, and the nature of future competition and markets difficult to determine’. 
The DCA emphasizes the role of strategic management in selecting, adapting, 
integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, 
resources and functional competences in order to meet the needs of the 
changing environment. Dynamic capabilities are the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build and reconfigure existing internal resources and external competences, 
and to create new competitive advantages for the firm within its industry. They 
underpin the ability to achieve new and innovative competitive advantages. 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) argue that dynamic capability becomes the source 
of sustained competitive advantage (SCA). They state that some dynamic 
capabilities deal with the integration of certain resources that can create 
competitive advantages, while other dynamic capabilities focus on the 
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reconfiguration of resources within firms to create new sources of competitive 
advantage, sometimes even requiring collaboration among various parts of the 
firm to achieve new and synergistic resources. Kogut & Zander (1992) bring in 
the concept of combinative capacities to describe organizational processes by 
which firms synthesize and acquire knowledge resources, and generate new 
applications from these resources. 
 
The DCA shifts the emphasis to the configuration and reconfiguration of 
resources and competencies in order to achieve and sustain competitive 
advantage (Teece et al., 1997). Dynamic capabilities are specific strategic and 
organizational processes that create value for firms by manipulating resources 
into new value-creating strategies. They are a set of processes to identify and 
enhance a firm’s best practices. The RBV focuses on existing resources and 
competencies (Grant, 1996), but the DCA is interested in generating and 
recombining new value-creating resources and competencies (Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1994; Teece et al., 1997). Grant (1991) defines capabilities as 
teams of resources being made to work together in the interests of a firm’s 
strategic development, and, therefore, capabilities involve complex patterns of 
coordination between people and resources, as well as learning through 
repetition (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000). For instance, managers could 
combine new technologies and knowledge of customer feedback to create a 
new product. 
 
The DCA accepts that firms respond to external factors to create or combine 
internal resources to create completive advantages, which the RBV tends to 
ignore. The DCA, in certain respects, can incorporate Porter’s positioning view. 
Firms must generally create dynamic capabilities, as opposed to buying them, 
in order to ensure their uniqueness. But, since firms overall aspire for ‘best 
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practice’, they may be commonalities across firms, and so dynamic capabilities 
tend to be more homogenous and substitutable than the capabilities described 
in the RBV. Eisenhardt & Martin state that ‘since the functionality of dynamic 
capabilities can be duplicated across firms, their value for competitive 
advantage lies in the resource configurations that they create, not in the 
capabilities themselves’. Dynamic capabilities are necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions for competitive advantage. Despite common features across firms, 
particular resource configurations ensure that no firm’s dynamic capabilities 
are exactly alike another’s. However, as with the RBV, it is difficult to identify 
and isolate what exactly is a dynamic capability or the dynamic processes that 
generate new value-added activities. The SCA similarly lacks empirical 
grounding (Williamson, 1999), and problems remain with figuring out which 
resource or competitive advantage has been created by which dynamic 
capability. While we might describe how dynamic capabilities build up ‘best 
practice’ within the firm, the extent to which other firms can duplicate remains 
unclear. The DCA does add the dimension of a firm’s strategic development 
over time, but it does not give lucid guidance on the processes by which a firm 
moves from one stage of competitive advantage to an enhanced position. 
 
3.5 Strategic Capabilities and Chinese Banks  
Many scholars have investigated the RBV of strategic management, and 
looked at its implications for areas of management such as marketing or 
human resources. Bharadwaj et al. (1993) attempts to integrate ideas about 
SCA into the service industry, and does so notably in marketing and strategic 
management. However, there are few investigations demonstrating empirically 
how resources are formed or utilized. This gap in our knowledge applies 
particularly to services, and this sector’s particular reliance on intangible 
assets and capabilities makes it harder to investigate or evaluate (Fahy, 2000). 
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As a result, we need to track the development of resources and their ability to 
produce competitive advantages over time (Fiol, 2001). Such an approach 
would additionally elucidate how external and market factors influence 
changes in a firm’s resources and capabilities. There is no general agreement 
on what constitutes the best single approach to the development of SCA. 
 
Dynamic capabilities are related to the gain and release of resources, which 
might involve alliance with and acquisition of other firms, in order to bring in 
new resources. Many Chinese banks have formed strategic alliances with 
foreign multinational investors with the aim of learning new resources and 
creating new competitive advantages. Dynamic capabilities involve the 
reconfiguration of resources, the acquisition of resources or their transfer, 
through internal processes or through the development of external 
relationships. Client relationships are themselves a vital resource for banking 
firms, but they also an external source of information and feedback, which can 
shape product development, itself a process of reconfiguring internal 
resources. Highly skilled employees are a key resource in the service sector, 
and their abilities are at the centre of creating new products and strengthening 
client relationships. Resources can be recombined to develop or utilize 
technologies that can provide new or better services to clients, resulting in the 
improvement of client relationships. Personal contact and interaction are 
important to the developing of networks and client relationship, and they have 
to be nurtured over a long time. Long term and value adding relationships with 
clients, which constitute a unique service that cannot easily be imitated or 
substituted by rivals, offers firms a sustainable competitive advantage. 
Moreover, as they are an intangible asset, and a complex set of combined 
resources, they are doubly difficult to replicate or substitute. If we look 
specifically at the Chinese banking industry, domestic firms have accepted 
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investments by foreign multinationals in the hope that such strategic alliances 
can enhance capabilities through learning. 
 
Prahalad & Hamel (1990) refer to central, strategic capabilities as ‘core 
competences’, which are the collective learning in the organization, and they 
especially emphasize the coordination of diverse production skills and the 
integration of multiple streams of technology. Teece et al., (1997) state that the 
value of core competences is enhanced when combined with the appropriate 
resource. The degree to which a core competence is distinctive depends on 
how well endowed the firm is relative to its competitors, and on how difficult it 
is for competitors to replicate its competences. In the highly regulated Chinese 
banking sector, most firms provide similar services and products; therefore, in 
the long term, it has become important for Chinese banks to develop their own 
core competences to differentiate themselves from rivals and to possess a 
competitive advantage. Recent reform of regulatory institutions has had a 
significant external impact on the attempts to develop knowledge and 
capabilities. 
 
In the service sector, intangible resources tend to be more important for a 
firm’s development than in the case of manufacturing. In banking, internal 
resources include managerial capabilities, knowledge of clients and market, 
product expertise, and financial strength. Moreover, external influences on 
these resources are indeed shaped by market changes, but institutional and 
government factors are notably important too. Banking is knowledge and 
human skills intensive. In the Chinese banking industry, there is a need to 
focus on the areas of human resources, client and customer relationships, 
product development, information technology, and the role of institutions, 
governance, and markets. 
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3.6 Chapter Summary 
The major view in institutional analysis is that national institutions – 
government, finance, labour markets, or education systems – have the most 
important influence on the nature of business systems and management. 
Some authors have nonetheless addressed to what extent global or 
multinational factors can shape firms in the short or long term, given the level 
of institutional pressures that will exist. In the case of the banking industry in 
China, FDI has proved a channel for transferring the best or latest 
management practices and technologies, but, compared to the manufacturing 
sector, the impact has been less and other factors have been more evident as 
the driving force for change. Since 2003, the CBRC has enforced reform of the 
Chinese banking industry and its practices. On the other hand, its objective 
has not been to enforce traditional or embedded practices, but to use its 
supervisory powers to introduce international or foreign approaches that are 
representative of global best practice. Moreover, what the case of the CBRC 
and Chinese banking indicates is the importance of looking at institutional 
transformation, especially in a transition economy, and especially since the 
relevant theory pays little attention to the institutional evolution. We do not see 
a situation of contrasting stable Chinese institutions and rapidly developing 
international practices, but a context in which institutions, international 
influences, and domestic managerial practice are all fluid. 
  
From the view of management strategy, approaches such as SWOT or 
Porter’s five forces and generic competitive strategies are based on the idea 
that the external environment is determinant, and that firms make internal 
adjustments to achieve a fit with these exterior factors. In their perspective, the 
external environment is associated with markets and technologies, but not the 
institutional determinants evident in the relationship established between the 
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CBRC and Chinese banks. In other words, strategic management can usefully 
give a central place to institutional factors in explaining the emergence of 
capabilities that give a sustained advantage. As we shall see, when we look at 
the cases of Chinese banks, the CBRC has not only pushed improvements in 
practices and performances, under the same regulatory framework, but 
allowed firms to undertake strategies that provide differentiation from each 
other strategy. Institutionally determined change brought about the 
development of Chinese banks and the use of international ‘best practice’, as 
well as promoting more competition from local commercial banks and, still to a 
much more limited extent, multinationals. The aim is to enhance the 
capabilities of the Chinese banks and to prepare them for the international 
competition. 
 
The resource-based view tends to focus on a firm's internal capabilities as 
determining business strategy. It argues that firms evolve capabilities and 
unique sustainable competitive advantages internally, and subsequently 
shape the marketplace. The importance of internal development is 
acknowledged, but so too is some measure of external influence, particularly, 
in Chinese banking, is we add institutional perspective. The DCA might be 
valuable in the analysis because it accepts the role of external factors. The 
DCA is less certain than the RBV about the uniqueness or inimitability of 
resources, but views managers or firms as creating unique combinations of 
internal resources which offer long term competitive advantage, and as doing 
so partially in response to external factors. The DCA, in certain respects, can 
incorporate Porter’s positioning view, but emphasizes responses to the market 
or technological environment and not the institutional. Firms must create 
dynamic capabilities in a way that ensures their uniqueness. But, since firms 
overall aspire for ‘best practice’, they may be commonalities across firms, and 
so dynamic capabilities tend to be more homogenous and substitutable than 
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the capabilities described in the RBV. Eisenhardt & Martin state that ‘since the 
functionality of dynamic capabilities can be duplicated across firms, their value 
for competitive advantage lies in the resource configurations that they create, 
not in the capabilities themselves. Dynamic capabilities are necessary, but not 
sufficient, conditions for competitive advantage’. In the banking service, 
dynamic capabilities may refer creating and maintenance of customer 
relationships, product and service innovation, organizational learning often 
through training, and human resources. The business strategy may be a client 
driven strategy, a product driven strategy, or multi objective strategy. In terms 
of Chinese banking, with its strong regulatory institutional framework, Chinese 
banks are being challenged to develop dynamic capabilities to achieve higher 
degrees of differentiation and competitiveness. The extent to which they have 
been able to achieve such differentiation, notably within a strong institutional 
structure, is a major question for the thesis.  
 
The RBV and DCA can be linked with the ‘O’ advantages of the OLI framework, 
by defining the nature of resources and capabilities to build ownership 
advantages. The RBV helps to explain the motivation of the Chinese 
government and Chinese banks, because of the need to improve the 
resources and capabilities of firms. It helps explain too the motivation behind 
allowing FDI and strategic alliances with overseas banks. An MNE with 
superior capabilities might through a strategic alliance with a local firm acquire 
local market based resources, and exploit and develop its competitive 
advantages in a host economy. The RBV in particular can include the idea that 
Chinese banks accepted foreign investment to learn about and to imitate the 
practices and capabilities that they lacked. The DCA is more focused on how 
firms transform existing resources and capabilities, or ‘O’ advantages, in 
response to market changes. The DCA supports the notion that capability 
might change over time. 
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Overall, under the control and guideline of the China Banking Regulation 
Commission, Chinese banks need to develop capabilities in management, 
skills, technology, products, and client relationships. The process has been 
top-down, with the CBRC working through the company headquarters. The 
main issue for the future is to what extent local agency and initiative will be 
able to replace the current high levels of regulatory control, and the 
implications of this desired transformation for the nature of firm level 
capabilities. 
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Chapter 4  
Research Methodology 
There is, as we have seen, a shortage of research on the Chinese banking 
industry, and no studies taking a detailed empirical investigation of individual 
banks. While there have been numerous studies looking at the impact of 
inward FDI on manufacturing businesses, the role of foreign multinationals in 
Chinese banks is comparatively under-explored. Mainstream FDI theory 
acknowledges the importance of political, market, and institutional factors 
alongside the role of the parent multinational, yet it has stimulated little 
case-based research demonstrating how these factors interact at the level of 
the subsidiary. Institutionalist theory emphasizes the effects of formative 
national institutions on firm-level management practice, but the literature offers 
limited insights into how such external factors directly shape the evolution of 
business strategies and internal organization. This thesis uses ideas from the 
resource based view (RBV) of the firm in order to define and describe the 
resources and core capabilities of Chinese banks, and compares the extent to 
which they have changed during a period of institutional and regulatory change 
and the instigation of inward FDI into the industry. It subsequently utilizes 
perspectives from the dynamic capabilities approach (DCA) in order to 
evaluate to what extent FDI, government policy and institutions, market, 
technological, and local management and agency determined the evolution of 
resources and core capabilities in the five case studies under investigation. 
 
The research questions were generated through an analysis of the existing 
literature on Chinese business and specifically the service and banking sector, 
and through an understanding of influential theories on FDI and institutions. As 
noted, the case-study approach was adopted in order to provide responses to 
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the research questions. It was important, too, to examine the type of 
information and data needed to answer a set of research questions, and the 
practicability of conducting the research topic and securing the information and 
data needed. This chapter will explain the research design and chosen 
research methods, ethical considerations, and tests of validity and reliability for 
the empirical analysis and frameworks. It will mention in particular the use of 
pilot studies to frame and reframe the research questions, and how a shift in 
the theoretical framework became necessary. 
 
This chapter includes six sections. The first section compares and contrasts 
quantitative and qualitative methods, and discusses why this research chose 
the latter. The second section explains the choice of the multiple case studies, 
and the third explains the criteria used for the selecting cases. The fourth 
section outlines the data collection process and the analysis. The fifth section 
explores the advantage and disadvantages of the research design, which is 
followed by the sixth section summarizing the chapter.  
 
4.1 The Choice of Qualitative Methods 
Polonsky & Waller (2005) define quantitative research as based on 
measurement and the use of mathematical, numeric, and statistical models to 
offer probabilistic estimates of findings. Quantitative methodology tends to 
gather a large amount of data, and use the results of statistical tests or multiple 
regressions to generate conclusions. An advantage of quantitative methods is 
producing numerical reliable results regarding the interrelationship between 
variables (Creswell, 2003). Flick (2006) argues that quantitative research does 
not provide data that facilitates deep understanding of events, cases, and the 
complex factors shaping these events or cases. Neuman (2000) argues that 
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quantitative research often separates the research objects from their context, 
which limits their capacity to discover or explore initially unknown variables. 
Wright, Beamish & Lane (1988) state that quantitative methodology has been 
criticized for its failure to understand social, cultural and political contexts. 
Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009) define qualitative research as 
non-numerical and providing rich or in-depth resources for research. Creswell 
(2003) suggests that qualitative research methods provide more ‘in-depth’ 
information. Leavy (1994) believes that qualitative methodology focuses on 
change and process and on description and explanation; tends to gather data 
first-hand; and emphasizes the details of organizational life. These goals suit 
the study of Chinese banks, the development of their strategic capabilities 
since 2003, the extent to which they been successful in their aims, and the 
main cause of their transformation. 
 
Overall, either of the main approaches combines advantages and drawbacks. 
Therefore, the choice of method depends on the nature of the study, the 
research objectives, and the research questions, as well as how the data 
required is to be presented. Yin (1994) argues that the qualitative research 
method is best adopted for answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions. 
Parkhe (1993) states that the quantitative method suits answering research 
questions with ‘who, what, where, how many or how much’. The quantitative 
approach for indicating the causal relationships between variables, but as less 
able to understand the interactions between inner forces and the outer context, 
which are hard to measure by quantitative methods, By contrast, qualitative 
methods allows researchers to experience the context, to improve their 
understanding of the phenomenon, and to achieve valuable insights. 
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The research in this thesis investigates the process of the development of 
management practice, linking a firm’s past, present and future. In explaining 
Chinese banking reform, we are interested in management processes, 
communication, strategic decisions, their implementation, and their revision. 
This research concerns three main forces external to the firm and one force 
internal to the firm, and required in-depth understanding of banking 
organizations. It argues that quantitative methodology could not adequately 
investigate the variables and processes in Chinese bank reform, the varied 
result of human decision-making and interaction. Holdaway (2002) argues 
further that the qualitative method is suited to finding unexpected insights that 
emerge from the context of the research object. 
 
This study chose a qualitative research design to investigate the impact of 
multinational investment, institutional regulations, and emerging firm level 
capabilities on the operations of China’s banks, particularly in the areas of 
management and organization, human skills, client and customer relationships, 
product development, technology, and the development of retail and business 
services, which necessitated in depth opinions, thoughts and information, 
rather than numerical data. Qualitative research is more suitable for this 
research, as it allows access to the rich context of the research object, 
providing details for an in-depth analysis of the participants’ opinions, and 
greater scope for conclusive findings and understanding (Easterby & Thorpe, 
2002). It would be not be possible or productive to define, measure or 
manipulate the data under study, which would have been the basis of 
quantitative research. 
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4.2 Qualitative Multiple Case Study Approach 
In social science research, Yin (2009) states that each method has its 
advantages and disadvantages, the choice depending on the type of research 
questions, on the control an investigator has over the events being researched, 
and on whether the focus is on contemporary as opposed to historical 
phenomena. Eisenhardt (1989) agrees that the case study strategy is 
particularly suited where researchers seek a deeper and richer understanding 
of the unit or event being studied. Yin (2003) takes the view that the case study 
strategy can be used for explanatory as well as descriptive research, because 
it can answer the questions ‘why?’, ‘what?’ and ‘how’?. A case study strategy 
is considered as an effective way to define, explore, analyze, and challenge 
existing theories, and to build a new theory. This study investigates the 
development of China’s banking industry. It looks at the role of government 
and the institutional regulation of banks, and at the impact of foreign 
multinationals on the organization and capabilities of firms. One of the 
objectives of this research is to answer the question ‘why’ the Chinese banking 
industry is undergoing rapid change in its management and business practices. 
Another is to answer the question ‘how’ those factors influence the 
development of Chinese banks, as well as ‘what’ strategies Chinese banks 
have used or could use to improve the competitive advantages. A qualitative 
case study method could evaluate the organizational setting whose complex 
influence could not be easily quantified. Therefore, case study is the 
appropriate methodology for research into the changing characteristics of 
Chinese banks. 
 
One key component of case study is to define what the “case” is and how 
many cases are needed to substantiate the objectives (Yin, 2009). The unit of 
analysis is related to the initial research questions. A single case is normally 
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conducted where it represents a unique, or, alternatively, a critical or typical 
case, or if it offers a chance to observe, investigate and analyse a 
phenomenon that few have considered before. Multiple cases are normally 
conducted to find out whether findings could be generalized (Maylor & 
Blackmon, 2005). Multiple case studies have obvious advantages compared to 
singe case study. Evidence from multiple cases is often considered more 
compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust 
(Yin, 2003). 
 
In investigating how and how successfully Chinese banks have attempted to 
develop their strategic capabilities, this research considers the main causes of 
the transformation, FDI and government regulatory institutions, and their 
influence on practices at the operational branches. Through multiple cases, 
and despite strong external determinants, we have discovered diversity in 
those practices and in the inter-relation between the factors involved. Multiple 
case studies provided data to compare and contrast how Chinese banks 
enhanced their strategic capabilities, and the variations and complexities in the 
dynamics of hybridization might have been neglected or downplayed. The 
banks are studied in their general and particular contexts, in which multiple 
forces from outside and inside the firm might influence the development of 
management practices over time. Multiples cases require extensive research 
resources and time compared to a single case study. Yin (2003) states that a 
multiple case investigation can address the research questions and issues 
emerging from the first case and guide the investigation of subsequent cases. 
 
Replication logic can be used in multiple case studies. Upon uncovering a 
significant finding from a single case, a priority would be to generalize findings 
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by conducting a second, third, and further cases, in the hope of predicting 
similar results. Some replications might attempt to duplicate the exact 
conditions of one case, but other replications might alter factors in one or two 
cases if considered unimportant to the research objectives (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). However, Hagg & Hedlund (1978) argue that the qualitative 
case study approach has limitations in establishing research objectivity, 
lacking generalizability, statistical reliability and validity, and only generating 
hypotheses but not testing them. Yin (1994) states that the validity and 
reliability of the case study approach could be constructed and enhanced by 
carefully designed research protocols and data analysis measures. Silverman 
(2000) believes that case study approach is not suitable for the generalizing of 
findings, but demonstrates particularity. Yin (2003) contends that using 
multiple sources of evidence such as semi-structured interviews, observation, 
and company documents and academic journals can enhance the validity of 
the qualitative multiple case study approach. He argues that the tactic of 
replication logic means that the case selection is made on theoretical rather 
than representative grounds to enhance analytic generalization. Analytic 
generalization could be achieved by carefully selecting cases based on the 
theoretical replication logic and comparing the empirical result of the case 
study with a previously developed theory. Yin (2003) states that finding the 
same results between cases and a theoretical replication could be claimed 
when the predicted difference is recognized across cases findings and 
achieves a literal replication. In the multiple cases study approach, every case 
needs to be selected base on the overall research objectives, and to achieve 
both literal and theoretical replications to strengthen the overall analytic 
generalization of the cases. This research chose five cases, comparing and 
contrasting their similarities and differences. Yin (2003) states that the 
similarities in the findings can achieve a literal replication and the differences 
can be used to create theoretical replications, strengthening the analytic 
generalization. Before all these replication procedures, the most important 
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step is to develop a rich theoretical framework. The framework needs to guide 
under which conditions a particular phenomenon tends to be found (a literal 
replication) and which conditions it is not likely to be found (a theoretical 
replication). 
 
4.3 Selection of Cases 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that the selection of sample cases in a quantitative 
approach follows random sampling and statistical analysis on the distribution 
of variables within the population, in contrast to the qualitative method, which 
identifies diverse cases in order to extend a theory. Pauwels & Matthyssens 
(2004) argue that the multiple case study does not achieve statistical 
significance and external validity, but develops theory through analytic 
generalization. Yin (1994) states that a theoretical sampling approach to 
selecting cases will enhance “replicative reliability”, and that replication can be 
achieved by obtaining similar results from all selected cases. To minimize the 
variation, case selection needs to be based on selection criteria. This thesis 
chose five cases based on the theoretical sampling approach based on the 
following selection criteria. 
 
Firstly, it was decided to study banks to be found in the province of Hunan. As 
it was important to analyse the development of banks at an operational level, 
there were practical considerations in limiting the geographical scope of 
investigation. Access to banks and their management was furthermore 
paramount, and the researcher had built a network of contacts in Hunan. The 
market and local context would play a role in the transformation of banks, and 
there is wide variation in the nature and economic development levels of 
China’s many provinces, suggesting the value of conducting inter-firm 
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comparisons within one province. Hunan is not as developed as many of the 
coastal provinces, but has achieved measures of industrialization and 
urbanization to stimulate demand for banking services. Therefore, any case 
selected had to have operational branches in Hunan. Secondly, for reasons of 
comparison, it was decided to select different types of banks. In the Chinese 
banking system, the former directly and current indirectly state-owned national 
banks account for the vast majority of China’s banking business. Alongside 
these are the newer and growing national commercial banks, established after 
the 1980s, and which have became the second largest players in the banking 
industry. Moreover, there is an expanding number of provincial commercial 
banks, serving local and regional markets, and growing organically and 
through mergers. As a result, the selected case firms had to cover state owned 
national banks, the national commercial banks, and the provincial banks. The 
mix of cases reflected the weight of the state owned national banks within the 
industry, but included examples of other categories. Investigations revealed 
that the state owned China Construction Bank, the Bank of China, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank, the national commercial China CITIC Bank, 
and the provincial commercial Huarong Xiangjiang Bank would provide useful 
comparators and contrasts. Thirdly, banks were chosen once investigations 
revealed that each case would allow a suitable number of interviewees from 
different departments in order to gain coverage of various operations and to 
enable the cross-checking of opinions. Fourthly, all banks were placed under 
the regulatory authority of the CBRC, but, for comparison, it was decided to 
choose firms with multinational partners. The four national banks all received 
FDI, and as a group they allow investigation of the impact of cross border 
capability transfer and learning, with a view of tracking variations as well as 
similarities. Huarong Xiangjiang Bank was selected as one of Hunan’s largest 
banks and a significant provincial bank in terms of the whole of China. It 
provides a contrast to the national banks, partly for only trading in Hunan, and 
partly as it has no multinational partner. 
	   118	  
4.4 Data Collection and Analysis  
The reliability of this research was enhanced by collecting data and 
information from multiple sources. This research mainly chose interviews in 
banks, but data was triangulated by the use of documentation, such as 
company internal documents, reports, websites, and academic journals in 
order to enhance internal validity in each individual case. 
 
4.41 Semi-structured interviews 
Yin (1994) states that ‘interviews are an essential source of case study 
evidence, because most case studies are about human affairs. These human 
affairs should be reported and interpreted through the eyes of specific 
interviewees, and well-informed respondents can provide important insights 
into a situation’. Interview is one of the major data collection methods, and can 
be used by itself or as a component to a triangulation approach (Bryman & Bell, 
2007). The major objective of interviews is to explore opinions, facts, and 
experience to result in an in-depth, specific understanding of a particular topic 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). This study aims to investigate the 
development of banking in China, based on investigation of existing relevant 
literature, evaluating the role of institutional regulations, the impact from FDI, 
and the emergence of firm level capabilities. The case based approach and 
interviewing enable in depth opinions, thoughts and information into the 
chosen research topic. For the chosen topic, the interview research method is 
suitable for collecting primary data. The interview could be categorized into 
three levels, which are structured interviews, semi-structured interviews and 
unstructured interviews (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2000). Structured 
interviews are based on a predetermined, well-identified and standardized set 
of questions. The interviewer is required to ask questions in the same order 
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and voice to avoid any bias infections (Singleton & Straits, 2005). However, it 
limits the interviewer in gaining deeper information from respondents. 
Unstructured interview is used when a researcher requires in-depth 
information and a free exchange of information, and there are no 
pre-determined questions. Semi-structured interviews are predicated on 
designing interview questions in advance, but they allow interviewees to 
explore other, new and potentially important issues to the research within the 
range of interview questions. They involve pre-determined questions in order 
to develop an understanding of a respondent’s experience and perception of 
the topic, and to facilitate comparisons between interviewees, but not to 
restrict answers to confined questions (King, 2004). Questions and main 
themes are pre-designed and listed in order to offer a guide for the interviewer 
but tend to be open-ended to provide a greater scope of information from the 
respondents in the progress of an interview (Kvale, 1983). Semi-structured 
interviews offer flexibility to study, and the interviewer has some freedom to 
vary and also add or reduce questions according to the progress of the 
interview (Gates, & McDaine 2007). Wengraf (2001) suggests that managers 
prefer interviews rather than questionnaires or other methods, particularly 
when the study is relevant to their role and may help to improve their work and 
further development. The semi-structured method benefits from the fact that it 
allows the interviewer to develop a good relationship with interviewees, which 
might potentially result in a higher probability of responsiveness. The 
open-ended questions could encourage interviewees to say what they 
consider is important, so eliciting their views rather than what the interviewer 
thinks are important, generating the discovery of causal explanations, rival 
explanations, and unexpected issues during interviews, and enhancing the 
internal validity of the research (Chisnall, 1997). In this study, during one of the 
interviews, when the interviewee gave suggestions about removing the age 
restriction for promotion or recruiting staff, it generated for the interviewer 
ideas relevant to human resources policy, and led to call-backs to previous 
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interviewees to find their opinions about the age limitation. This study chose a 
semi-structured interview method to collect primary information. 
 
4.42 Interviewee selection  
The interview data, collected from a number of carefully selected respondents, 
are expected to provide diverse viewpoints, which offer the basis for 
constructing valid causal explanations (Eisenhardt & Graebener, 2007). The 
interviewees were carefully selected. Each case firm has multiple interviews: 
about 5 to 7 interviewees based on the same pre-designed interview questions 
for the triangulation purposes. Interviewees are those who were directly 
involved in the decision making process. Within each case firm, the 
interviewees were selected from different functional areas and hierarchical 
levels from the top management to the assistant manager level. There were 
other selection criteria: those who work in the field of human resources, 
customer relationships, information and technology development, and who 
were able to answer the questions related to the research topic; those who 
have a thorough knowledge of the firm and its rivals; those who worked in the 
case firm or in the bank industry before 2002 were more preferable, since they 
could review the whole period under investigation. In all the five cases, a wide 
range of employees was interviewed, including general managers, HR 
managers, department managers, chairs of the Labour Union, and those at 
province branch level and city branch level. 
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Table 4-1: Number of Interviews Per Case Study 
 
Name of bank Number of interviews 
China Construction Bank 7 
China CITIC Bank  6 
Bank of China  5 
Industrial and Commercial   
Bank of China 
5 
Huarong Xiangjiang Bank  5 
 
 
4.43 Interview process 
Fieldwork was conducted at the five banks in Hunan province, from 2012 to 
2014. The researcher first went to Hunan province in the January of 2012, and 
started to establish relationships with certain employees within banks. In the 
November of 2012, the researcher conducted the pilot study, which focused on 
two banks, CCB and CITIC bank. The reasons for choosing these two banks 
for pilot study were the good personal connections in those organizations, and 
the chance to compare a ‘big four’ state owned bank and one of the largest 
commercial banks in China. After the pilot study, the researcher adjusted the 
research questions and the interview questions. Then, the researcher went to 
China to further confirm the names of interviewees in April 2013. The extended 
fieldwork was conducted in July 2013. In the January of 2014, the researcher 
returned to the banks to collect more internal documents. In some banks, the 
researcher was allowed to access to their internal online platform, which 
helped to gain a large range of internal documents. 
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The interview questions were designed to establish the interviewee’s personal 
and career background, with a view to judging whether interviewees had the 
knowledge to answer interview questions in their specific areas, had an 
overview of the firm’s development, and the reform of the industry. The 
interview questions were originally designed in English based, as a result of 
the literature review and subsequently a pilot study. The researcher is a native 
Mandarin Chinese speaker, who interpreted the interview questions into 
Chinese, and was able to have direct in-depth communication with 
Interviewees, reducing the chance of misunderstandings and enhancing the 
internal validity of the research. Yin (2003) states that it is important to 
safeguard interviewees who participate in any study, and this proviso includes 
protection of the privacy and confidentiality of interviewees. Therefore, at the 
beginning of each interview, all interviewees was assured that all the interview 
information provided would be used for the purpose of the PhD or academic 
research, and would not be seen or assessed by their firms. All interviews 
were conducted at the interviewee’s office with no third party in attendance. 
The researcher began by introducing the research project and its purpose. 
Normally, the interview lasted about 1 hour to 1.5 hours, according to the 
original design and interview plan, and according to the interviewees’ timetable 
and availability. Some interviews lasted up to two hours. The interview 
questions were pre-released to the interviewees. All the interviews were 
conducted on the basis of the pre-designed questions, and efforts were made 
to guide interviewees to provide requisite information and detail. But all the 
interviewees were allowed to comment freely on the relevant questions or to 
raise other points, and interviewees were not expected to respond to all 
questions if they felt they did not have the appropriate information or if they 
had concerns about confidentiality. Informal discussion proved an effective 
means of encouraging interviewees to give their opinions. After interviews, the 
researcher had lunch or dinner with the interviewees, which was an informal 
way to understand their comments and to integrate interviews further views. 
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Originally, the researcher planned to use digital recording, but banking sector 
remains a highly regulated and government controlled sector. All interviewees 
refused to be digitally recorded, and allowed the researcher to take written 
notes only during the interview. Hayes & Mattimoe (2004) state that the note 
taking method is as widely used as recording. The researcher used the pilot 
study to gain experience of note taking with the aim of not disturbing the 
process of interviews. All the transcripts were organized, reviewed and 
produced in Chinese, and then translated into English, within on day of each 
interview in order to achieve construct validity.  
 
4.44 Documentation 
Yin (2003) states that documentary information is likely to be relevant to every 
case, except for studies of preliterate societies. The most important use of 
documents is to corroborate evidence from other resources, and documents 
are important in the data collection plan. Firstly, documents are helpful to 
correct and verify spelling and titles of organizations. Secondly, documents 
could offer other detailed information to corroborate other resources. Thirdly, 
they can contain inferences as clues for further investigation, but overreliance 
on documents in case study research may cause the investigator mistakenly to 
assume that documents contain the unmitigated truth. However, the 
triangulation of documents with multiple sources is important to ensure the 
quality of the research. The period of fieldwork was between 2012 and 2014, 
and mainly during the summer in 2013. Lots of data and information from 
internal documentation was collected during the visits to banks. At some of the 
banks, the researcher was allowed to access their internal website in their 
office. Most of that information was confidential, and the researcher was not 
allowed to print. The researcher was only allowed to take notes, and limit use 
to the PhD and academic research. The data were used to triangulate and 
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supplement data from interviews. It is important to cross check and validate 
evidence from a multiple perspective, and analyse them from diverse angles. 
For this research, information was also collected from extant literature, reports 
and data published by research institutes and governments, and newspaper 
and journals articles. Through wide document collection, and corroboration 
with interviews, this research reduced biased selectivity.  
 
4.45 Data analysis 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that, for data analysis in a qualitative multiple case 
studies, ‘the overall idea is to become familiar with each case as a stand-alone 
entity’. This process allows deep understanding of each case, and then 
generalizing of patterns across cases. This research analysed each individual 
case first, and then analysed across cases for comparison. Yin (1994) states 
that the data and information collected should be based on the analytical 
framework and theoretical propositions, defined from the preceding literature 
review. Pattern similarities could improve the reliability of the overall research 
findings, and pattern differences enhance the probability of capturing novel 
findings from the data collected. Yin (2003) states that the pattern matching 
logic comes from empirically based patterns found in case studies being 
compared with the patterns predicted in theory. Similarities in the pattern could 
enhance the internal validity of the research, and differences could have 
‘theoretical replication’ across cases. The literal replication and theoretical 
replication could help to strength the analytic generalization of the research in 
the data analysis process. For example, the same result of three states owned 
banks adopting the targeted recruitment system, in which guanxi continued to 
play a role, shows literal replication. However, different results from the two 
commercial banks, which did not have the targeted recruitment system, reveal 
management and political traditions and an example of theoretical replication.  
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The pattern-matching logic is considered the most suitable general analytic 
strategy for analysing multiple case study research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Yin (1994) states that it involves comparing an empirically based pattern with a 
predicted one. In the multiple case study, an individual case study is regarded 
as a stand-alone entity or a ‘whole’ study, and each case needs to be analysed 
separately. This allows unique findings from each individual case. Each case 
is then linked back to the research propositions, in order to test how and why a 
particular proposition was verified or not verified. Then the patterns found 
across case considered. A replication could be claimed if cases support the 
propositions, which means literal replication is achieved. The theoretical 
replication is achieved if this pattern is not observed in every case. Based on 
such matching, the propositions could be accepted or generalized to build a 
theory. However, if the cases produce contradictory results, the propositions 
should be rejected.  
 
4.5 Validity and Reliability 
A research design is supposed to present a logical set of statements, and we 
can judge the quality of any given design according to certain logical tests (Yin, 
2009). Validity and reliability are both important factors for any research that 
involves information collection. Yin (2003) urges researchers to measure the 
quality of case study research designs by four criteria, which are construct 
validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. 
 
4.51 Construct validity 
Case study research is criticized for lacking ‘a sufficiently operational set of 
measures for the research questions addressed, which is difficult to construct 
validly’ (Yin, 1994). Critics have articulated their concern on the use of data 
collected through the investigator’s judgments while engaged in case study 
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research. Yin (2009) states that three tactics are available to increase 
construct validity when doing case studies. The first is the use of multiple 
sources of evidence. The second is the establishment of a chain of evidence, 
which is also relevant during data collection. The third is to have the draft case 
study report reviewed by key informants. The researcher should develop a 
sufficiently operational set of measures to avoid the invalidity of one single 
measure from a single source of evidence. Yin (2003) recommends that 
triangulation could avoid problems such as interviewees and documents being 
biased, and multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple 
measures of the same phenomenon. Triangulation refers to the use of different 
data collection techniques within one study to improve the richness and 
reliability of the information. 
 
Firstly, interview transcripts were triangulated within a bank across the 
business functions. Management interview transcripts were triangulated with 
each other. Secondly, notes taken from interviews were reviewed immediately 
after the interviews. To construct validity, this study used the data collected 
from interview transcripts, observation notes, government documents, 
academic books, journals, newspapers, company published reports, internal 
company documents and websites, and triangulated them in order to enhance 
representativeness and meaningfulness. The process also reduces the 
possibility of misinterpretation (Ghauri, 2004). 
 
Construct validity is increased by maintaining ‘a chain of evidence’ (Yin, 2003). 
Yin (2009) suggests that maintaining a chain of evidence could increase the 
reliability of the information in a case study. This is to allow an external 
observer to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research 
questions to ultimate case study conclusions. This research established and 
sustained the link from the literature and research questions to the cases and 
conclusions, which enables a reader to trace the origins of the evidence and 
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conclusions. All the data and information used are cited in the bibliography, for 
the tracking of all data and sources. 
 
Yin (2003) states that academic feedback could enhance validity. This 
research has been presented at Royal Holloway, University of London, School 
of Management conference every year. At these meetings, the literature 
review research, the pilot study, the methodology and fieldwork were all 
discussed, and received valuable feedback from academic scholars in my 
particular research area and in Management in general. 
 
4.52 Internal validity  
Yin (2003) states that internal validity is mainly concerned with explanatory 
case studies, when an investigator is trying to explain how and why event x led 
to event y. If the investigator incorrectly concludes that there is a causal 
relationship between x and y without knowing that some third factor z may 
actually have caused y, the research design has failed to deal with the threat to 
internal validity. In descriptive or exploratory studies, surveys or experiments, 
this is not an issue and there is no concern for the causal situation. For case 
study research, another point of discussion is the broader problem of making 
inferences, as a case study involves an inference every time an event could 
not be directly observed. The research design dealt with the overall problem of 
making inferences in order to enhance internal validity. Yin (2009) suggests 
that the analytic tactic of pattern matching is one way of addressing internal 
validity, which focuses on whether or not there is a good match between a 
researcher’s observations and the theoretical ideas developed. Three other 
analytic tactics are explanation building, addressing rival explanations, and 
using logic models. 
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This research used a pattern matching logic, and established causal 
relationships across the case studies. This research used multiple case 
studies, and cross case comparison revealed similarities and differences in 
context, processes and outcomes. The researcher summarized the findings in 
the text and tables in the concluding chapter, and helped to minimize the risks 
of misapplying or mismatching the data. Yin (1994) states that, if the patterns 
of a particular causal relationship coincide across cases, it could be claimed 
that the correct inference of a causal relationship has been made. Then, those 
findings could be used for comparison with the research questions; the 
literature review and the analytic framework in order to further improve internal 
validity.  
 
Since, in a case study, a researcher needs to infer an event in question was 
caused by a particular event that occurred earlier, based on the data collected, 
it has been argued that internal validity is hard to achieve (Yin, 1994). Pauwels 
and Matthyssens (2004) suggest that the use of triangulation could enhance 
internal validity, as it allows the various aspects of the research objectives to 
be based on multiple resources. Triangulation provides a more accurate 
comprehensive set of data on which an inference of causal relationship is 
based. Using the case study protocol could minimize errors and biases in the 
research to enhance the validity of the inferences. This research collected 
primary data through semi-structured interviews. The interviews provided 
basic information to establish a causal relationship, and the pattern-matching 
logic could enhance internal validity. Overall, this research selected cases 
based on selection criteria (theoretical sampling), and used triangulation and 
other methods to establish causal relationships and enhance internal validity. 
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4.53 External validity  
 
External validity is the degree to which research findings could be achieved if 
the findings from one research can be generalized beyond the immediate case 
studies. Yin (2003) suggests that choosing multiple-case design to achieve 
‘replication logic’ can be used for analytic generalization to enhance the 
external validly. This research was based on five cases, and the case selection 
was based on Yin’s case selection criteria, which are theoretical replication 
and analytical generalization, with the aim to ‘contribute to theory-building’, 
and to be generalized in a wider context and to provide implications for further 
studies.  
 
4.54 Reliability  
 
Reliability is concerned with the data collected and findings during the 
research. If the research is to be repeated with the same findings, the study 
could be successfully referred as having reliability (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
In turn, reliability looks forward the consistency of results (Chisnall,1997). Yin 
(2003) states that ‘The objective is to be sure that, if a later investigator 
followed the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator and 
conducted the same case study all over again; the later investigator should 
arrive at the same findings and conclusions’. The goal of reliability is to 
minimize the errors and biases in a study by clearly explicating the procedures 
of data collection. The most common way to ensure the reliability of research 
is to make as many steps as operationally repeatable as possible so that 
others could achieve the same results ?Kirk & Miller, 1986? .  
 
Yin (2003) suggests that the use of a case study protocol could reduce errors 
and biases during research, and guide the data collection procedures to 
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maintain consistency. The core of the case study protocol is the protocol 
questions as the reliability of the interview data is the key factor in the reliability 
of the search. The case study protocol provides a guide to the interview 
process and the maintenance of consistency. This research includes a basic 
protocol in the interviews to enhance the reliability as follows:  
 
i. General company information: core business, company history 
ii. Background of interviewees: age, education, career development, job 
responsibilities 
iii. Detailed information across business functions: management & 
decision-making, HR, client and customer relationship, product development, 
information technology  
iv. Contextual conditions in each company: past and present national/local 
context and relationships with local communities, governments and media at 
different levels 
 
Furthermore, as discussed before, this research used a multiple case studies 
approach to achieve replicative reliability through comparing, contrasting and 
repetition to reduce bias and minimize the errors. The sample selection 
process was carefully designed to enhance the reliability and validity of the 
research. The method to store information collected is important in the 
construction of reliability and maintenance of accuracy. As stated, the 
researcher considers that digital recording is the suitable way to record the 
interview progress. However, the interviewees in this research tended to be 
unwilling to be tape-recorded during interviews. Also, it is difficult to record 
casual or informal conversations such as at lunch or dinner. Hayes and 
Mattinoe (2004) consider that note taking is an alternative to recording 
interviews. The pilot proved an important part of the process of fine-tuning the 
interview protocols. The interviewees were allowed to raise new issues within 
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the range of interview questions, which could help to strengthen the internal 
validity inference and enhance the reliability of the research.  
 
4.55 Pilot case study 
 
Yin (1994) considers that a pilot case study would help a researcher to refine 
the data collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and the 
procedures to be followed. The pilot study could assist a researcher to develop 
relevant lines of questions, and possibly provide some conceptual clarification 
for the research design. Methodologically, the work on pilot cases could offer 
information about relevant field questions and their effectiveness and clarity. 
Therefore, using a pilot study could develop the study’s questions and test 
them. In general, convenience, access, and geographic proximity could be the 
main criteria for selecting a pilot case or cases. The pilot case enables you to 
observe different phenomena from many different views or to try different 
approaches on a trial basis. The pilot data offers considerable insight into the 
basic issues being studied. This information is used in parallel with an 
on-going review of relevant literature, so that the final research design is 
informed both by prevailing theories and by a fresh set of empirical 
observations. The dual sources of information help to ensure that the actual 
study reflected significant questions relevant to contemporary cases. 
 
The researcher chose case studies in Hunan so that they all had the same con 
compare to context. Unlike the coastal areas, Hunan is an under developed 
inland province. Since the 11th Five-Year Plan, the Chinese government has 
aimed to accelerate economic development in the inland province. The Hunan 
government put the development of financial services as a priority position for 
economic development. This study chose the China Construction Bank (CCB) 
as one of the pilot cases, which is one of the four state owned commercial 
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banks in China; it has received FDI and is listed on the stock market. The 
China CITIC Bank is another pilot case, and was one of the earliest Chinese 
commercial banks. It has grown to be one of the most competitive banks, after 
four states owned bank. These two banks were chosen as pilot case studies 
because personal networks allowed space for more discretion and necessary 
follow ups in fine-tuning the interview protocols. The pilot studies used 
semi-structured interviews, and triangulated the results with written information 
and reports from firms and government. 
 
Milliman & Glinow (1998) argued that the meaning or validity of translated 
questions might differ when research is conducted in different regions or 
countries. All interview questions were designed in English in the first place, as 
the content of questions was mainly based on a review of the literature mostly 
published in English. However, all the interviewees were native Mandarin 
speakers, with limited level of English. A translated Chinese version of the 
questions was necessary to conduct the semi-structured interviews. After the 
interviews, all collected information was translated into English for analysis, as 
this study is required to be published in English. The pilot study was conducted 
to ensure that Chinese version interview questions were accurate and 
understandable, and to minimize distortions and bias. The interviewer did not 
use academic terminology in order to make sure all interviewees understood 
the questions clearly. 
 
All interviews were conducted face to face, which could enhance the validity of 
information. The first interview was with the vice manager of the China CITIC 
banks in Hunan province, which lasted about three hours. The interviewees 
tried to answer the questions as detailed and as clearly as possible. Many 
interviewees helped me to look up internal documents with which to triangulate 
my findings. For reasons already stated, note taking rather than digital 
recording occurred in the pilot interviews. After all the interviews, the author 
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analyzed the notes, and translated answers into English, with information 
categorized into key areas and in accordance with protocols in order to 
maintain meaning and assist comparisons between interviewees. Other data 
provided by the interviewees, such as company reports and government 
documents, and newspapers were used to triangulate the findings to enhance 
the validity and reliability of this study.  
 
The interview questions for the pilot study were focused on the impact from 
FDI on ownership, strategy, product development, marketing, and customer 
service in Chinese banks. However, the foreign multinational banks had limited 
discernable impact on the development of banks at the operational or 
provincial level compared to other noted factors. Other interview questions 
were focused on the impact of central or local government on bank 
development. The China Banking Regulatory Commission appeared a good 
test for ‘institutionalist’ theory in seeing in detail how supervision can bring 
about firm level reform and to what extent international or FDI and other 
factors might be relevant. The CBRC shows a trend of moving from strong and 
direct government control towards a more decentralized approach to the 
banking industry, albeit with extensive central controls and policy objectives 
remaining. As more firm level decision making occurred, the need to focus on 
firm level developments and capabilities was re-emphasized. Therefore, the 
pilot studies helped redefine the research objectives. Moreover, the pilot 
interviews made the researcher realize that prompting techniques should be 
improved, and enabled the researcher to improve interview skills before 
undertaking the core fieldwork.  
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4.6 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter explains the rationale of choosing qualitative methods since they 
were the best means of delivering the research objectives and answering the 
research questions. Qualitative methods were suited to discovering in-depth 
information about the complex development of capabilities within Chinese 
banks at the operational level capability development, and analyzing 
institutional factors, FDI, and other contextual considerations as formative 
influences. The case selection was based on practical considerations, 
including access to data, but was based too on obtaining a significant number 
of interviews across different business functions, facilitating inter-firm 
comparisons and contrasts to maximize new insights, and isolating the 
contextual factors influencing firm development. This chapter explains the 
rationale of using a multiple case study strategy to answer the research 
questions of ‘why’ the Chinese banking industry is undergoing rapid change in 
its management and business practices; ‘how’ the development of Chinese 
banks has and is occurring; and ‘what’ strategies Chinese banks have used to 
improve their competitive advantages. This research chose the 
semi-structured interview and documentation as the main data collection 
methods. To enhance the reliability and validity of this research, it followed 
Yin’s methods of construct validity and reliability, and internal and external 
validity. The chapter also explains the importance of the pilot study in order to 
refine the research objectives, the interview questions, and to enhance the 
quality of the research.  
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Chapter 5 The China Construction Bank 
 
5.1 Background 
The China Construction Bank Corporation (abbreviated as CCB) is one of the 
biggest former state owned banks founded on October 1, 1954 (see chapter 2), 
and its main task was supporting and allocating the funds to government 
construction and infrastructure projects under the centralized economy that 
existed at the time. It was not expected to operate on a commercial basis, but 
existed to service the needs of state owned enterprises. In the first phase of its 
reform, from 1978 onwards, the Chinese government launched its economic 
reform policy. CCB began to transform itself into a commercial bank, and, to 
be able to operate outside the construction industry; it expanded its business 
by providing loans, savings, deposits, and other services. It remained under 
the guidance and control of government, which determined which products it 
could offer. However, there were no obligations to compete. In the second 
phase of its reform, from 1985 until 1993, all four former states owned banks 
faced competition from new commercial banks. CCB entered into a third phase 
of its development, from 1994, when the policy banks were founded to take 
over major responsibilities for implementing government projects, and 
because the 1995 Central Bank Law incentivized the four state owned banks 
to more towards competition and profit concentrate goal (Jiang, et al., 2009). 
Concerned about the performance of banks and the slowness of their reform, 
the Chinese government established the China Bank Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), in 2003, beginning of the critical fourth phase. The CBRC chose CCB 
and the Bank of China to be the pilots for its reform agenda to create more 
market-oriented and profit-conscious commercial banks. Along with the Bank 
of China, CCB was therefore the first to evolve from its state owned past, and 
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the lessons learnt were used subsequently to direct policy for other banks 
(CCB, 2013d). 
 
5.2 Strategic Control 
5.21 Ownership 
Under the newly appointed CBRC, which aimed to create a commercially 
orientated industry, CCB restructured as a shareholding bank, named the 
China Construction Bank Corporation. Before listing on the stock market 
(December 2003), CCB disposed of RMB 185.8 billion of NPLs, with the MOF 
providing RMB 65.5 billion. Most of its non-performing loans were transferred 
to Cinda AMC (Hong Kong Stock Exchange Market, 2006). Therefore, by the 
end of 2006, 3.29 per cent of all its loans were NPLs, compared to above 20 
per cent in 2002. The basic ownership pattern was established, and, as shown 
by the figures for 2007 and 2013, it remained intact for the five years. H shares 
are purchased through the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; A shares are 
purchased through the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The following list includes 
the top ten shareholders: 
5-1 Table：Major Shareholders of CCB (2007) 
Name of 
Shareholder 
Nature of 
Shareholder  
Total Number of 
shares held  
Shareholding 
percentage 
Central Huijin 
Investment Ltd 
State-owned  138,150,047,904 
(H-shares) 
59.12% 
Hong Kong 
Securities 
Clearing 
Company 
Nominee Limited  
Foreign investor  28,209,724,301 
(H-shares) 
12.07% 
Jianyin State-owned 20,692,250,000 8.85% 
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(H-shares) 
Bank of America 
Corporation   
Foreign investor  19,132,974,346 
(H-shares) 
8.19% 
Fullerton 
Financial  
Foreign investor  13,207,316,750 
(H-shares) 
5.65% 
Baosteel Group 
Corporation   
State-owned 3,000,000,000 
(H-shares) 
1.3% 
China Yangte 
Power Co. 
Limited 
State-owned  1,200,000,000 
(A-shares) 
0.51% 
Reca Investment 
Limited  
Foreign investor  800,000,000 
(H-shares) 
0.34% 
China Post Core 
Growth Stock 
Fund (a 
subsidiary of 
Agricultural Bank 
of China) 
Domestic 
non-state owned 
284,051,722 
(H-shares) 
 
 
0.12% 
China Life 
Insurance 
Company 
Limited 
Domestic 
non-state owned 
233,696,00 
(A-shares) 
0.10% 
(Source from, CCB annual report, 2007) 
 
5-2 Table: Major Shareholders of CCB (2013) 
Name of Shareholder Nature of 
Shareholder  
Total Number of 
shares held  
Shareholdin
g 
percentage 
Central Huijin 
Investment Ltd 
State-owned  142,590,494,651 
(H-shares) 
444,270, 519 
57.03% 
0.18% 
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(A-shares) 
Hong Kong Securities 
Clearing Company 
Nominee Limited  
Foreign 
investor 
70,551,277,133 
(H-shares) 
28.22% 
Temasek Holdings 
(Private) Limited  
Foreign 
investor  
17,878,670,050 
(H-shares) 
7.15% 
State Grid Corporation 
of China  
State-owned 2,895,782,730 
(H-shares) 
1.16% 
Baosteel Group 
Corporation   
State-owned 2,000,000,000 
(H-shares) 
318,860,498 
(A-shares) 
0.80% 
0.13% 
Bank of America 
Corporation   
Foreign 
investor  
2,000,000,000 
(H-shares) 
 
0.80% 
China Ping An Life 
Insurance Company 
Limited 
 
Domestic 
non-state 
owned  
1,907,104,725 
(H-shares) 
0.76% 
China Yangte Power 
Co. Limited  
State-owned  1,015,613,000 
(H-shares) 
0.41% 
Reca Investment 
Limited  
Foreign 
investor  
856,000,000 
(H-shares) 
0.34% 
China Ping An Life 
Insurance Company 
Limited 
Domestic 
non-state 
owned 
593,906,825 
(A-shares) 
0.24% 
(Source from CCB annual report, 2013) 
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Both in 2007 and 2013, among the top 10 shareholders, there were four state 
owned enterprises and four foreign investors, as well as two private firms. The 
Central Huijin Investment Limited holds the largest ownership control of CCB. 
Despite the change in ownership structure, the Board of Directors at CCB 
maintained responsibility for management decision-making, albeit working 
within the policy framework set by CBRC and having to gain its approval for 
key actions. Chinese state owned companies with shares in CCB are not 
expected to exercise operational control. Multinational investment in CCB is 
comparatively small, and so foreign investors are unable to determine 
management decision-making. Shareholders are in practice limited to giving 
opinions at the shareholder’s general meeting for reasons of broad supervision 
and corporate governance. One aim of the change in ownership and 
objectives has been to improve internal management, and notably the 
appointment of senior manager became based on performance and 
examinations, if subject to the CBRC’s final approval. One representative of 
the Bank of America is allowed to attend the Board of Directors, but has no 
management responsibilities (see CCB’s organization structure in Figure 5-1). 
In the head office, about 50 personnel from the Bank of America assist in risk 
management, governance, consumer banking and other areas, but again as 
advisors and without any management responsibilities. At the provincial level, 
such as in Hunan, there are no personnel from the Bank of America (Mr Li Lin, 
Sub Branch Vice Present, interview, 7th November 2012). 
 
The management structure, as in Figure 5-1, shows that below the 
headquarters and its departments are the provincial branches (Tier 1), the 
autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau, municipalities such as Beijing 
and Shanghai, and special listed cities such as Shenzhen, the hierarchical 
organization following official government structures. There are in addition the 
overseas branches and representative offices. Each province, municipality or 
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special listed city has its own headquarters, usually with departments in 
human resources, information technology, and credit cards. Within the 
province, the headquarters follows the policy and decisions of the company 
headquarters, and ensures implementation at the city (Tier 2) or country 
sub-branches, which deal directly with customers. The municipalities act 
similarly and oversee operations in urban district, just as special listed cities 
and autonomous regions have sub-branches. Decision-making within the 
provinces – as in the autonomous regions, municipalities and special listed 
cities – is limited. The provincial, municipal and listed city branches have 
specialized departments at their headquarters, in order to coordinate with the 
main office, and to manage corporate clients. 
 
Figure 5-1 Organizational Structure of CCB  
 
Shareholder’s Level 
 
 
Shareholders	  Genernal	  Meeting 
Board	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  Directors 
Board	  of	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Senior Management Level 
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As we have noted, after more than two decades of reform, the banking 
industry still showed signs of poor productivity, lack of risk management skills, 
and weak asset quality (Allen et al., 2005). In 2003, as we noted earlier the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was found as an agency of 
the Chinese government to regulate and supervise the banking sector. The 
CBRC is charged with setting common standards for all banks, but the state 
owned banks believe that the standards set are more exacting for them than 
those for non-states owned commercial bank (Mr Shaoming Huang, Tier 2 
Branch, Senior Client Relationship Manager, interview, 7th July 2013). The 
CCB Board of Supervisors monitors CCB, which is accountable to the 
shareholders’ general meeting. The Board of Supervisors consists of 9 
supervisors, including 4 shareholder representative supervisors, 3 staff 
representative supervisors and 2 external supervisors (CCB annual report, 
2011). The banks need to operate and carry out business activities according 
to the Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of China, passed in 
1995, and by the laws and regulations of the stock exchanges where it is 
listed. 
 
In October 2005, at the stipulation of the CBRC, and with objective of further 
transforming into a commercial bank, CCB was listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. The sales of just 10 per cent of the shares raised more than US $8 
billion. In late 2007, CCB also floated on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. In the 
third period of the bank’s evolution, as it began to compete and offer shares, it 
started its international expansion. In 2006, CCB set up a subsidiary in the 
special administrative region of Macao, and, then, from 2009, it created a 
foreign branch in New York and a representative office in London (CCB, 
annual report, 2009). By 2013, CCB had more than 13,629 branches in China, 
operations in Macao, Hong Kong, and Taipei, and ten overseas branches or 
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offices in New York, London, Tokyo, Sydney, Frankfurt, Seoul, Singapore, Ho 
Chi Minh City, and Moscow, and Johannesburg (CCB annual report, 2013). 
 
5.22 FDI 
FDI in China has largely been directed to the development of manufacturing 
and its management. In order to further enhance the competitive advantages 
of domestic banks, the CBRC encourages their cooperation with foreign banks. 
Chinese firms have formed international strategic alliances with the aim of 
creating new resources and competitive advantages. In 2005, the China 
Construction Bank Corporation (CCB) signed a five-year cooperative 
agreement with the Bank of America. CCB entered the joint venture in order to 
improve its managerial skills, human resource management, information 
technology, product development, and understanding of the implications of 
listing on the stock market. The Bank of America wanted to expand its 
business in China through CCB’s network, seek new markets, and benefit from 
the strong growth of the country’s economy (Cheng, 2011). The Bank of 
America is one of the world’s largest financial institutions, covering both retail 
and investment banking services. The Bank of America deals with clients in 
175 countries and has corporate business with most of the Global Fortune 500 
and established offices in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong. It acquired a 
9 per cent stake in CCB worth US $3 billion (CCB annual report, 2005). The 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has strict regulations for 
foreign banks to operate in China. In September 2011, CCB revised and 
extended the cooperative agreement with the Bank of America to 2016. As the 
result, the multinational agreed to help with improving private wealth 
management, e-commerce, investment banking, information technology, 
product development, credit card services, and skills training. About 50 
personnel from the Bank of America work in CCB’s departments of risk 
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management, governance, and consumer banking. The Bank of America 
appoints one member to the board of directors, although that person has no 
management responsibility. Temasek, a sovereign wealth fund, from 
Singapore, is one of world’s largest investment companies. It has invested in 
CCB since 2005. For the Chinese bank, it looked to learn from its investor’s 
experience of stock market listing, reputation in international markets, 
knowledge of long-term investments, and training in treasury business and 
other specialist areas. However, as with Bank of America, Temasek has no 
management responsibility. In 2011, Temasek took 9.06 per cent of the shares 
in CCB, falling by some 2 per cent in the years that followed (CCB annual 
report, 2011). 
 
5. 3 Human Resources 
The reform of CCB started from 2003, as one of the two pilot initiatives of the 
CBRC, with the long-term aim of changing working practices and upgrading 
capabilities of the banking industry. This chapter will evaluate how much CCB 
has changed from the initiation of reform compared to 2013, tracking the 
evolution of capabilities and resources. Employee skills are a key capability in 
banking, and core to effective client relationships and product development. In 
the case of client relationships and networks, personal contact and interaction 
are important. To deliver a new product or service, the bank requires 
employees possessed of the training and experience to operationalize and 
manage expectations. Ultimately, companies need to generate products or 
services that are not easily replicated or substituted, as the foundation of 
sustained competitive advantage (SCA), and they require the personnel to 
achieve this objective (which we can associate with the notion of dynamic 
capabilities). 
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Reform began with the change in employment contracts in 2003. Under the 
new contracts, there are two types of employment: the direct contract system, 
in which employees sign a contract directly with CCB, and the outsourcing 
system, in which employees are hired through agencies. CBRC has guided 
CCB in the development of ‘best practice’ human resource systems, and CCB 
publicly states that they are seeking to combine Western models, especially 
the German variant, and Japanese approaches with selected aspects of the 
current Chinese system (CCB, 2013c). The RBV specifically argues that 
specific human capital skills contribute to the competitive advantages of firms, 
and that individual employee behaviour could improve or detract from SCA. As 
we have explored elsewhere, Wright et al. (2001) suggest that capabilities 
serve as a bridge between the emphasis in the strategy literature on who 
provides sources of competitive advantage and the focus in the HRM literature 
on the process of attracting, developing, motivating and retaining people. 
 
5.31 Promotion 
The reform process, from 2003, established human resource development as 
a major objective for CCB, with the aim of downsizing the number of 
employees, and creating the conditions to improve and change skills. CCB 
chose three main ways to achieve the new objectives. Firstly, all employees 
needed to pass an exam to retain their current position, or, depending on the 
results, they were selected for an alternative position, training or both. 
Secondly, for those long-serving employees hired during the ‘life time 
employee’ system, and above 40 years old, but who failed the exam, the 
company would allow them to retire early on a pension. Thirdly, CCB hired 
many capable employees from other commercial banks, although they would 
also lose people to rivals. Fourthly, the employment of less skilled positions 
such as cleaners, or particularly high skilled positions such as information 
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system developers would be sub-contracted. The measures introduced in 
2003 were intended to change the nature of personnel and to create the space 
for human resource development in line with new strategic goals. At CCB, 
since 2003, key managerial staff were promoted internally rather than recruited 
from the local labour market. Internal selection has a rationale. Firstly, 
employees are more familiar with the business and prevailing ‘guanxi’ network. 
Secondly, despite reforms introduced at the outset of reform, the iron rice-bowl 
SOE system continues to affect promotion. Before 2003, promotion was 
almost entirely based on guanxi (Ms Yanmei Xia, Tier 2 Branch HR Manager, 
interview, 10th July 2013). From that date, no employee could be promoted 
without passing an examination, although guanxi still determined who would 
be promoted from amongst those who passed the examination. 
 
CCB divides its employees into twelve levels. For example, the first level is the 
Chairman. The second level consists of the Vice Chairmen. On the third level 
are the department managers at the headquarters and the chairmen of 
provincial branches, while the fourth level is the department vice-managers at 
the headquarters and the vice chairmen of provincial branches. The fifth level 
is the department managers of provincial branches and the chairmen of city 
branches. Key managerial staff in or above the fifth level are directly selected 
and appointed by the headquarters, and need to be approved by the CBRC. 
Before their formal appointment, CCB evaluates all candidates for written 
examinations devised by CCB headquarters, and all candidates must pass 
(Ms Yanmei Xia, Tier 2 Branch HR Manager, interview, 10th July 2013). 
Normally, having achieved the necessary pass, it is those candidates with 
strong political, personal or organizational support within their department (and, 
potentially, from the higher levels of management) that are selected. Most of 
those chosen are members of the Communist Party of China, even CCB states 
that there is no connection between promotion and Party membership (Mr 
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Heng Chang, Tier 2 Branch, Chairman of the Labour Union, 10th July 2013). 
At the next stage, performance during the past years needs to be evaluated, 
and interviews are held at the headquarters. The Corporate Clients Manager, 
Hunan, Long Xu indicates that personal relationships with high-level officials 
are a vita factor of promotion after passing the exams (Mr Long Xu, Tier 2 
Branch, Corporate Clients Manager, 11th July 2013). Appointments of key 
managerial staff below the fifth level are generally made within the province or 
city, although more senior posts remain under the decision of the company 
headquarters. CCB similarly evaluates the performance of candidates during 
recent past years. Some positions require a pass of examinations set by the 
provincial branch, after which there are interviews; in other cases, the bank 
just appoints directly. Occasionally, rather than internal candidates, the key 
managerial staff are recruited from the labour market, or appointed by the 
CBRC. Each position has different requirements in experience or qualifications, 
and there are additionally maximum age limits (Mr Long Xu, Tier 2 Branch, 
Corporate Clients Manager, interview, 11th July 2013; Ms Yanmei Xia, Tier 2 
Branch HR Vice Manager, interview, 10th July 2013). The CBRC has a strong 
influence on the promotion of employees at or above the fifth level within 
provincial management. The whole of CCB’s promotion system, therefore, is 
still largely a heritage from SOE practice, and ‘guanxi’ still plays an important 
role in an individual’s progress. What has changed, however, is the 
introduction of examinations. While employees are likely to be promoted on 
the basis of personal networks, they must first prove that they have reached 
the basic requirements. 
 
5.32 Recruitment 
CCB undertakes – as we shall, in the same manner as the other state own 
banks - four types of recruitment: graduate recruitment, targeted recruitment, 
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open recruitment and internship. Graduate recruitment is the main method, 
and CCB prefers to hire full time graduates. Students must apply online one 
year ahead. The CBRC regulates that all candidates must graduate in the year 
they are hired. Also, students must study at a high ranking university, achieve 
good grades, and hold a level 6 in the national English test (4 level is the 
minimum level for university graduates) or an IELTS 6. For some positions in 
headquarters or branch level, applicants must have a Master’s degree. CCB 
does not have requirements on students’ previous work experience yet it 
prefers students who have participated in university activities or the student 
union. After applying online, then candidates attend written examinations, 
which are set by CCB headquarters, and these include English, administrative 
and professional skills, and knowledge and expertise. After the candidates 
have passed the examinations, CCB will select suitable appointees by 
interview. Recruitment policies favour well-educated young graduates with a 
high level of commitment to banking and CCB (Ms. Yanmei Xia, Tier 2 Branch 
HR Manager, interview, 10th July 2013). 
 
Targeted recruitment is conducted as is graduate recruitment, but the 
openings are limited. It aims to hire graduates from a university or college, 
which in China has lower entry requirements and confers on the majority of its 
student’s diplomas rather than Bachelor degrees. However, compared to 
graduate recruitment, CCB’s grade or university ranking criteria are less strict. 
Otherwise, the online application, examinations and interview process are the 
same. Ms Yanmei Xia is the HR vice manager in Xiangtan City branch 
headquarters, and she indicates that this recruitment is more likely to open the 
door for graduates who did not reach the usual standard but have strong 
“guanxi” or they are the children of employees (Ms. Yanmei Xia, Tier 2 Branch 
HR Vice Manager, interview, 10th July 2013). 
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Open recruitment provides opportunities to local labour markets, with jobs 
advertised through the company website or recruitment agencies. Social 
recruitment is very limited, as CCB tends to promote their employees internally 
or to hire graduates. The bank uses this approach only when it cannot find 
suitable candidates from amongst its own employees (Ms Yanmei Xia, Tier 2 
Branch HR Manager, interview, 10th July 2013). Every summer the China 
Construction Bank holds a summer internship programme for students who will 
graduate the following year. In instituting this practice, CCB is imitating 
Western style human resource practices (CCB, 2013a). 
 
5.33 Training and Development 
CCB realized the importance of training for employees in the banking sector. 
The previous SOE system ignored human skills as a resource to be developed. 
From 2003, CCB began to provide both on the job training and general training. 
For example, in 2011, CCB states that it organized a total of 29,166 training 
sessions, costing about RMB899 million (CCB annual report, 2011); by 2012, 
the figures had grown to 43,220 sessions at RMB1.18 billion. Employees at 
CCB need to self-study 10 modules on a course related to their positions, and 
to pass exams in the internal online platform (CCB annual report, 2012). 
 
CCB organizes training programmes for different departments every year. 
When new products or new services are launched, the relevant department 
needs to conduct training, which is usually done in-house. External 
professionals provide English or Computer skills courses. The foreign partners 
of CCB, the Bank of America provides training courses in the area of wealth 
management. CCB frequently updates information and training materials, such 
as videos for employees to learn the latest product or service. The course 
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format includes telephone video conferencing, which provides the training for 
employees who could not attend the training in the headquarters in Beijing (Ms 
Yanmei Xia, Tier 2 Branch HR Vice Manager, interview, 10th July 2013; Qu, 
2013). For new employees, they will undergo induction training to learn their 
job responsibilities and to understand the firm’s corporate culture and values. 
Every year, CCB selects a department and some of its employees to visit its 
joint venture partner or to visit other banks overseas. For example, in 2007, the 
product development department selected employees to visit the Bank of 
America’s product development centre (Li, 2013). The training programmes 
with foreign partners help CCB to develop products. The on the job training 
largely improves the specialized and general knowledge of employees. 
However, all training programmes emphasize specific knowledge or skills, and 
none deal with the concept of customer service. 
 
5.34 Pay policy and welfare 
CCB pay and welfare systems are partly an inheritance from its time as an 
SOE, and partly elements learnt from Western style HR systems. The pay 
structure is determined by seniority and the position-related system, plus a 
performance-related bonus. Both length of service and grade contribute to the 
basic salary and welfare benefits. The pay rate and welfare benefits are based 
on levels of local economic development. There is a formula to calculate the 
salary, which is based on basic salary plus the rate of local economic 
development. Performance related pay became an important incentive for 
improving job performance (Mr Li Lin, Sub Branch Vice Present, interview, 7th 
November 2012). 
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Employees had many benefits within the SOE system, such as a house 
purchase allowance, hospital allowances, childcare allowances, and child 
education scholarship funding. After the reform of the social benefits system, 
the social welfare such as hospital allowance, pension connects with social 
medical and pension system. CCB has not only participated in local social 
insurance schemes - covering basic pensions, basic healthcare, 
unemployment insurance, industrial injury insurance, and maternity benefits - 
but it has also set up a housing provident fund. For retirement and medical 
care, CCB has established two types of staff welfare systems: corporate 
annuity and supplementary medical insurance (CCB social responsibility 
report, 2012). 
 
5.35 Summary 
The current CCB human resource system is partly inherited from the Chinese 
SOEs system, and partly learnt from western style HR systems. The CBRC 
has direct involvement in the promotion and the appointment of senior 
managers but less direct influence on recruitment, payment, welfare, training 
and development. The SOE HR system lacked monetary incentives to improve 
performance. Also, the SOE iron rice-bowl and lifetime employment still 
strongly influence recruitment, as according to the HR regulations handbook, 
employees cannot be dismissed excepting for breaches of law. Staff turnover 
is not a problem for CCB because highly committed employees and local 
labour see the state owned banks as providing stable employment, good 
welfare, and high pay rates. In the SOE HR system, when employee’s children 
grew up, they could work at the bank. After reform, recruitment tends to be 
open to all graduates and to local labour. However, CCB still has the targeted 
recruitment, which specially hires the employees’ children or people with 
‘guanxi’. The idea of the internship was learnt from the western style human 
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resource practices. However, it has been argued that it does not offer fair 
opportunities, as there is still a large number of candidates attending the 
internship from ‘guanxi’. The training programs largely enhance the general 
and specific knowledge of employees, but the concept of ‘service’ still needs to 
be further emphasized in their training. 
 
The CBRC has little direct influence on recruitment. But all examination papers 
need its approval. Before the founding of the CBRC, recruitment at CCB was 
based on the procedures associated with state owned enterprise, and so the 
children of employees would be given positions. The new system of graduate 
recruitment based on examination provides a greater measure of fair 
opportunity for applicants. The examination-based promotion similarly 
provides more fair opportunity to all employees. 
 
5.4 Client and Customer Relationships and Product 
Development 
In the banking sector, a firm has to interact with a client or customer directly, 
so it requires attention to developing and maintaining relationships with its 
clients and customers. Long term and value adding relationships with clients, 
founded on a unique service that cannot easily be imitated or substituted by 
rivals, could constitute a sustainable competitive advantage. Client and 
customer relationships – and similarly product development - are key 
resources in the banking sector (Chen, 2009). Client and customer 
relationships and product development are closely tied together, as good client 
and customer relationships could help to develop unique products, and unique 
products could help to gain and keep clients and customers. 
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CCB generally divides their clients or customers into four categories, which are 
corporate client; small to medium firm client; individual VIP customer; and 
individual customer (CCB, 2013b). In 2011, CCB announced its 
‘customer-oriented’ business principle. It made efforts to improve basic 
facilities such as ATMs. In 2011, the overall corporate client satisfaction rate 
was 90.5%, 2.2 percentage points up from the previous year (CCB annual 
report 2012). CCB refurbished its 7800 retail outlets, and established 940 
individual customer service centres, 240 small enterprise service centres and 
245 private banking customer service centres within selected branches. For 
relationships with corporate clients, small to medium firms, and VIP customers, 
‘guanxi’ remains vital (Mr Heng Chang, Tier 2 Branch, Chairman of the Labour 
Union, interview, 7th November 2012). In the meantime, product and service 
are key elements to attract individual VIP customers, which have become an 
important group for Chinese domestic banks. In the agreement with the Bank 
of America, CCB especially points out its key future mission is to develop VIP 
private wealth management. For individual customers, product and service 
play an important role. In this area, CCB came to realize the importance of 
customer service as well as developing new products. For example, CCB 
claims to be the first domestic banks to use the ticket service at its counters. 
Customer suggestions or feedback do help to improve service and to develop 
new products (Mr Li Lin, Sub Branch Vice Present, interview, 7th November, 
2012). Due to the agreement with the Bank of America, CCB sent employees 
to visit the Bank of America every year. For example, in 2007, selected 
employees visited the Bank of America product development centre. After the 
trip, CCB leant from the Bank of America and built its customer experience 
centre. The purpose of establishing the customer experience centre was to 
invite customers to try pre-launched products, and directly to gain feedback 
from them on how to improve the product. In 2008, after visiting the Bank of 
America, CCB learnt how to develop financial products based on individual 
customers. CCB headquarters designs and develops the majority of products 
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and services, after the CBRC’s approval (Li, 2013). The province level branch 
could develop short-term (under six month) financial products, such as those it 
introduced for large corporate clients and special requirements (Mr Shaoming  
Huang, Senior Clients Relationship Manager, 9th July 2013). 
 
CCB has established Product Innovation Centres in Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Xiamen and Suzhou in 2011. In the Product Innovation Centres, customers 
have been invited to experience new products. Then CCB uses customer 
feedback to improve products. For example, responding to customer feedback, 
CCB improved its design of the online security system. In 2011, CCB 
developed 372 new products, including basic financial products, credit and 
debit card business, and personal loans, particularly improving many products 
for electronic banking users (CCB annual report, 2011). 
 
CCB gradually moved its the basic counter service towards self-service 
facilities, and put more effort into selling financial products (Ms Juan Yu, VIP 
Customer Relationship Manager, interview, 11th July 2013). In 2011, CCB 
established 5771 self-service facilities to provide a 24-hour convenient service 
to customers. Self-service has become one of the largest transaction service 
channels in CCB. For example, the transaction value reached 4.56 billion in 
2011. Overall, customer satisfaction for the self-service facilities was 64.1% 
(CCB annual report, 2011). After visiting the Bank of America customer 
experience centres, CCB realized the importance of customer perceptions on 
developing retail business. CCB has established customer experience centres 
in five cities, which are Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Xiamen and Guangdong. 
In the customer experience centres, CCB organize customer experience 
activities for new self-service facilities, and collect opinions and suggestions 
from customers to improve services, products and business operations. 
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Through the customer experience activities and feedback from branches, in 
2011, CCB made improvements such as queue service numbers and 
customer identification systems. In 2012, the Bank’s overall customer 
satisfaction rate reached 64.5%, which was 1.2 percentage points higher than 
the industry average (although 1.2% is not statistically significant) (CCB 
annual report, 2012). CCB offers student loans. However, this initiative did not 
take a large of amount of business. Due to the less developed personal credit 
system, it is hard to evaluate personal credit histories, leading to non 
performing loans (Ms Juan Yu, Customer Relationship Manager, Interview, 
11th July 2013). CCB developed individual business loans to small and micro 
enterprise owners. By the end of 2012, CCB has provided RMB 101.776 billion 
to these groups of customers. Again, due to the less developed personal credit 
system, there is a limit to this business at CCB (CCB annual report, 2012). 
 
In 2012, CCB started to expand its individual VIP customer services, including 
wealth management. CCB divides the VIP customer into different levels 
according to their savings. The first level is the basic VIP customer, whose 
savings is over 50,000 Yuan. The second level is for wealth management 
services, and for those with savings over 100,000 Yuan. The wealth manager 
service is mainly based on individual customer needs, providing wealth 
management planning, asset management, financial advice, and consulting 
services for investments. Moreover, the family members of the VIP customer 
could enjoy the benefits of financial products and credit cards. The top level is 
called private banking service, for those whose savings are over 300,000 Yuan. 
The private banking clients and their families could have special loan financing, 
cash management, investments, and financing private bank cards. The VIP 
customer can benefit from non-financial services, such as CCB would organize 
different social events based on individual interests, including events at golf 
clubs (Liu, 2013a). In Hunan Province, CCB has 12 private banking or wealth 
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management centres in selected branches. By the end of 2012, in Hunan 
province, the number of VIP customers increased to 4878, the total asset from 
VIP customers reaching 300 million Yuan (Mr Shaoming Huang, Senior Clients 
Relationship Manager, 9th July 2013; Liu, 2013b). 
 
The state owned banks tend not to provide loans to small and medium 
enterprises as they consider them high risks compared to state owned 
enterprises or large corporates. The Chinese government encourages the 
development of small enterprises. Thus, the CBRC regulates that state owned 
banks have to provide loans to small to medium enterprise. CCB needs to 
support the development of small enterprise as a social responsibility 
commitment. At the end of 2011, CCB provided RMB913 billion loans to small 
enterprises, which indirectly helped create 20 million job opportunities (CCB 
annual report, 2011). CCB gradually realized that in a more competitive 
environment, large domestic banks and foreign banks tend to take a large 
share of business from corporate clients. Therefore, CCB is gradually moving 
towards a strategy to support small to medium enterprises. CCB started to 
develop and launch new products and services for its small enterprises clients. 
For example, in 2011, CCB developed the ‘petty loan’ products, which aim to 
provide a quick lending service to small enterprises. CCB’s commitment to 
provide the best financial services for small enterprise has won itself wide 
recognition. However, the progress of providing loans to small and medium 
enterprises is still very strict. CCB learnt from its foreign partner, the Bank of 
America, how to manage and control risk. CCB provides basic financial 
services to small and medium enterprises, and introduces the owner of small 
enterprises to CCB’s VIP customer and wealth management department (Mr 
Long Xu, Corporate Clients Manager, interview, 11th July 2013; Yang, 2013). 
In 2012, CCB implemented regulations to regulate and adjust the service fee 
on small and medium enterprises, as it has been criticized for high charges. 
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CCB developed special products designed for the small and micro enterprise. 
CCB developed the ‘Credit loans’, which is Renmingbi credit loan business for 
its small and micro enterprises (Luo, 2013). 
 
In the area of client and customer relationships and product development, the 
impact from the foreign partner tends to be more significant. CCB leant how to 
build customer experience centres, how to develop products based on 
customer feedback and requirements, how to develop wealth management 
and private banking, and how to improve customer service from its foreign 
partner. The CBRC has also directly influenced customer relationships and 
product development. It regulates the percentage of business each bank 
needs to achieve the small and medium enterprises, which was not the main 
customer group for the CCB banks. Product development needs to be 
approved by the CBRC. The CCB headquarters develops the products. The 
province level branch could develop short-term products based on the 
customer requirements, but they must be it approved by CCB headquarters 
and the CBRC. Overall, since the reform, CCB has made significant 
improvements on product development and customer service. 
 
5.5 Information Technology 
For Teece et al. (1997), ‘dynamic capability refers to the capacity to renew 
competences to achieve congruence with the changing business environment. 
Innovative responses are required when time to market and timing are critical, 
the rate of technological change is rapid, and the nature of future competition 
and the market are difficult to determine’. The integration of skills, knowledge 
and technology enables an organization to provide a particular benefit to 
customers. For example, advanced technology could help the development of 
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online banking, mobile banking, and self services facilities, thereby providing 
more convenient service to customers and improving the customer service and 
relationship. 
 
CCB realizes the importance of information technology, and online banking 
service and mobile banking services. There are many reasons to operate 
those services, such as make up for when customer need service during off- 
working time, help to save labour time, also save customer’s time in front of the 
counter. After 2003, CCB developed different kinds of online service. Basically, 
customer could transfer money and other traditional services in online banking. 
In 2012, CCB operates new section called: ‘Happy Life’ online banking service 
in majority of cities which customer could pay their bills such as electricity, gas, 
and phone bills through online. Customer could plan their trip through ‘Happy 
Life’ such as booking flight tickets and hotel. Also, customers could operate 
their financial service through ‘Happy Life’, such as buy shares or stock, fund 
financing stead investment, golden. Moreover, customer could appointment 
with local hospital through ‘Happy Life’. CCB have its own online business 
shopping mall, which includes wide range of products from clothing to 
electronic and apply for personal loans, which their customer could easy to 
shop online and save transaction fees to third party such as PayPal. CCB 
launched SMS service along with online banking service to help customer to 
confirm its online service (CCB annual report, 2012). 
 
Since 2012, CCB focus on their mobile service, most of smart phone could log 
in to their mobile banking and operate their service as similarly as online 
banking, and more easy and convenience to transfer money through personal 
phone. Customer only need to text with the amount of money and account 
number to certain service number, and then could easy transfer, or pay credit 
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card bills after operating this service (Mr Liang Gong, Tier 2 Branch, Electronic 
Banking Department Manager, interview, 10th July 2013). He further indicates 
that CCB specially focused on the development of online banking and tried to 
improve their online banking experience from customer feedback. In 2011, 
CCB collected more than 220,000 feedbacks from customers about their 
online banking or mobile banking service. CCB improved its service based on 
customer’s opinions. CCB further intensified the channel building of electronic 
banking via the introduction of various transaction platforms, including 
personal online banking, corporate online banking, mobile phone banking, 
SMS financial services and internet website in order to provide customers with 
more convenient financial services at a relatively lower cost. CCB offers 
business consultation, financial management, and other non-financial 
valued-added services through online and mobile banking. Based on customer 
feedback, CCB designed nine products for online banking customers, which it 
called its e-commerce platform, and included mobile phone banking end-user 
and automatic fund receipts, personal online payment, and personal security 
products. Moreover, CCB has renovated its personal online banking service 
interface in response to the issues identified in the customer experience 
campaign consisting of more than 200 participants. Furthermore, to create a 
more convenient online banking service for small to medium enterprises, CCB 
provides capital market investment accounts with third party custodian 
contract signing service (Tan, 2013; CCB annual report, 2013). CCB focuses 
on the innovation of online banking or e-commerce development. Since, 2007, 
CCB has held e-commerce innovation national championship competition 
every year. CCB provides the event with prize, job opportunities for the 
winners or excellent participators. For example, in 2011, the championship 
involved more the 200,000 university students from 2800 universities. The 
price is RMB 250,000 for the winner, to encourage people participate 
innovation the service and products (CCB annual report 2011). 
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CCB specially developed online banking channel for small and micro 
enterprises. Clients could apply for loans and make payments through the 
online banking channel. For individual clients, CCB has introduced its 
‘e-Account’ services, where customers could make a hospital appointment, 
process social security insurance, foreign exchange purchase, and treasury 
bonds services. In addition, CCB promoted electronic financial services 
through various channels, including online-banking and mobile banking. CCB 
brought in a new mobile banking user-end service, employed QR codes for 
financial products sales, and introduced new features for mobile banking 
clients such as ‘shake’ account balance inquiries, ATM cash withdrawal 
services and queuing status inquiries at CCB retail outlets. The launch of new 
products and services not only helps clients save time travelling to the retail 
outlets, but it saves labour costs. 
 
CCB integrated new technological applications and improved back office 
management processes in order to meet customer needs for applying credit 
cards anywhere at anytime. CCB launched a series of electronic application 
channels that customers can apply for credit cards through the Internet, mobile 
phone, and tablet computer, SMS, email and telephone. CCB developed an 
emergency card issuing business process and operating procedures that met 
the urgent credit card needs of customers during their travel or study overseas. 
The credit card can be made and mailed on the day of approval in the case of 
emergency card issuing. Customers can receive new cards within three days 
at earliest. As a large number of customers requested to adjust their credit 
card limits during festivals, the Bank predicted the increased spending of 
customers based on data analysis and systematic detection in order to 
facilitate customers' spending in or outside China during Christmas, New Year 
or the 11 November Festival. The Bank took the initiative to increase the credit 
limits for 4.94 million customers. The Company specially provided SMS alerts 
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for over 40 service categories, including card mailing and payment due 
reminders. CCB has used Weibo to promote its products and services. It 
directly gains feedback from customers through Weibo (Mr Liang Gong, Tier 2 
Branch, Electronic Banking Department Manager, interview, 10th July 2013). 
 
In the area of information technology development, market demand plays an 
important role forcing the change of service channel in CCB. The impact from 
the foreign partner has been more significant, as one of the important 
agreements between the Bank of America and CCB is that the Bank of 
America needs to help with technology development. There are personnel 
from the Bank of America in the technology development departments of CCB 
headquarters. The CBRC has no direct influence but must approve all 
products and services. The development of multiple channel services provides 
more convenience for customers. CCB is committed to combining the 
development of its electronic banking operations with traditional counter 
service, by building up an expanded e-banking service network and increasing 
e-banking products and services. 
 
5.6 Summary 
After China joined the WTO, the entry of foreign banks was used to encourage 
further reforms in China’s banking industry. The Chinese government 
established the CBRC in 2003, and CCB began a series of changes under the 
guidance of CBRC. According to interviewees, most of the significant changes 
and reforms happened after 2003. Therefore, the case reveals that the state 
institution is the leading force for the reform, but that the link with the overseas 
partner provided a useful resource to learn lessons on best practice. The other 
forces for change are the impact from the foreign partner and the nature of 
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market demand. The ownership structure changed. CCB became the 
shareholding China Construction Bank Corporation. The bank's major 
shareholders included state owned enterprises, private enterprises and foreign 
investors. CCB was in principle made accountable for its own losses or profits 
by law, and the Chinese government could no longer assume its bad debts. 
CCB was listed on stock market, which took the supervision from public. 
Although the Bank of America could take one seat at in the broad meeting, the 
CBRC regulates that the Bank of America could not participate in management 
decisions. A small number of personnel from the Bank of America work in the 
specialized department, such as online banking, or the technology department. 
However, those personnel have no management decision-making authority. At 
the province level, there are no foreign employees participating. From FDI 
theory, the foreign investor was looking to bringing its ownership advantages 
to the host economy. However, in the banking sector in China, with strong 
regulation from the CBRC, foreign partners have not been involved in 
management decision-making. The impact of the foreign investor has been 
noted in technology, management, and product development. The province 
level branch has limited authority to make decisions. Most of the management 
decisions are from CCB headquarters, approved by the CBRC. The province 
level branch acts as an agency, receiving guidelines from the headquarters, 
and implementing in the city level sub branches. 
 
CCB restructured its HR systems after 2003. Significant changes included the 
switch from the ‘iron rice bowl’ to contracted employment and performance 
related pay and promotion systems. CCB emphasizes the training of their 
employees. Although strong influenced by the previous HR system, the 
improvements are still significant. One major concern of the HR system is the 
age related policy. CCB regulates that certain positions have age limitation, 
which lead to low incentives for people to work hard after certain ages. Another 
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concern is guanxi still playing an important role in recruitment and promotion. 
The training programmes largely enhance the general and specific knowledge 
of their employees, but the concept of ‘service’ still needs further emphasis in 
their training. The influence from the CBRC is direct on promotions, as above a 
certain level of senior manager they need to be approved by the CBRC. The 
CBRC indirectly influences recruitment, as the exam paper needs to be 
approved by the CBRC. 
 
CCB gradually learnt the importance of customer relationships, and set the 
customer orientated principles, and seeks to improve customer service both 
from training employees and improving basic facilities. CCB learnt how to 
develop products from its foreign partner, such as establishing the product 
innovation centres. The use of customer feedback helps CCB to improve its 
product development, thereby improving its customer relationships, which can 
be regarded as a dynamic capability. CCB enhanced these factors from 2003, 
partly realizing the importance of customer services, and partly as it learnt from 
its foreign partner. In the area of client and customer relationships and product 
development, the impact of the multinational partner has been more impactful. 
CCB learnt about customer experience centres, developing products based on 
customer feedback and requirements, wealth management and private 
banking, and improving customer service. The CBRC has indirect influence on 
the operational level of product development. However, at the branch level, the 
concept of customer service has not fully transferred to every employee, which 
shows that more training is required. CCB realizes the importance of online 
and mobile banking services for new and improved customer services. For 
information technology development, the market demand acts as the major 
force for change. 
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As discussed above, CCB headquarters makes all the management decisions, 
and the province level branch act as the agency between headquarters and 
branch level. The province level has limited power to make management 
decisions. They can develop short-term products based on feedback from the 
branch level, but those decisions still need to go through headquarters and 
gain the permission of CBRC. The CBRC strongly controls management 
practice at the bank, and the centralized management decision making from 
the headquarters leads to low responses to the market. CCB was the pioneer 
in seeking a good reputation for customer service, but change has been partial. 
CCB needs to enhance its capabilities and build core competitive advantages 
to differentiate it from the other banks. The human resource management 
could be improved by ending the age limitations, and ceasing the remaining 
elements of guanxi in recruitments and internal promotion. 
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Chapter 6 
The Bank of China 
6.1 Background  
The Bank of China (BOC) is one of China’s four state owned banks. It is also 
the country’s oldest bank, having been formally established in February 1912. 
Until 1949, its main function was as both the central bank and an international 
exchange and trade bank. The People’s Republic of China was established in 
1948. Since 1950, the General Management Department of the Bank of China 
was directly under the supervision of the People's Bank of China. In October 
27, 1953, the State Administrative Council of the Central People's Government 
authorized BOC as a specialized foreign exchange bank. The main 
responsibilities of BOC were as the state-designated specialized foreign 
exchange and trade bank, responsible for managing foreign exchange 
operations, international trade settlements, overseas fund transfer, other 
non-trade foreign exchange services, and supporting the nation's foreign trade 
development and economic infrastructure (BOC, 2012)  
 
In March 1979, during the first phase of banking reform initiated from 1978 
onwards, the State Council separated BOC from the People's Bank of China. 
As in the case of CCB, BOC evolved into a commercial bank, although it acted 
under guidelines from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. Since 
government continued to determine which products it could offer, BOC had no 
incentive to compete meaningfully. In September 1983, the State Council 
authorized the People's Bank of China as the central bank. Then the State 
Council separated the Bank of China from the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange. In phase two of banking reform, from 1985 until 1993, the Bank of 
	   166	  
China’s main responsibility remained national foreign exchange business, 
under the supervision of the People's Bank of China. As with other state 
owned banks, it started to face competition from the new commercial banks. 
BOC’s third phase of its development began from 1994, when three policy 
banks assumed major responsibilities for government projects. In early 1994, 
BOC was transformed from a specialized foreign exchange and trade bank to 
a state-owned commercial bank, and it expanded business by providing loans, 
savings, deposits and other services. In 1995, the Central Bank Law 
encouraged the four state owned banks to compete with each other and to 
pursue profit as a goal (Jiang, et al., 2009). As we have seen, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) began in 2003 to address concerns 
about the bank industry’s performance and failure to reform significantly, and 
determined BOC’s critical fourth reform phase. The CRBC chose both CCB 
and BOC to be pilots for the development of more competitive banks, and 
sought address their lack of profitability. As with CCB, the lessons from BOC 
subsequently guided policy for other banks. 
 
6.2 Strategic Control  
From 2003, BOC started to restructure as a shareholding bank. Before listing 
on the stock market (September, 2005), BOC disposed of RMB 308.1 billion of 
NPLs, and the MOF provided RMB 141 billion of this sum (Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange Market, 2005b). Most of the non-preforming loans were transferred 
to Orient AMC. Therefore, by the end of 2006, NPLs were 4.04 per cent of total 
loans, compared to over 20 per cent in 2002. In August 26, 2004, the Central 
Huijin Investment Ltd took 67.75% of the Bank of China shares, and the Bank 
of China restructured as the Bank of China Limited. In 2006, at the 
requirement of the CBRC, BOC listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. BOC's business includes corporate banking, 
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personal banking and financial market services. The basic ownership pattern 
was established, and, as shown by the figures for 2006 and 2014, remained 
intact for eight years. A share presents that the stock was purchased from the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, H share presents that the stock purchased from 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The following list includes the top ten 
shareholders:  
 
Table 6-1: Major Shareholders of BOC (2006) 
Name of shareholder  Nature of 
shareholder 
Total number of  
Shares held 
Shareholder 
percentage (%) 
Central Huijin 
Investment Ltd. 
State-owned  171,325,404,740 
(A shares) 
67.49 
Hong Kong Securities 
Clearing Company 
Nominees Limited  
Foreign 
Investor  
30,262,318,674 
(H shares) 
11.92% 
RBC China 
Investment  
Foreign 
Investor  
20,942,736,236 
(H shares) 
8.25% 
Asia Financial Holding 
Pte Ltd 
Foreign 
Investor  
10,471,368,118 
(H shares) 
4.13% 
National Council for 
Social Security Fund 
(NSSF) 
State-owned  8,377,341,329 
(H shares) 
3.30% 
UBS AG Foreign 
Investor  
3,377,860,684 
(H shares) 
1.33% 
Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) 
Foreign 
Investor  
506,679,102  
(H shares) 
0.20%  
The Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 
Ltd.  
Foreign 
Investor  
473,052,000  
(H shares) 
0.19% 
Wingreat International Foreign 420,490,000  0.17% 
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Limited  Investor  (H shares) 
Best Sense 
Investment Limited  
Foreign 
Investor  
236,526,000 
(H shares) 
0.09% 
Turbo Top Limited  Foreign 
Investor  
236,526,000  
(H shares) 
0.09% 
 
(Source from: BOC annual report, 2006) 
 
Table 6-2:Major Shareholders of BOC (2014) 
Name of shareholder  Nature of 
shareholder 
Total number of  
Shares held 
Shareholder 
percentage (%) 
Central Huijin 
Investment Ltd. 
Stated-owned  189,179,033,607 
(A-shares) 
67.72% 
Hong Kong Securities 
Clearing Company 
Nominees Ltd 
Foreign 
Investor  
81,614,000,276 
(H-shares) 
29.21% 
The Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 
Limited.  
Foreign 
Investor  
520,357,200 
(H-shares) 
0.19% 
Huaxin Trust Co., 
Limited 
Domestic 
non-state 
owned  
124,931,383 
(A-shares) 
0.04% 
Shenhua Group 
Corporation Limited 
State-owned  99,999,900 
(A-shares) 
0.04% 
Aluminum Corporation 
of China  
State-owned  99,999,900 
(A-shares) 
0.04% 
CSOP FTSE China  Foreign 
Investor 
95,997,489 
(A-shares) 
0.03% 
China Southern Power State-owned  90,909,000 0.03% 
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Grid Co.Ltd (A-shares) 
China Securities 
Finance Corporation 
Limited  
State-owned  83,451,001 
(A-shares) 
0.03% 
Wang Jingfeng  Domestic 
non-state 
owned  
60,588,888 
(A-shares) 
0.02% 
 
(Source from: BOC interim report, 2014) 
 
In 2006, there are eight foreign investors among the top 10 shareholders, but 
each of them took only a small percentage. By 2013, most of the shareholders 
were state-owned firms. The most significant change was the decline of 
shareholders from overseas. The number of foreign investors reduced to three. 
The major non-state owned domestic shareholders are Dalian Huaxin Trust Co. 
Limited (0.04%) and China Universal CSI Index Securities Investment Fund 
(0.02%). The key shareholders are still Central Hujin Investment Limited. and 
Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Nominees Limited (HKSCC 
Nominees Limited). Central Hujin has controlled more than 60% of shares 
since 2006 (BOC annual report, 2006).  
 
Despite the change in ownership structure, since 2006, the Board of Directors 
at BOC retained control of management decision-making, although, across the 
industry, the CBRC set the policy framework and had to sanction major 
decisions and appointments. Chinese state owned companies that assumed 
major shareholders were not expected to exercise operational control, and the 
foreign direct investment share was too small to determine management 
decision-making. Shareholders are limited to giving opinions at the 
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shareholder’s general meeting, and exercising supervision and corporate 
governance. Linked to the change in ownership and objectives is the 
appointment of senior managers according to performance and examinations, 
with the final approval of the CBRC.  
 
The management structure is presented in Figure 6-1. At the top are the 
headquarters and its departments, and below them the branches (Tier 1) in the 
provinces, the autonomous regions such as Hong Kong, and municipalities 
such as Shanghai. Each province or municipality has its own headquarters, 
and, typically for a state owned commercial bank, a human resource 
department, an information technology function, and a credit card centre. The 
company headquarters gives key instructions and sets the parameters for the 
provincial headquarters, which in turn sets policy at the level of the city 
branches (Tier 2). There is a similar pattern in the municipalities, which give 
the directives at the operational level of the urban district, just as autonomous 
regions in Hong Kong and Macau have parallel sub-branches. 
Decision-making within the provincial branches at BOC, as in the case of the 
autonomous regions and municipalities, is limited. The provincial, municipal 
and listed city branches have specialized departments at their headquarters, 
such as human resources, information technology, and credit cards, These 
branch headquarters and departments coordinate with the main office and 
supervise local operations. They also take direct responsibility for important 
corporate clients. 
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Figure 6-1: Organisational Structure of BOC  
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Domestic Branches/Offices Level  
 
(Source from: BOC annual report, 2013) 
 
Since the founding of the CBRC, BOC considers that the cornerstone of a 
modern enterprise system rests with corporate governance mechanisms (BOC 
annual report, 2012). BOC is publicly committed to the improvement of its 
corporate governance in compliance with the PRC Company Law, PRC 
Commercial Banking Law and relevant requirements promulgated by 
regulatory authorities. The corporate governance framework of BOC is as 
follows ： the shareholder’s meeting is the authority of the Bank. The 
shareholders’ meeting is responsible for making decisions on important issues, 
such as considering and approving the Bank’s annual financial budget and 
financial statements, the profit distribution plan of the Bank, and selecting and 
replacing directors, shareholder’s representative supervisors. The Board of 
Directors, under the management of the shareholders' meeting, is responsible 
convening shareholders' meetings and implementing the resolutions of 
shareholders; deciding on the Bank's strategic policies and business plans, 
reviewing and evaluation, and appointing or dismissing members of special 
committees and senior managers; and developing and reviewing corporate 
governance policies. The Board of Directors has set up the Strategic 
Development Committee, Audit Committee, Risk Policy Committee, Personnel 
and Remuneration Committee, and Connected Transactions Control 
Domestic	  Branches/OfLices 
Tier	  1	  Branches	  and	  its	  Departments Tier	  2	  Branches Branches	  Directly	  Controlled	  by	  the	  Head	  OfLice 
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Committee to assist the Board in performing its functions. The Board of 
Directors comprises 13 members. There are 3 executive directors, 5 
non-executive directors and 5 independent non-executive directors. The 
Bank's directors are selected at the shareholders' meeting, with a term of three 
years, and after the approval of the CBRC. A director may serve consecutive 
terms by re-election and re-appointment unless specified by laws, regulations 
and supervisory requirements (BOC annual report, 2013).  
 
By the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Board of 
Supervisors is responsible for overseeing the Bank’s financial activities and 
the legality and compliance of the Board of Directors and the senior 
management in performing their responsibilities. The Board of Supervisors has 
set up the Duty Performance and Due Diligence Supervision Committee and 
the Finance and Internal Control Supervision Committee to assist it in 
performing its functions. The Board of Supervisors has 8 supervisors, with 3 
supervisor positions assumed by representatives of shareholders, 3 supervisor 
positions assumed by employee representatives and 2 external supervisors. A 
supervisor has a term of three years and may serve consecutive terms by 
re-election and re-appointment. Supervisors representing shareholders and 
external supervisors are selected or replaced by the Shareholders’ Meeting. 
BOC needs to operate and carry out business activities according to the 
requirements set by the ‘Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of 
China’, as passed in 1995, and by the laws and regulations of the stock 
exchanges where it is listed. Until 2013, BOC provided a comprehensive range 
of financial services to customers across the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, 
Macau, Taiwan and 28 countries (BOC annual report, 2013).  
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6.22 FDI 
BOC selected the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) as its multinational partner. 
RBS, established in 1727, is one of the oldest banks in the UK. Its 
headquarters is located in Edinburgh, Scotland. RBS provides both corporate 
and commercial banking services to its customers. RBS supports its 
customers in accessing international markets in Europe, Asia, the Middle East 
and North America (RBS, 2014). In 2006, RBS purchased 8.25% of the shares 
in BOC, through its subsidiary RBC China Investment. RBS was listed as one 
of the top 10 shareholders. BOC allowed one representative of Royal Bank of 
Scotland to attend the Board of Directors, but the representative has no 
management responsibilities. BOC and RBS reached an agreement to assist 
BOC in risk management, governance, IT, wealth management, credit cards 
and corporate banking. For example, in the credit card business, RBS and 
BOC have a separate joint venture. RBS has a 49 percent ownership. The 
venture involves the RBS and BOC headquarters. At the provincial level, such 
as in Hunan, there are no personnel from Royal Bank of Scotland (Ms Luo Li, 
Tier 2 Branch HR Vice Managers, interview, 15th July 2013). In 2009, RBS sold 
its entire stake in Bank of China, for $2.34bn (BBC NEWS, 2009). 
 
UBS AG is a Swiss firm, providing financial services to private, corporate and 
institutional clients. Its financial services include investment banking, asset 
management and wealth management. UBS AG is present in all major 
financial centres and has offices in over 50 countries (UBS, 2014). In 
September 2005, BOC and UBS announced that both of them would enter into 
a strategic investor arrangement. UBS would make a US$500 million equity 
investment in Bank of China, subject to a lock up period of three years. UBS 
AG and BOC intended to cooperate in investing banking and the securities 
business. In addition, UBS would share its skills, experience and know-how in 
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risk, asset and liability management with Bank of China (BOC annual report, 
2005). In 2006, UBS AG purchased 3,377,860,684 shares in BOC, or 1.33% of 
BOC total shares, and it was listed in its top 10 shareholders. However, it has 
no Board representation and management responsibility in BOC. In December 
2008, UBS AG sold out its shares in BOC, but retained its business 
relationship (Reuters, 2008).  
 
Incorporated in 1974, Temasek is an investment company based in Singapore, 
and has 11 international offices (Temasek, 2014). In 2006, Temasek through 
its wholly owned subsidiary of Asia Financial Holdings purchased 
10,471,368,118 shares in BOC, and took 4.13% of the total shares, so being 
listed in the top 10 shareholders in 2006, without any Board representation and 
management responsibility. In 2006, other main foreign investors included the 
Asia Development Bank, the Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ Limited., Wingreat 
International Limited, Best Sense Investment Limited, and Turbo Top Limited. 
None of them were involved in any strategic partnerships, or had Board 
representation and management responsibility. Until 2013, most of these 
foreign investors were no longer in the top 10 shareholders lists; only the Bank 
of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd remained (BOC annual report, 2006; 2013).  
 
6.3 Human Resources  
The CBRC, as we have seen, guides Chinese banks to develop the ‘best 
practice’ of human resource systems, and the banks need to combine the 
advantages of the both western and Japanese style human resource practices 
and current systems in China. Under the stipulations of the Labour Law and 
Labour Contract Law, from 2003, two types of contract, specifically directly 
contracted employees and employees hired through agencies, replaced 
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lifetime employment. The introduction of the contract system helped BOC to 
downsize the number of employees. As in the case of CCB, all employees had 
to pass exams if they were to retain their current position; the results might 
mean employees were selected for an alternative position, training or both. For 
long-service employees, above 40 years old, and unable to pass the exam, 
BOC would allow them early retirement on pension. Sub-contracting was 
adopted for less skilled positions such as cleaners or particularly high skilled 
positions. The introduction of the contract system helped BOC to create the 
conditions to improve and change skills and the efficiency of the bank. By the 
end of 2012, BOC had 302,016 employees in total, which included 22,117 
overseas employees (BOC annual report, 2012).  
 
6.31 Promotion  
The majority of key managerial staff are promoted internally rather than 
recruited from the local labour market, since they have experience and 
knowledge of the business. As a result, the iron rice-bowl SOE system has a 
measure of influence on promotion, as well as recruitment. BOC divides its 
employees into thirteen levels (apart from people the directors and chair 
person). For example, the first level is the headquarter department managers 
and the branch manager of the province branch. The second level is the 
headquarter department vice-managers and the province branch 
vice-managers. The third level is the department manager of the province 
branch and the second tier branch managers. The fourth level is the 
department vice manager of province branch and the vice manager of a 
second tier branch. Key managerial staff in or above the fifth level are directly 
selected and appointed by headquarters, subject to CBRC approval. Before 
their formal appointment at BOC, all candidates must pass written 
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examinations devised by the bank (Ms Luo Li, Tier 2 Branch HR Vice Manager, 
interview, 15th July 2013). 
 
Other than the most senior province managers directly appointed by the 
headquarters, staff are appointed at the province level or within the city 
echelon. BOC evaluates the performance of candidates in previous years. 
Some positions can be through promotions without exams. Some positions 
require a pass of examinations set by BOC province branch, after which there 
are interviews. Some key managerial staff is occasionally recruited from the 
labour market. Each position has different requirements in experience or 
qualifications, and maximum age limits are set. BOC’s promotion system 
remains influence by SOE practice, but a substantial difference is the 
introduction of examinations. Before 2005, promotion was almost entirely 
based on guanxi, but thereafter no employee could be promoted without 
passing an examination. Personal networks are likely to determine promotions, 
but every appointee must first have passed an examination for their position 
(Ms Luo Li, Tier 2 Branch HR Vice Managers, interview, 15th July 2013). 
  
6.32 Recruitment  
Parallel to the other state owned banks, BOC has four types of recruitment, 
which are graduate recruitment, targeted recruitment, open recruitment and 
internship. Graduate recruitment is the core recruitment method, and BOC 
prefers to hire full time graduates. The CBRC sets the process, and so there is 
a similar pattern for all state owned commercial banks. Therefore, students 
must apply online one year ahead of appointment, and all candidates must 
graduate at the year they are hire from a high-ranking university, achieve good 
grades, and hold a level 6 in the national English test (level 4 is the minimum 
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level for university graduates) or an IELTS 6. For some positions in the 
headquarters or at the province branch level, candidates must hold a Master 
degree. After applying online, candidates sit written examinations as set by 
BOC headquarters, and papers include English, Maths, administrative and 
professional skills, and knowledge and expertise. Once candidates have 
passed, BOC will select suitable appointees by interview. Li (2013) states that 
the introduction of examinations provides relatively fair opportunities for all 
candidates compared to previously. All candidates need to pass examinations, 
as the basic requirement, and candidates with strong ‘guanxi’ have no 
opportunity to be recruited if they fail to pass the examinations (Ms Luo Li, Tier 
2 Branch HR Vice Managers, interview, 15th July 2013). 
 
Targeted recruitment is similar to graduate recruitment in several respects, but 
the opportunities by this route are limited. Moreover, it allows the hiring of 
graduates from a university or college with relatively low entry requirements 
and awarding mostly diplomas rather than degrees. Similarly, as CCB, 
compared to graduate recruitment, grades or the university ranking criteria are 
less strict. Targeted recruitment provides more chance to provide positions for 
people with ‘guanxi’ or to employees’ children (Mr Junping Liu, Tier 2 Branch 
Vice Present, interview, 15th July 2013). Open recruitment provides 
opportunities to the local labour market, and these jobs are advertised through 
the company website and recruitment agencies. The space for open 
recruitment is very limited, because BOC tends to promote their employees 
internally or to hire graduates. BOC reverts to open recruitment when it cannot 
find the appropriate candidate from amongst its own employees. 
 
Every summer, BOC holds a summer internship programme (for three months) 
for students graduating in the following year. The internship programme, 
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introduced in 2005, shows how modernizing initiatives can have mixed results 
in circumstances where long-standing practices are deeply embedded. 
Candidates who are interested in the internship program need to apply, and at 
least pass a level 6 in the national English test (BOC annual report, 2005). 
BOC will hold interviews for suitable candidates. As with other banks, excellent 
students will have the internship experience when seeking to pass the basic 
examinations when attending the next year’s formal graduate recruitment (Ms 
Luo Li, Tier 2 Branch HR Vice Managers, interview, 15th July 2013). The 
provinces or local branch internship recruitment does not need to be approved 
by the headquarters. Internship program is important in that it only provides 
opportunities for important clients’ children rather than openly fair opportunities 
for all. One interviewee explains that, around 2012, BOC introduced 
examinations, even for the internship programmes (Ms Ting Feng, Sub Branch, 
Small to Medium Enterprise Department Manager, interview, 16th July 2013). 
 
6.33 Training and development 
The previous SOE system ignored the development of human skills. Since 
2003, BOC has focused on the training and development of employees and 
helps them to plan their long-term career development and provide suitable 
career training. BOC provides different training programmes for different 
departments and positions. When launching new products or new services, the 
relevant department needs to attend training. The professionals or specialists 
normally give the training course, and they are internal trainers. Some courses 
such as English language and computer skills are supported and given by 
external professionals. BOC supplies information and training materials to 
learn about their latest product or service. New employees must attend 
induction training to learn their job responsibilities and to understand the firm’s 
corporate culture and values. For senior managers, BOC holds senior 
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management training sessions in Hong Kong annually. It established an 
appraisal system for employees in its domestic branches, to determine the 
promotion of staff and to encourage career development. To provide 
incentives, the Bank changed its remuneration policies, and improved its 
performance management mechanisms. During the first half of 2013, BOC 
offered 25,831 training courses in total to its domestic employees (BOC interim 
report, 2013).  
 
6.34 Pay policy and welfare  
Part of the BOC pay and welfare system has been inherited from Chinese 
SOE practice. BOC’s remuneration consists of 3 parts: basic salary, bonuses 
and welfare benefits. Basic salary follows seniority and grade. The pay rate 
formula is calculated on basic salary plus a local rate related to economic 
development levels. The bonus is linked to departmental and individual 
performance. Both length of service and grade determine welfare benefits as 
well as basic pay, in accordance with national, local and the Bank’s internal 
regulations. Employees still have access to many benefits from the SOE 
system, such as house purchase, hospital, and childcare allowances and a 
child education scholarship. After the SOE reform, the hospital allowance and 
pension has been part of the national medical and pension system. BOC 
provides the basic pension, medical-care, unemployment, work injury and 
maternity insurance (BOC social responsibility report, 2013).  
 
6.35 Summary  
The BOC human resource system is a mix of the Chinese SOE system and 
initiatives influenced by western style HR. The CBRC directly sanctions the 
promotion and the appointment of senior managers, and indirectly influences 
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recruitment, payment, welfare, training and development for all staff. It 
approves all examination papers and training materials at BOC. In 2003, 
introduction of the contract system helped BOC to cut the number of 
employees, as, before signing any of the new contracts, BOC needed to select 
suitable candidates. Under the SOE system, employee’s children could expect 
to work at BOC, and some of these traditions continue at the bank. As well as 
guanxi affecting the promotion of those that can pass the required 
examinations, graduate open recruitment allows some opportunities for hiring 
connected individuals. As state owned banks are seen as stable employers, 
offering good welfare and pay rates, BOC does not have a staff turnover 
problem. As with other banks, BOC has induction training, and provides a 
variety of training for different positions and levels. The training programmes 
generally enhance the general knowledge and specific knowledge of their 
employees. Compared to the other state owned banks, BOC tends to focus on 
the training of senior managers.  
 
6.4 Client and Customer Relationships and Product 
Development  
As in the other state owned banks, BOC divides its clients or customers into 
corporate, small to medium enterprise, individual VIP customer, and individual 
customer. Its corporate clients are important to its commercial operations; 
small to medium clients are less important than the other three. So, its profile is 
similar to the other state-owned banks. Developing new services and products 
for individual VIP customers has become a major aim for Chinese domestic 
banks, and guanxi plays an important role in developing and maintaining this 
group of customers. For individual customers, products and services tend to 
be the dominant role to maintain customer relationships.  
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As provided by other banks, BOC, firstly, improved the appeal, look and 
structure of its 10,145 sub-branches. Then, it concentrated on expanding its 
self-service facilities, including ATMs, to improve convenience and efficiency. 
Personal foreign exchange settlements and personal international remittances 
are one of BOC’s traditional services, and one of its competitive advantages. 
BOC provides RMB and foreign currency remittance, personal foreign 
exchange settlement and sale, foreign exchange conversion, agency 
insurance and funds, and agency collection and payment to its individual 
customers. After BOC cooperated with its foreign investors, it built the brand 
reputation of ‘Bank of China Remittance’. It aims to provide multiple channel 
services to its customers, and it has focused on transferring basic individual 
customer services such as money transfer to self-service facilities or to online 
banking services. Xie (2013) states that, in selected branches, BOC has 
employees especially to show customers how to use self-service facilities and 
to help them to operate their online banking services (Mr Yun Xie, Sub Branch 
VIP Client and Individual Customer Manager, interview, 16th July 2013). 
 
BOC divides its individual VIP customers into three levels: individual VIP 
customers, wealth management customers, and private banking customers. It 
changed its management system and service by setting up a personal banking 
department. BOC tends to design marketing activities for targeted customers 
rather than in general. It introduced the ‘direct-to-customer’ marketing service 
to promote its online banking services. Similarly, the same as other state 
owned banks, and under the encouragement of the CBRC, BOC concentrated 
on developing its wealth management business. BOC is in strategic alliance 
with UBS AG to learn how to develop wealth management. Firstly, a separate 
sub department was established named ‘Bank of China Wealth Management’. 
At the end of 2013, BOC has built 366 standardized wealth management 
centres, and over 1,000 wealth management offices and numerous wealth 
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management counters in selected branches. It trained more than 200 wealth 
management advisors and 2,500 wealth managers. As a member of BOC’s 
wealth management, customers have extra benefits in Chinese domestic 
airports and with other cooperative partner with BOC. For individual VIP 
customers, whose personal financial assets are over USD 1 million, BOC 
provides more private, tailored, premium services and products (Mr Yun Xie, 
Sub Branch VIP Client and Individual Customer Manager, interview, 16th July 
2013; BOC annual report, 2013).  
 
Medium and small enterprise traditionally were not BOC’s main clients, as the 
bank considered that small and medium firms were a higher risk than state 
owned enterprise. Even when state owned enterprise could not cover their 
loans, the Chinese government would always assist. Currently, the CBRC 
regulates the percentage of each type of banking business each domestic 
bank must achieve in the totality of its operations. Therefore, BOC started to 
improve its credit authorization and products for small and medium sized 
enterprises, and did so by learning best practices from its strategic investors. 
Firstly, BOC simplified the process of providing loans to small and medium 
enterprises, with the aim of providing more efficient and convenient services to 
them. Secondly, BOC used the feedback from these clients, and developed 
short term financing products. It also established a risk control management 
system for micro-sized enterprises in order to ensure fast service and decision 
making (Ms Ting Feng, Sub Branch, Small to Medium Enterprise Department 
Manager, interview, 16th July 2013). 
 
Corporate business has always been one of the main businesses at BOC. In 
2007, after listing on the stock market, BOC restructured the corporate 
banking department and its client information service system. In the history of 
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BOC, it has always been involved in foreign exchange and international trade, 
which are its competitive advantages. Therefore, BOC keeps expanding and 
improving its business cooperation with global financial institutions, and 
providing financial services in fields such as international settlements, bond 
financing, global cash management for multinational enterprises, and outward 
investments by Chinese firms. In the first half of 2013, BOC’s foreign exchange 
deposits ranked first place amongst Chinese domestic banks. Incomes from 
the international settlement business were ranked first amongst Chinese 
domestic banks (BOC interim report, 2013). BOC continues to support public 
utilities, state health care, government life, and public education. It tries to 
broaden its corporate client base. Since 2013, under the guidelines from the 
Chinese government through the CBRC, BOC started to support emerging 
industries such as energy conservation and new energy industries. 
 
Similar to other banks, BOC headquarters can develop products within the 
remit of CBRC regulations and with the approval of the CBRC. The city level 
branch has no authority to develop products and it can only report customer 
feedback to the headquarters. BOC’s product development is based on client’s 
feedback and CBRC requirements to provide for different types of clients and 
business. For example, BOC developed a series of trade financing products 
including Rong Yi Da (a financing service based on receivable accounts), 
Tong Yi Da (pledge issuing for receivable accounts), Rong Xin Da (a financing 
service based on receivable accounts for export credit insurance) and Rong 
Huo Da (cargo pledge financing) for its corporate clients. BOC introduced new 
products, including undisclosed export factoring and forfeiting under a bank 
guaranteed bill. In addition, in order to keep up with the change of mainstream 
settlement methods in global trade, BOC is the first Chinese domestic bank to 
join SWIFT's Trade Services Utility (TSU). BOC is the first Chinese domestic 
bank to introduce a series of payment products combining the services 
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provided by overseas and domestic branches, which includes "full payment 
without deduction", "Taiwan remittance", "priority remittance" and "special 
remittance service". BOC developed its ‘Idea Home’ products and services, by 
introducing fee-based services related to retail loans such as "An Xin Bao", a 
kind of entrusted escrow business for house transaction funds, and "An Yi 
Bao", a kind of entrusted management business for house transaction funds, 
based on further segmenting customers' demands. Also, since September 
2012, BOC opened its office ‘weibo’ account to directly communicate with 
customers (BOC annual report, 2012). 
 
BOC keeps enhancing the research and development, marketing, and service 
of its bankcard products. Based on different customer needs (such as 
business expenditure of domestic enterprises and public institutions, frequent 
travel, business travel and business procurement), BOC has developed 
different card products such as UnionPay Single Currency Great Wall 
Business Credit Card, Bank of China Phoenix Miles VISA Olympic Credit Card, 
Bank of China Ctrip Credit Card, and Bank of China Amway Credit Card. BOC 
has released market segmentation co-branded cards such as Bank of 
China-Dazhong Co-Branded Card, Great Wall-Ideal Home Co-Branded Card 
and Great Wall-China Life Co-Branded Card (BOC annual report, 2010; 
2011;2012). 
 
BOC continues expanding its traditional business in foreign exchange and 
international trade business, but its main incomes still comes from corporate 
clients. BOC uses its advantages for individual customers, and has focused on 
foreign exchange and financial products for them after improving its basic 
facilities and self-service systems. Small and medium enterprises are still not a 
main focus, but it has expanded its business for this group of clients by 
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simplified business processes and improving products and service. The 
leading changing force comes from the CBRC, as it regulates that the 
percentage of small and medium enterprise business that BOC needs to 
achieve every year. The CBRC encourages the development of wealth 
management for individual customers, and so products and services for 
high-end individual customers are a major strategic objective of domestic 
banks. Therefore, BOC is in strategic alliance with UBS AG to learn how to 
develop wealth management. This shows that in this case market demand is 
the leading force for changes; it demonstrates that it was the support from 
foreign partners that assisted the implementation of change. Products and 
services are still determined by BOC’s headquarters, while sub branches are 
important to reporting customer feedback.  
 
6.5 Information Technology  
BOC integrated its information technology and core financial business to 
create a ‘mobile, electronic, and intelligent’ multiple channel service. BOC 
aims to provide seven days a week and 24 hours a day service to customers. It 
improved its self-service and ATM facilities to shorten customer waiting times 
at counters, to serve customers outside of office hours, and to increase the 
efficiency of internal operations. However, in reality, the online banking system 
fails, particularly during weekends and public holidays (Mr Ruoguo Cheng, Tier 
2 Branch, Electronic Banking Department Manager, interview, 15th July 2013).  
 
Customers criticize BOC’s online banking system as it can only operate in 
Microsoft system. Many customers cannot use online banking if they are using 
iPad. Therefore, BOC improved its online banking system and launched a new 
application for the iPad, and made basic financial services, such as bill 
	   187	  
payments, loan enquiries, and fund and foreign exchange trading, better 
integrated with different end user systems (Mr Ruoguo Cheng, Tier 2 Branch, 
Electronic Banking Department Manager, interview, 15th July 2013). BOC 
further enriched and improved its online banking functions, and separated 
corporate clients and individual customer online banking. It introduced new 
services to corporate clients such as supply chain order financing, SME loans, 
and foreign exchange quick settlement. BOC provides new personal online 
banking such as options, saving bonds, virtual credit card, precious metal 
deposits, and social security and public accumulation funds. For corporate 
clients, BOC added an online supply chain financing function to ‘BOC 
e-Commerce’. It developed many payment products such as B2B direct 
payment, B2B guarantee payment and B2C interbank acquiring. These efforts 
helped to improve online payment processes and raise the success rate of 
account settlements. It improved personal online banking services such as 
fund transfer, credit card, and foreign exchange settlement and account 
management. BOC developed mobile banking to provide basic online transfer 
and balance check services. As with online banking, its mobile banking has 
limitations, such as iphone users not being able to access (Mr Ruoguo Cheng, 
Tier 2 Branch, Electronic Banking Department Manager, interview, 15th July 
2013). BOC continues to develop its mobile banking services, and, at the end 
of 2013, most mobile users could use BOC’s mobile banking services. BOC’s 
telephone banking network could cover ten overseas branches in the Asia 
Pacific region (BOC annual report, 2013).  
 
BOC continued to be driven by its commitment to technology-driven 
development and technology-guided financial innovation. Through its 
overseas information system transformation and integration project, BOC 
improved the functionality, operational flexibility, processing timeliness and risk 
control effectiveness of its current information system. It optimized its IT 
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infrastructure and operational maintenance system, thus improving the 
security of its IT operations and global service capability. The Bank capitalized 
on advanced technology and enhanced intelligent customer service, and 
differentiated service capability to improve customer experience. The Bank 
improved the online electronic innovation platform. It stepped up product 
innovation for its core banking system and launched personal intelligent call 
deposits, tiered interest calculation accounts, remittance packages, and 
password-based remittance (BOC annual report, 2013). 
 
Market demand plays an important role in the use of information technology for 
service channels. Customer feedback helps BOC to improve its online and 
mobile banking platform. Learning ‘best practice’ from foreign partners is 
another important force in changing service channels. BOC further developed 
and enhanced its e-banking service channels, including online banking, mobile 
banking, telephone banking, and self-service banking. The CBRC has had 
indirect influence on the development of information technology at BOC. 
However, all online or mobile banking products and services need to be 
approved by the CBRC. BOC tried to improve its management system and 
business processes to provide faster services to customers. As a result, the 
number of e-banking customers increased steadily and transaction volumes 
increased rapidly, which contributed to a continuous enhancement of 
e-banking channels to replace traditional channels. For example, in the first 
half of 2013, BOC’s e-banking transaction volume reached RMB50.86 trillion, 
an increase of 24.47% compared to the same period in 2012. The substitution 
ratio of e-banking channels for traditional outlets rose to 77.22% (BOC interim 
report, 2013).  
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6.6 Chapter Summary  
The CBRC, since its establishment in 2003, has attempted to encourage a 
more market-oriented banking sector in China. BOC began a series of 
changes under the guidance of CBRC, and, according to interviewees, most of 
the significant changes and reforms at their bank happened after 2003. 
Therefore, the case shows that the regulatory and supervisory institution is the 
key factor for reform. Nonetheless, the link with the overseas partner provided 
a useful resource for acquiring best practices and acted as a source for 
change. BOC’s ownership structure changed, and became restructured as a 
shareholding bank, named Bank of China Limited. BOC was in law made fully 
responsible for its own losses and profits, since the Chinese government could 
no longer write off its bad debts. BOC’s major shareholders include state 
owned firms and private firms as well as foreign investors. Since it was listed 
on stock market, and until 2014, Central Huijin Investment Ltd was its key 
shareholder, and it controlled more than 60% of BOC’s shares. One significant 
change is the decrease of foreign investor shares from 2006 to 2014. Despite 
the change in ownership structure, since 2006, BOC retains management 
decision-making autonomy, albeit under the aegis of the CBRC. Foreign 
investors have not been involved in management decision making, although 
they influenced the development of BOC, particularly in the area of technology 
development and product development. At the province level, managers have 
limited authority to make product or policy decisions. BOC headquarters 
makes the majority of management decisions, while the authority of the 
province level branch is limited, acting as an agency and following guidelines. 
Changes in ownership and objectives have brought an overall improvement in 
internal management, since senior managers are appointed according to 
performance and examinations, if subject to final approval from CBRC. 
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The main reason for the introduction of new human resource practices is the 
CBRC. BOC restructured its HR systems, and significant changes include 
contract employment and performance related pay and promotion. Since 2005, 
the labour contract system has helped BOC to downsize, and to create the 
conditions to improve, integrate and change skills. Examinations for promotion 
and recruitment ensure employees have the basic knowledge requirements for 
their position. Yet the age limitation for promotion and recruitment leads to low 
incentives for people to work hard when that pass the age limit. The CBRC 
directly influences the promotion of the senior managers, but has less direct 
involvement in the recruitment and promotion at lower levels. However, all 
exam papers are approved by the CBRC. Performance related pay is 
designed to incentivize employees. BOC provides training for its employees. It 
designs different training for different departments and different grades. 
Training programmes have expanded to increase general knowledge of 
banking and specific knowledge of posts. Similar to other banks, new human 
resource practices have become embedded in BOC, and helped to improve 
overall performance. 
 
BOC has traditionally had a competitive advantage in foreign trade business 
and with institutional clients, but it has made gains in the area of retail banking 
business. BOC made efforts to improve its retail banking business. It started to 
improve its basic facilities, to provide training for employees to offer customer 
service to its clients, and to develop products meeting customer needs. The 
nature of market demand plays an important role in this development. The use 
of customer feedback is a tool to help BOC improve its product development 
and thereby maintain customer relationships. Foreign investors helped BOC to 
develop products and services. The CBRC has only indirect influence at the 
operational level of the product, but must approve the introduction of all 
products and services. 
	   191	  
As for technology development, the online banking and mobile banking 
business are a common trend. Market demand is the leading force for the 
development of information and technology. BOC has focused on developing 
online and mobile banking business since 2005, along with telephone banking 
to provide multiple channel service to customers. Although CBRC has indirect 
influence on information technology development, all these services and 
products need to be approved by the CBRC. 
 
Apart from the strength of conducting business in foreign and international 
trade, as well as with certain institution clients, BOC does not have competitive 
advantages in other banking areas, such as retail banking and including 
individual customers and VIP customers. Its multiple channel services have 
been improved markedly since 2013. As the CBRC gradually allows other 
banks to conduct business in the foreign and international trade sectors, BOC 
needs to improve its competitive advantages in many aspects of banking.  
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Chapter 7 
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China  
7.1 Background  
From 1978 to 1984, during the first phase of the banking reform, the main task 
was to separate firms from the regulator and the central bank. The Chinese 
government founded the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) on 
January 1st, 1984, and it was the last of the big four firms to be reformed. It 
took over some of the responsibilities of the China People’s Bank, mainly 
commercial activities in urban areas. In 1985, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China had already established branched in most of the provinces and 
cities in Mainland China. During 1985 to 1994, in phase two of the Chinese 
banking sector reform, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China had the 
role of helping to grow state owned firms, and did so under the guidance of the 
government. As a result, ICBC became the leading bank in China. In 1993, its 
savings accounted for 42.1% of the whole Chinese bank industry (ICBC, 
2014b). The third stage of Chinese banking sector change, from 1994 to 2002, 
pushed ICBC into the next phase of its reform. As we have noted, 1994 saw 
the creation of three policy banks, and from 1995, the Central Bank Law 
determined that banks should pursue profits and compete. A major aim at that 
stage was to control the non-performing loans and bad debts. The Chinese 
government helped ICBC to write off part of its bad debts, and ICBC has 
maintained its bad debts at 1.6% of the total since 1999. 
 
The government acknowledged that Chinese banks still showed low 
performance and slowness in their reform, and that further reform would need 
help from government. China joined the WTO in 2002, and the government 
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agreed to open up the financial sector, and, in 2003, CBRC was appointed. It 
dealt first with CCB and BOC, and then turned its attention to ICBC, which 
entered its next phase of development 
 
7.2 Strategic Control  
7.21 Ownership 
In August 2005, with the clear aim of creating a commercially orientated 
structure, ICBC was restructured as a joint stock limited company, 
differentiating it from its former status of wholly state owned commercial banks, 
It was formally renamed Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited on 
October 28, 2005. Before listing on the stock market (June, 2005), ICBC 
disposed of RMB 705 billion of NPLs, assisted by RMB 246 billion from the 
MOF (Hong Kong Stock Exchange Market, 2005a). Most of the 
non-performing loans were transferred to Huarong AMC. Therefore, by the end 
of 2006, they constituted 3.79 per cent of all loans, compared to above 20 per 
cent in 2002. The basic ownership pattern was established, and, as shown by 
the table 7-1 and table 7-2 for 2006 and 2013, it remained intact for eight years. 
A share refers stock purchased in Shanghai Stock Exchange; H share refers 
stock purchased in Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The following list includes the 
top ten shareholders.  
 
Table 7-1: Major Shareholders of ICBC (2006) 
Name of Shareholder Nature of 
Shareholder  
Total Number of 
shares held  
Shareholding 
percentage 
Ministry of Finance of 
the People’s Republic 
State-owned  118,006,174,032 
(A-shares) 
35.3% 
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of China 
Central Huijin 
Investment Ltd  
State-owned 118,006,174,032 
(A-shares) 
35.3% 
Hong Kong Securities 
Clearing Company 
Nominee Limited 
Foreign 
Investor  
43,222,318,000 
(H-shares) 
12.9% 
Goldman Sachs  Foreign 
Investor  
16,476,014,155 
(H-shares) 
4.9% 
National Council for 
Social Security Fund 
State-owned 14,102,149,559 
(H-shares) 
4.2% 
Dresdner Bank 
Luxembourg S.A. 
(Allianz holds shares 
in ICBC through its 
Dresdner Bank 
subsidiary  
Foreign 
Investor 
6,432,601,015 
(H-shares) 
1.9% 
American Express  Foreign 
Investors  
1,276,122,233 
(H-shares) 
0.4% 
China Life Insurance 
(Group) Company  
Domestic non 
state-owned  
809,266,000 
(A-shares) 
0.2% 
China Life Insurance 
Company Limited  
Domestic non 
state-owned 
682,083,807 
(A-shares) 
0.2% 
China Pacific Life 
Insurance Co., Ltd.  
Domestic non 
state-owned 
655,591,000 
(A-shares) 
0.2% 
 
 
(Source from: ICBC annual report, 2006) 
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Table 7-2: Major Shareholders of ICBC (2013) 
Name of 
Shareholder 
Nature of 
Shareholder  
Total Number of 
shares held  
Shareholding 
percentage 
Central Huijin 
Investment Ltd 
State-owned  124,155,852,951 
 (A-shares) 
35.33% 
Ministry of 
Finance of the 
People’s 
Republic of China 
State-owned 123,316,451,864 
 (A-shares) 
35.09% 
Hong Kong 
Securities 
Clearing 
Company 
Nominee Limited 
Foreign Investor 86,013,832,094 
(H-shares) 
 
24.48% 
Ping An Life 
Insurance 
Company of 
China Ltd  
Domestic non 
state-owned  
4,474,434,462 
(A-shares) 
 
1.27% 
ICBC Credit 
Suisse Asset 
Management Co. 
Limited 
Domestic non 
state-owned 
1,053,190,083 
(A-shares) 
0.30% 
China Securities 
Finance Co. Ltd  
Domestic non 
state-owned 
806,536,828 
(A-shares) 
0.23% 
An-Bang 
Insurance 
(Group) 
Company  
Domestic non 
state-owned 
540,842,624 
(A-shares) 
0.15% 
China Life 
Insurance 
Company Limited  
Domestic non 
state-owned 
373,491,528 
(A-shares) 
0.11% 
China Pacific Life 
Insurance Co., 
Domestic non 
state-owned 
262,303,877 
(A-shares) 
0.07% 
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Ltd.  
Ping An Life 
Insurance 
Company of 
China Ltd 
Domestic non 
state-owned 
261,629,846 
(A-shares) 
0.07% 
 
(Source from: ICBC annual report, 2013) 
  
Huijin, a state-owned firm, and the Ministry of Finance took the large 
ownership shares (always above 35% each), by 2013. Most of the top 
shareholders are former state-owned firms, although each of their holdings is 
comparatively small. The major overseas shareholder in 2013 is Hong Kong 
Securities Clearing Company Nominee Limited. In 2006, Goldman Sachs had 
one representative on the Board of Directors, but could not influence 
management policy. One significant change from that time is the decrease in 
shares of overseas shareholders. Goldman Sachs (which had once held 4.9%), 
Dresdner Bank Luxembourg (1.9%), and American Express (0.4%) all sold up. 
Despite the change in ownership structure, the Board of Directors at ICBC 
retains the power of decision making (within CBRC’s policy framework). 
Chinese state owned enterprises do not interfere in ICBC operations, and 
multinational partners do not and cannot have enough shares to determine 
policy. As in the other state owned commercial banks, shareholders exercise 
general governance, and attend shareholders’ meetings (ICBC annual report, 
2012). 
 
ICBC’s management structure, shown in Figure 7-1, demonstrates that there is 
a common structure in state owned commercial banks: the headquarters and 
its departments, branches in the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous 
overseas representative branches (Tier 1), plus the more local operational 
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branches (Tier 2). Both the main company and the tier 1 branches have their 
own headquarters, with a human resource department, an information 
technology department, and a credit card department. Within the province, the 
headquarters follows the instructions and guidelines set by the company 
headquarters, and acts as the means for implementing policy. 
Decision-making within the provinces level is limited. ICBC headquarters 
makes the management decisions, with the approval of the CBRC. The 
provincial headquarters and departments coordinate with the main office, and, 
whole managing corporate clients directly, action policy in the city branches 
(Tier 2). 
 
Figure 7-1: Organizational Structure of ICBC 
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As was claimed at ICBC, Jiangang Chen (2013), a Tier 2 branch president, 
states that the CBRC more strictly supervises state owned banks than 
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of an advanced corporate governance model by international standards is one 
of the key factors to develop the Bank into a pre-eminent international modern 
financial institution (ICBC annual report, 2006). ICBC has established and 
improved its organizational structure for corporate governance, consisting of 
the Shareholders’ General Meeting, the Board of Directors, the Board of 
Supervisors and the senior management. The Board of Directors makes the 
strategic decisions, and consists of 16 directors, including 4 executive 
directors, 6 non-executive directors and 6 independent non-executive directors. 
ICBC has strict division of duties and separation of power between the Board 
of Directors and its senior management. The senior managers operate the 
business based on decisions from the Board of Directors. The Board of 
Supervisors takes the responsibility of supervision of the bank, and is 
accountable to the shareholder’s general meeting. The Board of Supervisors 
consists of 5 supervisors, namely 1 shareholder supervisor, 2 external 
supervisors and 2 employee supervisors. (ICBC, annual report, 2013). The 
senior management is the executive body of the Bank is accountable to the 
Board of Directors, and consists of 8 members. They work on the basis that 
ICBC needs, under the 1995 Commercial Bank Law, to evolve into commercial 
banks. 
 
In 2006, ICBC was listed on both the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock 
exchanges. In this period of its evolution, ICBC began to compete 
commercially and to offer shares, and started its international expansion, 
diversifying and expanding overseas, assisted by the ‘Going Global’ policy and 
RMB internationalization. It endeavoured to promote the endogenous 
development of overseas operations by providing a basic service to its clients 
globally. ICBC expanded its business in most of major financial centres around 
the world, such as Singapore, Tokyo, Seoul, Busan, Frankfurt and Luxemburg. 
By 2013, ICBC had established 329 operations in 40 countries, covering six 
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continents in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, North America, Australia, 
and the major global financial centres. In 2013, the Bank ranked first place 
among the Top 1000 World Banks by The Banker magazine (ICBC annual 
report, 2013).  
 
7.22 FDI 
In 2006, ICBC signed agreements with the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. The 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. is a leading global investment bank, and a 
securities and investment management firm, providing products and services 
to worldwide customers, which includes corporations, financial institutions, 
governments and high-net-worth individuals. The Goldman Sachs Group was 
founded in 1869. Its headquarters is located in New York and it has offices in 
all major financial centres around the world (Goldman Sachs, 2014). Goldman 
Sachs has extensive experience and expertise in risk management, treasury 
management and products, asset management and financing, coupled, it 
claims, with its consultancy in corporate governance and internal control. The 
motivation of ICBC to cooperate with Goldman Sachs is that it believes the 
American firm can assist with corporate governance, risk management and 
developing its banking business. Therefore, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 
(Goldman Sachs) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC) 
had entered into definitive agreements with respect to (i) a strategic 
investment of U.S. $2.58 billion US dollar in newly issued ordinary shares of 
ICBC and (ii) Goldman Sachs helping ICBC to develop corporate governance, 
risk management and internal controls, and to provide expertise to help ICBC 
to improve its asset management, corporate and investment banking, 
non-performing loans disposal, and product innovation (ICBC annual report, 
2006). ICBC ordinary shares purchased by Goldman Sachs were subject to 
substantial transfer restrictions that, among other things, halted any sale for at 
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least three years from the closing date. Goldman Sachs, as we have seen, had 
the right to nominate one director of ICBC. If Goldman Sachs held less than a 
total of 2.5% of ICBC shares, then it would lose the nomination right. In April 
2006, Goldman Sachs subscribed for 16,476,014,155 shares, which equalled 
4.9% of the total shareholding percentage. The initial term of cooperation was 
five years, and could have been extended or been subject to early termination 
by ICBC at any time. Until 2011, although ICBC net profit increased every year 
since 2006, it was considered one of the slowest growths amongst the big 
banks. Since then, Goldman Sachs gradually reduced its shares, particularly in 
April 2012, when it sold 2.5 billion shares, mostly to Temasek Holdings, the 
Singaporean sovereign investment firm. Therefore, Goldman Sachs has not 
been in the top 10 shareholders of ICBC since 2012 (ICBC annual report, 
2012).  
 
Allianz is a world leading insurance company and financial services provider. It 
was founded in 1890, and it was originally located in Munich. Nowadays, its 
headquarters is located in Berlin. Allianz provides insurance and asset 
management products and services to over 83 million customers in more than 
70 countries. It includes a wide range of property, casualty, life and health 
insurance products for both private and corporate customers, It is the leading 
property and casualty insurer globally, and ranks among the top five in the life 
and health insurance business. In 1994, Allianz established representative 
offices in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. However, the representative 
offices in Guangzhou and Shanghai were closed in 2003 and 2008 
respectively. In 2003, Allianz Insurance Company opened a wholly 
foreign-funded subsidiary insurance company with its headquarters located in 
Guangzhou. It mainly offers a series of insurance services including property, 
liability, marine, engineering, and domestic credit insurance, as well as 
short-term health insurance and accident insurance for clients within the 
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province of Guangdong, including Shenzhen. The motivation of Allianz to ally 
with ICBC is to expand into China. ICBC considers that Allianz has extensive 
experience and expertise in insurance business. It believes that Allianz is a 
valuable partner for ICBC to develop leading insurance products and services 
(ICBC annual report, 2006). Allianz subscribed for 6,432,601,015 shares, 
through its wholly owned subsidiary Dresdner Bank Luxembourg S.A., 
amounting to 1.9% of the total shareholding percentage. Allianz reached an 
agreement with ICBC to offer technical assistance for its insurance business, 
but without any management responsibility. Further to the joint press release 
by Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and Allianz Group 
(Allianz), issued on March 25, 2009, both parties reaffirmed their strategic 
cooperative relationship. Nonetheless, Allianz has sold 3,216,300,507 ICBC H 
shares, on April 28, 2009, to a selected group of investors through a private 
sale. Allianz continues to hold 3,216,300,508 H shares in ICBC. After the sale, 
the total shareholding by Allianz represents approximately 0.97 percent of 
ICBC’s total outstanding shares. Its actions gained the support of regulators 
(ICBC annual report, 2009). In July, 2010, with official approval from the CBRC, 
Allianz Insurance Company Guangzhou Branch was permitted to transform 
from a branch to a subsidiary, and completed all legal processes, including the 
license application, and officially commenced operation in the name of Allianz 
China General Insurance Company Ltd. Since then, Allianz gradually sold its 
remaining ICBC shares. Two years later, in March 2012, the company opened 
its first branch in Shanghai. Allianz China General Insurance Company Ltd will 
be able to apply to extend its for branches across provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities outside Guangdong (Allianz, 2014).  
 
American Express Company is a diversified worldwide travel, financial, and 
network service firm, founded on 1850. Its principal products and services are 
charge and credit payment card products and travel and business services. In 
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2004, ICBC became American Express’ first card-issuing partner in China. 
ICBC considered that American Express had extensive experience and 
expertise in the credit card business. It believed that American Express is a 
valuable partner for ICBC to develop credit card products for its customers. In 
2006, American Express subscribed for 1,276,122,233 shares of ICBC, which 
took 0.4% of total shareholding. American Express Company reached the 
agreement with ICBC to offer technical assistance for its credit card business, 
however, without any management responsibility. The motivation of American 
Express Company was to cooperate through ICBC’s domestic network and to 
build new markets. Since then, American Express Company and ICBC have 
worked together and introduced more than 30 credit card products for 
individual and corporate customers in China. ''This partnership provides us 
with the opportunity to cultivate the tremendous potential of the Chinese credit 
card market,'' said Jiang Jianqing, chairman and president of the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC annual report, 2006). 'The profitable 
[initiatives] are going to be those that put credit cards in the hands of Chinese 
who travel abroad,' he added. Kenneth I. Chenault, American Express's 
chairman and chief executive, described the foray into the Chinese market as 
one of its broadest third-party alliances to date. He said that ICBC was already 
the country's largest card issuer. Under the arrangement, ICBC will market and 
issue cards with an American Express logo. Customers will be able to use the 
cards at any of the merchants in ICBC 's existing network as well as through 
merchants in American Express's international network. In turn, American 
Express will earn a percentage of every purchase, and its cardholders from 
other countries will have access to the merchants in ICBC's network (ICBC 
annual report, 2006). Until 2013, American Express still had a cooperative 
strategic partnership with ICBC, although the US firm was no longer one of its 
top 10 shareholders (ICBC annual report, 2013). 
 
	   204	  
ICBC case indicates that it chose its partner by focusing on specific finance 
markets, and seeking partners that could help to develop specific areas, rather 
than choosing a commercial bank to help development in many areas. It chose 
Goldman Sachs for corporate governance and risk management, Allianz for 
insurance business, and American Express for its credit card know-how. 
 
7.3 Human resource  
As in the case of CCB and BOC, the new contract system that replaced life 
time employment on the instructions of the CBRC helped ICBC in downsizing 
the number of employees. Reform at the company started in 2005, with the 
founding of a human resource department, which was responsible too for 
upgrading skills and improving the bank’s efficiency. To keep their current 
positions, all employees had to pass the relevant examination of knowledge 
and competence, or be transferred to another post or undertake training. 
Retirement was another option for long standing staff. ICBC took two further 
decisions. It hired many capable employees from other commercial banks 
(while also losing people to rivals). It sub-contracted out the employment of 
less skilled positions, such as cleaners, and particularly high skilled personnel, 
such as information system developers. 
 
7.31 Promotion  
Similarly, ICBC tends to promote its senior or key managerial staff internally 
(Mr Xueming Lu, Tier 2 Branch HR Manager, interview, 24th July 2013). There 
is a pattern in promotion in CCB, BOC and ICBC, and therefore the state 
owned commercial banks have followed closely the policy set by the CBRC. 
Internal promotion retains staff with experience and knowledge of the business, 
but tends towards guanxi and maintaining the iron rice bowl approach. ICBC 
	   205	  
divides its employees into 25 levels. For example, the first level is the 
president of ICBC, and the second is the senior vice president of ICBC. The 
third is vice president. The fourth level is the president of the tier-one branch; 
the fifth level is the president of the tier-two branch. The tenth level is the 
president of the individual branch (ICBC annual report, 2013). Key managerial 
staffs at or above the fifth level are directly selected and appointed by 
headquarters, and need to be approved by the CBRC. Before their formal 
appointment, ICBC evaluates all candidates through written examinations 
devised by the bank, and all candidates must pass. Then, performance during 
the past years needs to be evaluated, and interviews are held at ICBC 
headquarters. From this point, ICBC adopted the state owned commercial 
bank practice in which ‘guanxi’ plays important role, and those candidates with 
political, personal or organizational support within their department or higher 
management are selected (Mr Jiangang Chen, Tier 2 Branch President, 
interview, 23rd July 2013). Appointments of key managerial staffs at the fifth 
level or below are appointed at the provincial or city level, as in CCB and BOC. 
ICBC similarly evaluates the performance of candidates over a period of years. 
Some positions can be obtained without examinations, but some require a 
pass in examinations set by the ICBC provincial branch, after which there are 
interviews. Occasionally, key managerial staff. Each position has different 
requirements in experience or qualifications, and there are additionally 
maximum age limits. 
 
The CBRC has a strong influence on the appointment of the ICBC president 
and vice-presidents. It is accepted that ICBC’s promotion system is still 
influenced by SOE practice and ‘guanxi’ (Ms Haojuan Zhang, Sub Branch, VIP 
and Individual Customer Client Relationship Manager, interview, 23rd July. 
2013). What has made a substantial change – at the instigation of the CBRC in 
the industry – is the introduction of examinations. Before 2005, promotion was 
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almost entirely based on guanxi, but afterwards no employee could be 
promoted without passing an examination. While employees are likely to be 
promoted on the basis of personal networks, they must first demonstrate that 
they have reached the basic knowledge requirements.  
 
7.32 Recruitment  
In the same manner as the other state owned banks, ICBC has adopted the 
full range of recruitment strategies: graduate recruitment, target recruitment, 
open recruitment, and internship (Mr Xueming Lu, Tier 2 Branch HR Manager, 
interview, 24th July 2013; ICBC, 2014a). Graduate recruitment is the most 
important recruitment method. As in the other state owned commercial banks, 
ICBC hires full time graduates who must apply online in the year before their 
graduation, from a high ranking university, having achieved good grades, and 
holding a level 6 in the national English test or an IELTS 6. For some 
headquarters or provincial branch management, candidates must have a 
Master’s degree. Written examinations are set by the ICBC headquarters and 
test English, administrative and professional skills, and knowledge and 
expertise. After the candidates have passed the examinations, ICBC will select 
suitable appointees by interview (ICBC, 2014a).  
 
Targeted recruitment is similar to graduate recruitment, as we have seen, save 
that it accepts students with diplomas rather than Bachelor degrees from high 
ranking universities. These practices are referred to as target recruitment 
because they seek to fulfil a specific post, and because, as a legacy of guanxi, 
they allow the hiring of connected but less qualified individuals. The number of 
such posts however has been greatly reduced, and ICBC, like other banks, 
has to move towards graduate recruitment as the basis of its hiring strategy. 
	   207	  
Open is aimed at the local labour market, although ICBC tends to promote 
their employees internally or hires graduates. ICBC resorts to this approach 
when it cannot find suitable candidates from amongst its own employees, 
which is reflected at CCB and BOC (Mr Xueming Lu, Tier 2 Branch HR 
Manager, interview, 24th July 2013). ICBC has held, since 2005, an internship 
programme during summer for students intending to graduate the following 
year. The state owned commercial banks, as we have discerned, chose 
graduates through entrance examinations, but the internship will be an 
important consideration in the selection criteria after the examinations. The 
headquarters runs its own internship programme, and the provincial or local 
branch internship opportunities do not need to be approved by the 
headquarters.  
 
7.33 Training and development  
Since 2005, ICBC has focused on training and development, and on helping 
employees plan their long-term career development. New employees need to 
attend induction training. Then ICBC divides its employees into three 
categories: administrator and manager, professionals and business 
representatives. For different levels and positions, ICBC organizes different 
types of training. The course formats include face-to-face training, online 
education for twenty major training programmes, and a digital library. Since 
2007, ICBC has focused on the professional employees’ development, and on 
employees achieving international certificates in varied aspects of banking. 
ICBC attends to middle-aged employee development and to their attaining 
professional skills. Since 2011, ICBC has selected employees and sent them 
to top overseas universities or internships with foreign firms, including Morgan 
Stanley, and cooperation with many top universities such as Cambridge and 
Stanford. By 2012, 267 employees have attended these programs and 157 
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employees have successfully graduated from overseas institutions. In 2012, 
ICBC provided 36,000 training sessions to employees in total (ICBC annual 
report, 2012). 
 
7.34 Pay policy and welfare  
ICBC’s pay and welfare system retains elements inherited from Chinese SOEs. 
So, pay is based on seniority and position-related pay system, plus an annual 
performance-related bonus. The pay rate and welfare benefits are additionally 
related to the economic development of each locality. Both length of service 
and position determine the basic salary and welfare benefits. After the reform 
of the SOE system, employees relied on general government hospital and 
pension systems, for which ICBC would meet the fees or contributions. ICBC 
participates in local social insurance schemes for basic healthcare and basic 
pension, and it pays for unemployment insurance, industrial injury insurance, 
maternity benefits, and a staff housing provident fund. To improve protection 
for medical care in retirement, the bank has corporate annuity and 
supplementary medical insurance. Furthermore, different branches and 
sub-branches have established childcare subsidies. ICBC always organized 
social events and sporting activities, including parent-child activities and 
athletic meetings to enrich an employee’s off-the-job life, and to relieve work 
pressure. By the end of 2012, ICBC had established 504 service departments 
for the care of retired employees (ICBC social responsibility report, 2012). 
 
7.35 Summary  
The current ICBC has the characteristics of CCB and BOC: it mixed the old 
SOE system with international practices. The change in the nature of staff 
contracts, as introduced in 2003, replaced lifetime employment, forced staff to 
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pass a competency examination, and brought about examinations for 
recruitment and promotion. Yet guanxi influences the selection process after 
individuals have passed the requisite examination. At ICBC, targeted 
recruitment specially hires employees’ children or people with ‘guanxi’. The 
key significant change after the reform is training and development. As in other 
banks, with the expectations of the CBRC, ICBC conducts induction training, 
and it provides programmes different positions and levels. Compared to the 
other state owned banks, ICBC has shown greater inclination to send 
employees to study abroad or to gain work experience with overseas banks, 
where they might learn ‘best practice’. 
 
7.4 Client and Customer Relationships and Product 
Development  
ICBC is no different from the other state owned banks in dividing its clients or 
customers into four types, categorized by corporate, small to medium firm, 
individual VIP customer, and individual customer. Corporate clients are 
responsible for a large part of ICBC’s revenues, and ‘guanxi’ plays an 
important role in obtaining and keeping such clients. Small to medium firms are 
less important to its commercial operations than the other three, as they are for 
the other state owned banks. To attract and keep the relationship with 
individual VIP customer and individual customer, ‘guanxi’, product, and service 
quality have important roles, and tailor-made services and products are 
provided. 
 
With the aim to improve the quality and efficiency of services to retail 
customers, ICBC implements the ‘Big Retail’ strategy. ICBC established a 
service policy framework to guide employees on how to provide customer 
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service. ICBC has a third party to investigate and evaluate its customer 
services and overall customer satisfaction, and to identify those factors that 
could influence customer’s perceptions. This can provide a data support for 
improving customer service (ICBC annual report, 2012; 2013). As the same as 
other banks, ICBC invested in its sub-branches and implemented its 
‘customer-centric operation service system’ to enhance and diversify service 
capability and its retail banking. At the end of 2012, ICBC has refurbished its 
16,718 sub branches in the mainland of China. ICBC established service 
facilities accessible to disabled customers. In the meantime, it has 
concentrated on expanding self-service facilities, including ATMs. At the end of 
2013, ICBC had 21,825 self-service banks and 80,501 ATMs in mainland of 
China. ICBC developed ‘the ICBC Merchant Friend Club platform’, which is 
based on a system to classify different levels of customers by their savings or 
loans. Based on customers’ data collected through this system, ICBC could 
identify or expand the numbers of premium customers, and develop precise 
marketing activities. For example, ICBC targeted key customer groups, and 
promoted a coordinated marketing campaign for the public and private sectors 
to popularize its ‘ICBC Salary Manager’ payroll service. ICBC provided 
different wealth management products to different customers based on its data 
collection platform. With the same information, ICBC according to strict criteria 
implemented differentiated housing credit or personal loans to support the 
needs of borrowers. At the end of June 2014, the Bank had 449 million 
personal customers, including 9.29 million personal loan customers, 
representing an increase of 17.01 million and 0.55 million from the end of the 
previous year, respectively. According to statistics from the PBC, at the end of 
June 2014, the Bank ranked first in the domestic industry in terms of both the 
balance of personal deposits and personal loans, with a market share of 15.01% 
and 13.1% respectively (ICBC interim report, 2014). 
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Just as other banks, ICBC generally divided its VIP customers into three 
categories: basic VIP customers, wealth management and private banking 
business, depending on a customer’s savings or loans. Different services and 
products are designed for each level. The CBRC further regulated the 
development of wealth management business and sought to mitigate risks. 
ICBC made greater efforts to develop and launch new wealth management 
products and services to customers, and to conduct related marketing 
activities toward new markets and customers. For example, ICBC launched 
specific marketing campaigns among target customers, and scaled up ‘the 
Elite Club Account service’ for them. ICBC provides individualized and 
specialized services to this group of customers, and established wealth 
management centers in selected branches. ICBC trained its employees to be 
qualified to offer wealth management services to customers. At the end of 
June 2014, 26,289 employees gained the certificate of Associate Financial 
Planner (AFP); 3, 944 employees gained the Certified Financial Planner (CFP). 
The total number of Elite Club Account holders reached 30.51 million at the 
end of June 2014, and the total number of wealth customers reached to 4.74 
million. For example, in the Shanghai Branch, the project of "convenient 
receipt taking" was put into operation, which enables corporate clients to print 
their receipts on any self-help receipt printing terminal with their financial 
service cards and passwords linked to their accounts. It mitigates operational 
risks, saves a series of traditional procedures in the counter businesses, and 
reduces workload (ICBC annual report, 2013). Although ICBC made many 
efforts to develop products and services for its individual VIP customers, 
‘guanxi’ is the key factor to attract and maintain this group of customers (Ms 
Haojuan Zhang, Sub Branch, VIP and Individual Customer Client Relationship 
Manager, interview, 23rd July 2013). 
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ICBC tried to extend private banking business and develop a network of 
channels covering nationwide high-end customer markets. It strengthened 
internet finance services by popularizing basic private banking services on 
mobile banking and internet banking platforms, as well as by releasing ‘ICBC 
Private Banking’, and it’s WeChat service platform to build all-dimensional 
private banking product and service channels. ICBC located its global product 
research and development in Hong Kong Private Banking centre. ICBC 
improved its private banking management product lines and services by 
leveraging interaction with the Group’s domestic and overseas institutions. 
ICBC was awarded the ‘Best Private Bank in China’ by Finance Asia. At the 
end of June 2014, ICBC had over 39,300 private banking customers and 
managed RMB675.7 billion worth of assets (ICBC interim report, 2014).  
 
As CBRC sets the percentage of each bank’s business for small enterprises, 
ICBC supports the development of small enterprise as a new business 
opportunity as well as a social responsibility commitment. It gradually realized 
that, in a more competitive environment, state owned banks, national 
commercial banks, and foreign banks all compete for large corporations as 
clients. ICBC started to adjust its business strategy, paying attention to small 
to medium enterprises and developing products, such as ‘Petty Credit Loan’ 
and ‘Online Revolving Loan’. It strengthened services to SME clients by 
building an independent and complete system of SME credit policies, 
processes and products. ICBC provides all basic financial services to small 
and medium enterprises. Moreover, it made efforts to expand markets, by 
pushing forward business development among small and micro enterprises on 
the upstream and downstream of the supply chain, in special markets and 
industry clusters. At the end of 2012, the total medium, small and micro 
enterprise clients increased by 11.8% compared to 2011 (ICBC annual report, 
2012). However, the process of providing loans to small to medium enterprises 
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is still very strictly regulated and time consuming (Mr Xin Xu, Sub Branch, 
Small to Medium Enterprises Department Manager, interview, 22nd July 2013). 
In 2013, ICBC enriched its system of all small enterprises and finance products 
by introducing pilot medium and long-term credit such as commercial housing 
mortgage loans and property building loans to small enterprises. It introduced 
the ‘Easy Loan Corporate Card’ business for small and micro enterprises, and 
provided unsecured ‘petty credit loans’ to small and micro enterprises. At the 
end of June 2014, the balance of loans to small (micro) and medium-sized 
enterprises reached RMB 4,548,905 million, including RMB 2,731,797 million 
to medium-sized enterprises and RMB 1,817,198 million to small and micro 
enterprises (ICBC interim report, 2014). 
 
Service and products are important for maintaining the relationship with 
corporate clients, even if ‘guanxi’ tends to be more dominant. ICBC aims to 
meet the diverse and individualized financial requirements of customers. It 
continues to serve national institutional clients, including organizing the social 
insurance, housing allowance, education and medical care schemes run by 
government. It still funds the state’s key development projects and it has 
increased loan extensions for new urbanization programmes, core and 
advanced industries, infrastructure, energy and natural resources, and modern 
service businesses. ICBC has supported the ‘Going Global’ efforts of Chinese 
state-owned companies, and developed cross-border trade finance. In 2014, 
ICBC organized the Treasury’s electronic centralized payment system, and 
assisted fiscal and taxation system reform; developed platforms for the 
integrated social security and housing fund services in order to raise efficiency 
and improve customer experience; it implemented the national equities 
exchange and quotation (NEEQ) system; and it was among first firms to 
introduce a centralized clearing service for RMB interest rate swaps at the 
Shanghai Clearing House (ICBC interim report, 2014). At the end of June 2014, 
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ICBC had 5,032,000 corporate customers in total, representing an increase of 
297,000 over the end of 2013. According to the statistics from the PBC, at the 
end of June 2014, the Bank ranked first in the domestic banking industry in 
terms of corporate deposits and corporate loans, with a market share of 11.8% 
and 11.3%, respectively. The total balance of corporate loans reached RMB 
7,576,419 million, representing an increase of RMB 529,90m or 7.5% over the 
end of 2013. The balance of corporate deposits amounted to RMB 8,120,197m, 
an increase of RMB616,700 million or 8.2% from the end of 2013 (ICBC 
annual report, 2013). 
 
ICBC seeks to use technological innovation for product development. For 
example, in 2012, it launched a number of products such as foreign exchange 
trading on a personal account, regular investment accounts, and gold 
purchases. ICBC emphasizes the development of its bank card business. It 
cooperates with American Express, and has developed a card that can 
operate in two currencies, for use all over the world, the transaction going 
through UnionPay in RMB and through American Express merchants globally 
in US dollars. Depending on personal saving and incomes levels, ICBC offers 
a Gold and General American Express card. Also in cooperation with 
American Express, ICBC promotes a card to Chinese customers based on 
incomes and savings and consequently with different levels of service and 
credit limits. Mobile and internet banking services are supplied to all American 
Express cardholders, with services including reminders of balance changes. At 
some point, these product approaches were applied to holders of the card 
provided solely by ICBC (ICBC annual report, 2012). 
 
In 2012, ICBC launched a number of card related products or services, such 
as the Account Manager, the Lump Sum Remittance and Withdrawal by 
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Instalments, the Bank-Hospital Card, the JCB dual currency credit card, the 
credit-debit-in-one card, the ICBC-AXA co-branded card, and a two card 
account. ICBC bases its business offerings on large customer data, and seeks 
to match the card to targeted customers and their individual needs. The bank 
specially developed an ‘Easy Loan’ business credit card for small and micro 
enterprises. ICBC upgraded its services with a chip debit card systems, which 
improved the personal security of customers. By June 2014, ICBC was the 
No.1 credit card issuer in China (ICBC interim report, 2014). 
 
As with the other state owned banks, ICBC designs and develops its own 
products. The provincial branch moreover can introduce short-term products 
(only available for six months) for retail and corporate clients. The city branch 
level can pass customer feedback to the provincial branch, and then on to the 
headquarters, to assist with product development. ICBC invites customers to 
view products pre-launch, and assesses their feedback directly. For example, 
in 2012, ICBC collected 355 customer feedbacks on new products. Since 2010, 
it has organized the ‘ICBC Cup’ or the National Competition in Innovative 
Design in Banking Products for university students. For example, in 2012, over 
6,200 students participated in the competition, and more than 370 universities, 
such as Tsinghua University and Renmin University of China, were involved. 
 
The Chinese government to take responsibility for commercial banking 
activities in urban areas originally established ICBC. Therefore, ICBC has 
competitive advantages from a large number of individual customers as well 
as large corporate clients in commercial, urban banking. Since the CBRC 
regulates the percentage of each type of banking business every firm must 
hold in the totality of its operations, especially for supporting small to medium 
firms and agriculture industries, ICBC accepts the importance of customer 
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relationships, and has improved services and products for small to medium 
enterprises. It has evolved in addition specialized services and products for 
high-end individual customers, a trend typical in domestic banks. ICBC 
headquarters must develop services within the remit set by CBRC. The 
branches have no authority to develop permanent products and focus on 
reporting customer feedback to the headquarters. ICBC has three main ways 
of collecting customers’ feedback, with customers bringing their feedback to 
their local branches, third parties collecting feedbacks, or customers being 
invited to the pre-launch of new products and services. ICBC particularly 
focuses on the development of card business. ICBC and America Express 
introduced different types of credit cards for Chinese domestic customers. 
ICBC applied the approach it learnt from American Express to develop its own 
card business, showing the impact of a foreign partner on product and service 
development. Moreover, through introducing and improving information 
systems, ICBC could provide targeted marketing activities and products. 
‘Guanxi’ still plays an important role in maintaining clients and customers, most 
obviously for large corporate and government clients. 
 
7.5 Information Technology  
ICBC, as have CCB and BOC have realized the importance of information 
technology development for online and mobile service and for self-service 
facilities. It has improved its online service system and launched its ‘Online 
POS’ product, which has made online transfer and other basic financial 
activities more convenient. ICBC diversified its online banking business to 
cater for corporate and personal customers. Since 2006, it has launched 
various new products such as an online shopping mall, online cross-border 
remittance, intercity account management, online account reconciliation 
between bank and corporation, and a bulk payment system for enterprises. 
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Since 2006, ICBC has put its online banking system in the three overseas 
branches of Seoul, Tokyo and Macau, a convenience to customers who work 
or travel to these countries. ICBC has improved the security of online banking 
system, with an E-banking password card, and security question validation 
and log-in (ICBC annual report, 2006). In the early stage of its online banking, 
ICBC encountered problems, as its system was not fully compatible with 
others or with Mac computers. Customers complained about the complexity of 
using its online banking services and about the levels of security. After nearly 
eight years of development, ICBC solved those difficulties (Mr Qin Zeng, Tier 2 
Branch, Electronic Banking Department Vice Manager, interview, 23rd July 
2013). 
 
By the end of 2012, ICBC's e-banking exceeded RMB300 trillion, an increase 
of 17.2% compared with the previous year. Business conducted through 
e-banking was equivalent to transactions processed by 230,000 bank counters, 
so saving labor time and improving business efficiency. More than half of fund 
transactions and sales of wealth management products and 90% of foreign 
exchange trading and precious metals transactions were conducted through 
its e-banking channels (ICBC annual report, 2012). 
  
ICBC developed its mobile financial services to allow transfers, withdrawals, 
and balance checks. By the end of 2012, ICBC mobile banking offered 74 
services. Customer feedback was used to implement improvements (ICBC 
annual report, 2012). In 2006, ICBC launched new telephone banking services, 
such as telephone payment (BTOC), automatic payment and payment 
reminder services. The initial experiment occurred in seven branches, such as 
Tianjing. By the end of 2006, the service covered 33 domestic areas (ICBC, 
annual report, 2006). By the end of 2012, the telephone banking hotline 95588 
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answered more than 95% of calls from customer, and ICBC managed to 
answer over 90% of calls within 20 seconds. In order to meet the needs of 
customers who frequently work overseas or travel, ICBC launched services 
such as overseas iPhone mobile banking, the overseas electronic password 
device, the overseas co-branded card, overseas telephone banking for the 
global asset management and personal customers (Mr Qin Zeng, Tier 2 
Branch, Electronic Banking Department Vice Manager, interview, 23rd July 
2013). 
 
ICBC piloted TV banking at its Jiangsu branch, which provided basic financial 
services such as account management, transfer and remittance. Customers 
could complete business transactions easily while watching television. To 
enhance its multiple service channels, ICBC launched Android internet 
banking, the mobile life client, cash withdrawal by mobile phone, corporate 
foreign exchange trading, internet banking for the Firefox or Google browsers, 
smart response to short message banking, and the self-service card issuing 
machine. ICBC diversified its insurance brokerage via internet banking and 
self-service equipment. 
 
As well as facilitating account transactions, ICBC has utilized the Internet to 
market products. For example, in 2012, ICBC launched marketing and 
promotion campaigns through online advertising. ICBC has used social media, 
such as Weibo and Wechat, to collect customer’s feedback. ICBC improved its 
branch queuing management system, its product appointment service and 
preliminary document filling service at the counter. It upgraded its customer 
data integration system in 2006. As a result, ICBC could cross-sell products 
and services between different departments. For example, a client with a 
private medium-sized enterprise account could be recommended for an 
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individual VIP customer account if personal savings reached the required 
standards (Mr. Qin Zeng, Tier 2 Branch, Electronic Banking Department Vice 
Manager, interview, 23rd July 2013). 
 
In the area of information technology development, market demand and firm 
level initiative played the key role in pushing the change in service channels. 
Customer feedback helped to improve services, and ICBC could communicate 
with customers directly through social media. The CBRC has had less direct 
influence information technology development, and clearly so if compared to 
human resource management. ICBC has made continuous efforts to improve 
its e-banking, comprising of internet, telephone, mobile, SMS and TV banking. 
Until December 2013, 90% of individual retail customers could complete basic 
transactions through self-service facilities. The core competitive advantages of 
ICBC in information technology development are its innovations in TV banking, 
which can teach customers how to use self-service facilities. Furthermore, by 
the end of 2012, ICBC had launched Internet and telephone banking in 26 and 
14 overseas locations respectively. ICBC used information technology to 
improve its management and human resource systems. 
 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
ICBC implemented its reforms from 2005, guided by the CBRC. According to 
interviewees, all of them recalled that the most significant changes happened 
after 2005, as a result of the CBRC as the supervisory institution. The other 
notable forces for change were the impact of a foreign partner and market and 
customer demand. The ownership structure changed from October 2005 
onwards. ICBC restructured into a joint-stock limited company, and became 
responsible for its own profit and loss. In 2006, ICBC listed on both the 
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Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges. ICBC's major shareholders 
included state owned enterprises as well as foreign investors, yet, in state 
owned commercial banks such as ICBC, managers remained in control. ICBC 
allowed one member from the Goldman Sachs to attend its Board Directors, 
but that person had no management responsibilities. However, ICBC did not 
allow Allianz and American Express to attend to the Board Directors. Although 
these foreign partners have not been involved in management decision 
making, they still influenced the development of ICBC, particularly in credit 
cards, insurance, technology, and product development. At the province level, 
managers have limited authority to make decisions. 
 
The major leading force for the reform of human resource practice, as we have 
stated before, is the CBRC. Since 2005, the labour contract system, training, 
performance related pay and benefits, and examinations have transformed the 
system, The guanxi element in post-examination selection and in targeted 
recruitment remain, however, and the age limitation on promotions can have a 
deleterious effect on those whose chances of a higher post and salary have 
been lost. The CBRC directly sanctions the promotion and recruitment of 
senior managers. All examination papers, for all levels of appointment and 
recruitment, have to be approved by the CBRC. 
 
ICBC traditionally had a competitive advantage in retail banking. ICBC sets its 
customer orientated principles, and the CBRC has had less influenced on its 
customer relationships and product development. The use of customer 
feedback became central to product development and thereby for maintaining 
customer relationships. Foreign partners are another important force in helping 
ICBC to improve its products and services. For example, America Express 
assisted ICBC in developing its card business. The CBRC has indirect 
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influence at the operation level, but all products and services need to be 
approved by the CBRC. Foreign investors such as Goldman Sachs, Allianz, 
and American Express have helped ICBC to adopt international standards and 
best practices. In technology development and in the online and mobile 
banking business, market demand is the leading force for development. ICBC 
has developed its online and mobile banking business since 2005, although 
the CBRC must approve all new products and services. ICBC emerged as the 
leading domestic banks, with the brand image of ‘a reliable bank that's always 
by your side’. It has competitive advantages in retail banking, individual 
customers and VIP customers, and corporate firms. ICBC has advantages in 
providing multiple channel services to customers through its well-developed 
online, mobile, telephone and TV banking. 
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Chapter 8 The China CITIC Bank 
 
8.1 Background 
The China CITIC Bank Corporation Limited (abbreviated as CITIC Bank) was 
founded in 1987, CITIC Industrial Bank, one of the earliest Chinese 
commercial banks. It is a subsidiary of the CITIC Group Corporation, formerly 
the China International Trust and Investment Corporation, a state owned 
investment company, established in 1979, and located in Beijing. The purpose 
behind the establishment of CITIC Group was to attract and utilize foreign 
capital, and to introduce advanced technologies and operational and 
management skills from outside China. The CITIC Group was a pilot of 
national economic reform and modernization. It currently owns 44 subsidiaries, 
including China CITIC Bank. CITIC Group has businesses both in financial and 
non-financial fields. Its financial businesses cover a full range of services 
including commercial banking, investment banking, trust, insurance, fund 
management and asset management. Its non-financial businesses include real 
estate, engineering contracting, energy and resources, infrastructure 
construction, machinery manufacturing and IT industry. 
 
In phase two of the Chinese banking sector reform, from 1985 until 1993, 
designed to increase competition in the banking sector, the Chinese 
government allowed the establishment of new commercial banks. Therefore, 
CITIC Bank was established during this period. In the third phase of the 
Chinese banking sector reform, from 1994, the 1995 Central Bank Law 
encouraged all domestic firms to compete with each other in most fields of 
banking and to pursue profit as a goal (Jiang, et al., 2009). CITIC Bank grew 
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quickly, but did not become competitive because the four state owned banks 
remained dominant. As we have seen, the appointment of the China Bank 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003 initiated the critical fourth phase of 
Chinese banking sector reform. The CBRC began with the China Construction 
Bank (CCB) and Bank of China (BOC) and it followed with the reform of other 
state owned banks. Then, in 2005, it was the turn of the large commercial 
banks to be reformed. CITIC Bank changed its name from CITIC Industrial 
Bank to China CITIC Bank in August 2005. In 2006, CITIC Group and CITIC 
International Financial Holdings Limited (CIFH) were the top two shareholders 
of CITIC Bank. In 2006, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (BBVA), a 
leading bank in Europe, and a significant multinational, most notably in Latin 
America, invested in CITIC Bank and established a strategic cooperative 
relationship. In 2007, CITIC Bank listed on both the Shanghai and Hong Kong 
stock exchanges. In the past two decades, after the four state owned 
organizations, China CITIC Bank has grown to be one of the biggest 
commercial banks. CITIC Bank operates in the corporate, retail, international, 
treasury and capital, investment, auto financing, credit card and private 
banking businesses and sectors. By the end of 2012, CITIC Bank’s business 
covered 130 countries and regions all over the world. It had set up 36 tier-one 
branches (based on each province), 60 tier-two branches (based on each city) 
and 789 sub branches (operational branch which directly deal with client) in 
China, which are mainly located in coastal areas in Eastern China and the 
economically developed cities of Central and Western China, with 41,365 
employees (CITIC Bank annual report, 2012). By the end of 2013, the total 
number of branches had increased to 1,073 in mainland of China, and the total 
number of employees to over 46,000. There are three additional subsidiaries 
under the control of CITIC Bank, which are Zhejiang Lin’an CITIC Rural Bank, 
which mainly deals with rural business in Zhejiang Lin’an region; China 
Investment and Financing Limited (CIFL) in Hong Kong; and CITIC Bank 
International Limited (CNCBI). CNCBI is mainly concerned with international 
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business, and has over 1,700 employees and more than 40 branches or 
offices in Hong Kong, Macao, New York, Los Angels, Singapore (CITIC Bank 
annual report, 2013). 
 
In 2012, CITIC Bank innovated their management philosophy, which is 
‘insisting on the coordinated development of profit, quality and scale’, ‘pursuing 
a risk-adjusted profit’, ‘seeking for a market capitalization with stable growth’ 
and ‘striving to take the lead among banks from home and abroad’ (CITIC 
Bank annual report, 2012). Under the new management philosophy, CITIC 
Bank operates their business based on profit and market orientation. CITIC 
Bank strengthened capital constraint management and upgraded the assets 
management and internal management on a consistent basis in accordance 
with the Basel Accord and the requirements of risk management. Furthermore, 
CITIC Bank has made improvement in asset quality in recent years, and its 
NPL ratio is much lower than the average level of other Chinese banks. CITIC 
Bank ranked 185th among the ‘2010 Global Top 500 Enterprises in market 
value’ released by The Financial Times of the United Kingdom. CITIC Bank, 
with a brand value of USD 2.342 billion, ranked 480th among the Brand 
Finance Global 500l brands in 2010, conducted by Brand Finance, a British 
brand consulting company (CITIC Bank annual report, 2010). In 2013, CITIC 
Bank was also ranked 57th in terms of total assets among the ‘Top 1,000 world 
Banks’ published by the Banker Magazine of the United Kingdom (CITIC Bank 
annual report, 2013).  
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8.2 Strategic Control  
8.21 Ownership 
Under the CBRC, from 2005, CITIC Bank restructured as a shareholding bank, 
named China CITIC Bank Corporation Limited. The basic ownership pattern 
was established and, as shown by table 8-1 for 2013. A share means shares 
purchased through Shanghai Stock Exchange market, H share manes shares 
purchased through Hong Kong Stock Exchange market. The following lists 
includes the top ten shareholders (2013): 
Table 8-1 Major Shareholders of CITIC Bank (2013) 
Name of 
Shareholder 
Nature of 
Shareholder  
Total Number of 
shares held  
Shareholding 
percentage 
CITIC Group  State-owned  31,325,081,973 
(A-shares) 
66.95% 
Hong Kong 
Securities 
Clearing 
Company 
Nominee Limited  
Foreign Investor  7,371,949,936 
(H-shares) 
15.76% 
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria S.A. 
(BBVA) 
Foreign Investor  4,631,945,376 
(H-shares) 
9.90% 
National Natural 
Science 
Foundation of 
China  
State-owned 338,513,209 
(A-shares and  
H-shares) 
0.72% 
China 
Construction 
Bank  
State-owned 168,599.268 
(H-shares) 
0.36% 
Mizuho 
Corporate Bank  
Foreign Investor  81,910,800 
(H-shares) 
0.18% 
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Csop Asset 
Management 
Co.Ltd 
Domestic non 
state-owned  
42,643,092 
(A-shares) 
0.09% 
China State 
Shipbuilding 
Corporation 
Limited   
State-owned  35,172,000 
(A-shares) 
0.08% 
China Credit 
Trust Co. Ltd.  
Domestic non 
state-owned 
31,219.052 
(A-shares) 
0.07% 
Industrial and 
Commercial 
Bank of China  
State-owned 31,034,400 
(A-shares) 
0.07% 
Dongfeng 
Automobile 
Group 
Corporation 
Limited  
State-owned 31,034,400 
(A-share) 
0.07% 
Sinochem Group State-owned 31,034,400 
(A-shares) 
0.07% 
Hebei 
Construction 
Investment 
(Group) Limited  
State-owned 31,034,400 
(A-shares) 
0.07% 
 
(Source from: CITIC annual report, 2013) 
 
CITIC Group takes the majority control of the ownership of CITIC Bank (about 
61.85%, 2005-2013). Most of the shareholders are state-owned firms. The 
other state owned shareholders include the China Construction Bank, China 
State Shipbuilding Corporate Limited, Industrial and Commercial Bank, 
Dongfeng Automobile Group, Sinochem Group and Hebei Construction 
Investment (Group) Limited Liability Corporation. The major non-state owned 
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domestic shareholder is Csop Asset Management Co. Limited. The overseas 
shareholders include Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Nominee 
Limited (15.75%), BBVA (15%, 2005-2012) and Mizuho Corporate Bank. The 
basic ownership pattern, established since 2005, remained intact for nine 
years. However, one of the significant changes is that the share of BBVA 
decreased from 15% to 9.9% in 2013, and the share of CITIC Limited 
increased from 61.85% to 66.95%. The Board of Directors at CITIC Bank 
remains responsible for decision-making, within the policy framework, 
although, as with other banks, some important decisions need the subsequent 
approval of the CBRC. Chinese state owned companies, which are 
shareholders, are not expected to interfere in the operations of CITIC Bank. 
Although Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Nominee Limited and 
BBVA are amongst the top 10 shareholders; they cannot influence 
management decision-making, but can give opinions at the shareholder’s 
general meeting. Under the new structures, the appointment of senior 
managers has become based on performance and examinations, if subject to 
the final approval of the CBRC. Two representatives of BBVA are allowed to 
attend the Board of Directors, but have no management responsibilities (see 
CITIC Bank’s organization structure in Figure 8-1). CITIC Bank headquarters 
plays the guiding and leading role in market planning, policy guidance, 
information sharing, championing marketing efforts, technical support, product 
innovation, resource allocation and personnel training. 
 
The management structure, as in Figure 8-1, shows, that below the 
headquarters and its departments are the Tier 1 branches at the level of the 
provinces and municipalities such as Beijing. As with state owned commercial 
banks, each province or municipality has its own headquarters, which includes 
a human resource department, an information technology function, and a 
credit card centre. Within the province, or Tier 1, the branch headquarters 
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follows the agenda set by the company headquarters, and oversees at the city 
Tier 2 or sub-branches that deals with customers. The municipalities act 
similarly by carrying out the directives from above at the operational level of 
urban district. Decision-making within the provinces – as in the case of 
municipalities – is limited, and it is CITIC Bank headquarters that makes 
decisions in concert with CBRC approval. The provincial and municipal 
headquarters, as with state owned commercial banks, coordinate with the 
main office, and manage corporate clients. In the provincial level, such as in 
Hunan, there are no personnel from BBVA (Mr Heng Zhou, Tier 2 Branch, Vice 
President, interview, 6th November 2012). 
 
Figure 8-1: Organizational Structure of CITIC Bank (2013) 
The Relationship Between CITIC Bank and CITIC Group  
 
 
 
CITIC	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Domestic Branches/Offices Level 
 
(Source from: CITIC annual report, 2012) 
 
The CBRC is charged with setting common standards for all banks, but the 
non state owned banks believe that the CBRC shows favoritism to state owned 
commercial banks (Mr Heng Zhou, Tier Two Branch, Vice Present, interview, 
6th November 2012). The CBRC monitors CITIC Bank’s Board of Supervisors, 
which is accountable to the shareholders’ general meeting. CITIC Bank has 
established an organizational structure consisting of the Shareholders’ 
General Meeting, the Board of Directors, the Board of Supervisors and the 
senior management (CITIC annual report, 2012). The Board of Directors 
makes the decisions of the Bank, and it consists of 15 members, including 2 
executive directors. The senior management is the executive body and 
accountable to the Board of Directors. The senior management consists of 9 
members. As we have in the examples of state owned commercial banks, 
CITIC Bank separates the power of the Board of Directors and senior 
management. The Board of Directors makes the strategic decisions, and 
senior management takes the day-to-day decisions based on policy set by the 
Board of Directors. The Board of Supervisors oversees the directors and 
senior managers and is accountable to the Shareholder’s General Meeting. It 
consists of 5 members. One is a shareholder representative supervisor. Two 
of them are external supervisors. The other two are employee’s representative 
Domestic	  Branches/OfLices 
Tier	  1	  Branches	  and	  its	  Departments Tier	  2	  Branches Branches	  Directly	  Controlled	  by	  the	  Head	  OfLice 
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supervisors (CITIC annual report, 2012). In 2012, in addition to amending 
internal regulations such as the Measures for Management of Reputation Risk, 
the Measure for Management of Liquidity Risk and the Compliance Policies, 
the Bank formulated the Administrative Measures for Regular Reports Review 
and amended the Administrative Measures for Inside Information and 
Information Insiders in accordance with changes in relevant regulatory 
requirements for information disclosure management, improving the bank’s 
corporate governance regulations (CITIC annual report, 2013).  
 
CITIC Bank needs to operate and carry out business activities according to the 
requirements set by the ‘Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of 
China’, as passed in 1995, and by the laws and regulations of the stock 
exchanges where it is listed. In October 2007, at the requirement of the CBRC, 
and with aim of further evolving into a commercial bank, CITIC Bank was listed 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. For depositors and other clients, as well 
as investors, listing was an outward symbol of its sound corporate governance 
structure. CITIC Bank began offer shares in Hong Kong. 
 
8.22 FDI 
In 2006, CITIC Bank signed a cooperative agreement with the Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (BBVA). BBVA has taken both shareholdings in China 
CITIC Bank (15%) and CITIC International Financial Holdings (30%) (BBVA, 
website). By the end of 2012, BBVA held a total of 7,018,099,055 H-shares of 
CITIC Bank, representing 15.00% of the bank’s total issued share capital. 
However, its shareholding had dropped to 9.9% by 2013.  
 
BBVA was originally established in 1858 as the Banco de Bilbao. BBVA’s 
international activity began as early as 1902, when it opened a branch in Paris. 
Nowadays, BBVA is a global financial group, and it has foreign partners or 
subsidiaries in many countries, such as in the U.S, Latin America, and Europe. 
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Particularly it is the largest financial group in Latin America region. Its business 
covers retail banking, corporate banking, international trade finance, global 
market, consumer credit, asset management, private banking, pension and 
insurance. BBVA has advantages in its significant size, a strong capital base, 
and appropriate geographic diversification of its business and risks. By the end 
of December 2012, BBVA had a market capitalization of EUR37.9 billion and 
total assets of EUR637 billion. It owned 7,978 branches, of which over 50% 
were located outside the territory of Spain (BBVA, 2014). 
 
CITIC Bank entered into a strategic alliance with BBVA in order to improve its 
managerial skills, human resource management, information technology, 
product development, private banking service, car financing and knowledge of 
listing on the stock market. The motivations of BBVA are considered as 
expanding their business in China by using the network of CITIC Bank, and the 
strong growth of Chinese economy, which is creating profitable opportunities. 
CITIC Bank and BBVA have signed several agreements to cooperate and 
conduct business in cash management, international business, treasury and 
capital market business, financial services to small enterprise, investment 
banking, private banking, pensions, and insurance. In cash management, they 
reached agreement to both provide cash management services to strategic 
customers of BBVA. From this agreement, CITIC Bank learnt cash 
management practices, and also gained from sharing a customer with BBVA. 
In 2012, international settlements and trade finance transactions completed 
between CITIC Bank and BBVA amounted to USD 79,5918m and USD 622m 
respectively. With the help of BBVA, CITIC Bank has opened 11 cross-border 
Renminbi settlement accounts for BBVA in major Latin American countries. 
CITIC leant how to expand their business in international markets with the help 
of BBVA. In 2012, the transaction value of foreign exchange treasury business 
between CITIC Bank and BBVA was RMB34.656 billion, while the value of 
their derivatives transaction was RMB5.95 billion. In the area of financial 
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services, CITIC Bank and BBVA reached agreement to improve the credit 
granting process for small and micro enterprises, and quantitative risk control 
techniques and the construction of business operation platforms. They 
reached agreement to improve the private banking service in China, by 
learning from BBVA’s private banking service in Spain. CITIC Bank also learnt 
how to develop pension business systems and products. Furthermore, they 
established cooperation over market research in China. For example, they 
analyzed commercial and affordable housing developments in China, and they 
produced the China Real Estate Outlook Annual Report 2012 (CITIC annual 
report, 2012). In the province level, there are no foreign personnel (Ms 
Changshun Jiang, Tier Two Branch HR Manager, interview, 19th July 2013). 
 
It is interesting that the commercial CITIC Bank and the state-owned China 
Construction Bank both chose to have one major foreign partner, but CITIC 
Bank’s approach was markedly different. It set out and was able to put into 
effect both a wider range and deeper levels of cooperation. While the state 
owned banks showed themselves to be more conservative and less open to 
change, the commercial CITIC Bank was more open to the opportunities 
available in its partnership with a foreign investor. The Industrial and 
Commercial Bank and Bank of China, on the other hand, selected multiple 
partners, with each one chosen supplying a particular expertise for different 
areas of banking business. While the expertise was more specific, the 
relationship with each partner was not so strategic and ultimately less stable. 
Of the major banks in our study, the CITIC-BBVA partnership had the greatest 
impact. As such, it demonstrates that within Chinese banking’s strong 
regulatory environment firms could exercise different strategic choices capable 
of producing different competitive and organizational outcomes. In later 
sections, we will need to assess how influential BBVA was in the spheres of 
operations, human resources, training and customer relationships as well as 
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products and services, and how important its contribution was compared to 
other determining factors in the competitive evolution of CITIC Bank. 
 
 
8.3 Human Resource 
 
With CRBC’s decision to alter employment contracts, from 2003, CITIC Bank 
has hired its own direct contract employees, but uses recruitment agencies to 
hire other staff. As with the state owned commercial banks, existing staff had 
to pass examinations appropriate to their roles, retrain or seek an alternative 
position, and in cases of those over 40 years accept early retirement. Low skill 
staff could be sub-contracted, as were some IT professionals. As a result of 
restructuring, CITIC Bank hired many capable employees from other 
commercial banks, particularly CCB. The introduction of new employment 
terms helped CITIC Bank to improve skills and enhance efficiency. By the end 
of 2013, CITIC Bank had 46,800 employees, of which 38,803 (82.87%) were 
under the two new labour contracts. Some 82.88% of employees held a 
Bachelor degree. CITIC Bank employed all staff in accordance with relevant 
provisions set out in the PRC Labor Law and the PRC Labor Contract Law 
(CITIC Bank annual report, 2013). 
 
 
8.31 Promotion 
While internal promotion keeps employees who are familiar with the business, 
CITIC Bank has hired people from other banks, in order to secure capable and 
experienced employees. Ms Changshun Jiang, a Tier 2 HR Vice Manager, 
said that most senior managers at CITIC Bank were hired from CCB, in order 
to facilitate expansion. She herself had worked in CCB previously, and had 
joined CITIC Bank in 2004 (Ms Changshu Jiang, Tier 2, HR Vice Manager, 
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interview, 19th July 2013). CITIC Bank headquarters directly select and 
appoint Tier 1 and Tier 2 branch vice presidents and above, and each 
appointment is approved by the CBRC. Before formalizing appointments, as in 
the case of the state owned commercial rivals, CITIC Bank assesses all 
candidates through written examinations, which all candidates must pass 
before the selection process still determined to a significant extent by guanxi. 
At this juncture, past performance is usually also evaluated, and interviews are 
held at the national or provincial headquarters in accordance with the position 
being considered. 
 
Before 2005, promotion had almost entirely been based on guanxi. Jiang 
(2013) indicated that ‘guanxi’ plays a vita role when recruiting from external 
labour markets, as demonstrated by the fact that a large percentage of senior 
managers in Hunan province came from the China Construction Bank. From 
2005, as appears to be common practice in Chinese banks, since the founding 
of the CBRC, no employee could be promoted unless they passed the 
appropriate examination, although guanxi still determined what happened to 
those who did pass. Other than those directly appointed by the headquarters, 
that is those below the Tier 1 and Tier 2 branch vice president level, the 
relevant branch has the authority to appoint their key managerial staff. 
Similarly, the relevant branch evaluates the performance of candidates. Some 
positions require a pass of examinations set by the provincial branch, followed 
by interviews; in other cases, the bank just appoints directly. Occasionally, 
rather than internal candidates, key managerial staff are recruited externally or 
are appointed by the CBRC. Each position in the organization has different 
requirements in experience or qualifications, and there are additionally 
maximum age limits. 
 
In 2013, CITIC Bank further standardized the system for promotion and 
remuneration, and refined the Measures of CITIC Bank for Management of the 
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Internal Staff Hierarchy and the Measures of CITIC Bank for the Management 
of Categories of Technical Functions. CITIC Banks mainly classify their 
employees into three groups, which are managerial, expert and technical 
positions, and within each there are four levels, namely junior, intermediate, 
advanced, and senior. The criteria and professional orientation of technical 
positions in different categories were readjusted and improved. Promotions to 
technical positions mainly depend on their professional knowledge, technical 
competence, and performance; also, academic qualifications and career 
seniority are taken into consideration. Employees in technical positions need 
to pass exams and achieve the technical qualification certification, provided by 
CITIC Bank. Employees may only participate in performance evaluation for 
promotion purposes after completing on-the-job training and relevant 
examinations ( Mr Guozhong Xie, Tier 2 Branch, Vice Present, interview, 6th 
November 2012). 
 
The CBRC exercises strong influence on the promotion of employees at or 
above Tier 1 or Tier 2 level management. ‘Guanxi’ still plays an important role 
in an individual’s progress, despite the fundamental introduction of 
examinations. Nonetheless, employees must first demonstrate that they can 
fulfill the requirements of the position. CITIC Bank claims that it provides equal 
job opportunities and equal promotion opportunities for all employees. 
Particularly, it claims that there is no gender discrimination against qualified 
female job applicants. The Bank states that it safeguards all legitimate rights 
and interests of its female staff, and does so in strict accordance with 
provisions set out in the PRC Labor Law and PRC Labor Contract Law. 
Female staff currently account for 53.09% of the total employees (CITIC social 
responsibility report, 2012). However, Ms Jiang (2013) indicates that, in 
practice, CITIC Bank tends to employ male employees in higher positions. 
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8.32 Recruitment 
 
CITIC Bank undertakes – as we shall see, in the same manner as other 
non-state owned commercial banks - three types of recruitment: graduate 
recruitment, open recruitment, and internship. Open recruitment is the main 
method. CITIC Bank advertises these vacancies through the company website 
and recruitment agencies. Mr Guozhong Xie, a Tier 2 Branch Vice President, 
indicates that CITIC Bank prefers employees with working experience Mr. 
Guozhong Xie, Tier 2 Branch, Vice Present, interview, 18th July 2013). CITIC 
Bank does not have any formal policy on giving priority to the hiring of local 
candidates (local residents and people with local household registration). Mr 
Zhou, the Tier 2 Banch Vice President, states that, in reality, CITIC Bank tends 
to hire employees locally for the purpose of maintaining staff stability and due 
to ‘guanxi’ (Mr Heng Zhou, Tier 2 Branch, Vice Present, interview, 18th July 
2013). As a result, 82.27% of senior management at branch levels were hired 
locally (CITIC social responsibility report, 2012). 
 
CITIC Bank does hire full-time graduates. In the same manner as other banks, 
students must apply online one year ahead of graduation, and all candidates 
must graduate in the year they are hired. The entry requirements - 
high-ranking university, good grades, level 6 in national English test or an 
IELTS 6 – are standard for the industry. For some positions in the 
headquarters of Tier 1 branch level, a Master’s degree is, as elsewhere, 
required. After applying online, candidates attend written examinations, set by 
CITIC Bank headquarters, including papers on English, administrative and 
professional skills, and knowledge and expertise. After the candidates have 
passed the examinations, CITIC Bank will select suitable appointees by 
interview (Mr Guozhong Xie, Tier 2 Branch, Vice Present, interview, 18th July 
2013). In other words, the practices copy those set in state owned commercial 
rivals, and CITIC Bank seeks to follow the policy set by CBRC. Since the 
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introduction of graduate recruitment, and by the end of 2012, 26,506 
employees, which account for 64.08% of the total, had bachelor’s degrees; 
5662 employees (13.69%) had a postgraduate degree or above. CITIC Bank 
organizes internship programmes, which provide opportunities for students 
who will graduate in the following year to learn about the banking sector (Ms 
Changshun Jiang, Tier 2 Branch HR Vice Manager, interview, 19th July 2013). 
Candidates interested in the internship programme need to apply online, and 
CITIC Bank will hold interviews for selected candidates.  
 
 
8.33 Training and development 
Since 2010, CITIC Bank has developed examinations that are directly related 
to job qualification criteria, and those seeking promotion must sit and pass the 
relevant examinations. CITIC Bank provides induction training, and thereafter 
organizes on-the-job training. CITIC Bank has developed a special 
leadership-training program for the general managers of sub-branches. 
Originally, this program was designed for newly appointed sub-branch general 
managers, focusing on improving professional skills and the handling of 
business operations, the management of teams, and responding to new 
markets. Therefore, since 2012, the leadership-training programmes become 
compulsory program for all sub branches general managers. In that year, the 
firm was responsible for a total of 4,171 training courses for all levels of 
employee. CITIC Bank has devised its own training systems and certificates. 
For example, in the risk management department, managers need to attend 
training courses, pass exams, and achieve a CITIC Bank Certificate of Risk 
Manager (CCRM). In the wealth management department, a CITIC Bank 
Certificate of Wealth Adviser (CCWA) is awarded. The bank developed the 
E-Learning system, and makes available online on-the-job training sessions 
for all employees. For example, in 2012, CITIC Bank organized 341 online 
examinations, covering all branches (CITIC annual report, 2012). 
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8.34 Pay policy and welfare 
CITIC Bank’s remuneration consists of the basic salary, a bonus and welfare 
benefits. Basic salary follows the established seniority and position-related 
system, and living cost calculations for differing provinces. The bonus is linked 
to departmental and individual performance. Mr Heng Zhou indicates that the 
basic salary is very limited, and that most of the income comes from the bonus, 
for which they have to work very hard (Mr Heng Zhou, Tier 2 Branch, Vice 
Present, interview, 18th July 2013). Welfare benefits follow the relevant 
national and local regulations as well as those of the bank. CITIC Bank 
provides insurance for the basic pension, basic medical-care, unemployment, 
work injury, and maternity (CITIC social responsibility report, 2012). Ms 
Changshung Jiang states that many employees consider CITIC Bank provides 
stable employment, good welfare provision, and competitive pay rates, most 
obviously so in the case of local personnel (Ms Changshun Jiang, Tier 2 
Branch, HR, Vice Manager, 19th July 2013). 
 
 
8.35 Summary 
Since its introduction of the employment contract, in 2003, CITIC Bank was 
able to downsize the number of employees, select to a greater extent 
employee by reason of capability, and improve and change skills, all ultimately 
with the aim of enhancing efficiency. To further its rapid expansion and to 
move into new areas of business, CITIC Bank tends to hire employees with 
work experience, and, in particular, it favors recruiting senior managers from 
other banks. However, a significant number of senior employees have quit to 
join rival firms, which have themselves targeted experienced staff. It is not 
simply the loss of personnel: managers potentially take their clients with them. 
CITIC Bank relies heavily on local ‘guanxi’ or ‘networks’ in order to maintain 
and bring in new clients. One strategy for staff retention has been the hiring of 
local employees, and locally hired managers have a greater likelihood of 
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bringing their connections with them. Guanxi has a role furthermore in 
recruitment and promotion, firstly by encouraging needed personnel to join the 
firm, and secondly in deciding whom amongst those that pass the entry 
examinations are finally hired. Guanxi, similarly, is important in deciding the 
final cut of promotions from those passing the internal examinations for each 
post. Employees are likely at the last stage to be promoted on the basis of 
personal networks, having nonetheless demonstrates that they possess the 
basic knowledge requirements for their position. As have the state owned 
commercial banks, CITIC Bank has established training programs for different 
positions and levels, and provides job specific and general training. In a break 
with the SOE system, CITIC Bank uses the bonus to incentivize employees. 
The CBRC has directly influenced the procedures for appointing and 
promoting senior managers, and the content of employment contracts. The 
retention of the age limitation for each position remains and reduces incentives 
for senior employees who have no hope of promotion. Although notable 
numbers of managers have left for rival firms, overall staff turnover is not a 
problem for CITIC Bank, which is seen as providing stable employment, good 
welfare provision, and competitive pay rates, most obviously so in the case of 
local personnel (Ms Changshun Jiang, Tier 2 Branch, HR Vice Manager, 19th 
July 2013). Changing the structure of human resource management was one 
of the larger tasks, since practices had been deeply embedded within the 
previous SOE system. With guidance and compulsion from the CBRC, CITIC 
Bank was able to introduce important changes. In the HR function, the 
institutional context set by the CBRC has driven developments, and the 
systems to be found at different banks have a marked similarity. 
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8.4 Client and Customer Relationships and Product 
Development 
 
As emphasized previously, a service firm has to interact with a customer 
directly and must develop effective client and customer relationships. Being 
linked, client and customer relationships and product development are key 
resources in the banking sector, from which firms can gain competitive 
advantage (Chen, 2009). Customer feedbacks develop products and service, 
and good products and service can help to attract customers and maintain 
client relationships. The client relationship and service development interaction 
is therefore a locale of dynamic capability – by moving from type or level of 
capability to another – and banks can consider how both networks and 
products can be enhanced and more deeply inter-related. 
 
In 2013, CITIC Bank published its Corporate Culture Handbook, incorporating 
the concept of ‘customer first, dedication to service’. In this mission statement, 
‘customer first’ means that the Bank puts customers first, works on behalf of its 
customers, takes the initiative to understand customers, and helps customers 
address problems and overcome difficulties. ‘Dedication to service’ means that 
the Bank is grateful to customers for their custom and trust, and that it seeks to 
provide high quality, user-friendly services (CITIC annual report, 2013). CITIC 
Bank generally divides their clients into the four levels of corporate, small to 
medium firms, individual VIP, and individual client, as do its state owned 
commercial rivals. To attract corporate, SME, and VIP clients and to maintain 
good relationships, ‘guanxi’ remains a central consideration (Ms Yixuan Zhang, 
Sub Branch Individual VIP Customer Manager, interview, 17th July 2013). 
Nonetheless, product and service levels are viewed as important factors to 
attract individual VIP customers. Product development is based on customer 
requirements as well as market demand. CITIC Bank headquarters designs 
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and develops products, while the local branch passes back customer feedback 
and requirements to the headquarters (Mr Guozhong Xie, Tier 2 Branch, Vice 
Present, interview, 18th July 2013). The VIP customer business has emerged 
as an important and expanding trend in Chinese banking. For the individual 
customer, product and service play a more important role than guanxi. CITIC 
Bank has come to realize the rising importance of the larger retail market for 
individual customers in China, and it has concentrated on improving their 
customer service and products. For example, CITIC Bank develop different 
type of deposit accounts for individual customers, which offer loans for 
mortgages, cars, or tuition fees, and SMEs, which are seeking to expand their 
business (Mr. Heng Zhou, Tier 2 Branch, Vice present, interview 6th November 
2012). 
 
CITIC Bank implements the ‘customer focus’ business concept, and states that 
it puts customer service first in its retail banking business. CITIC Bank has 
developed personal housing mortgage loans and credit card loans as core 
businesses. By the end of 2012, personal retail credit loaned by CITIC Bank 
was RMB 320.044 billion, an increase of 26.07 % compared to 2011. CITIC 
Bank’s deposit balances reached RMB 366.972 billion. CITIC Bank made 
efforts to promote its retail business through adjusting its bank charges and 
improving service. By the end of 2012, there were 33.12 million individual 
customer accounts, an increase of 13.1% over 2011 (CITIC annual report, 
2012). 
 
CITIC Bank expanded the distribution network of self-service facilities. In 2012, 
CITIC Bank established 1,572 self-service banks, and installed 5,306 units of 
self service equipment (such as ATM), and increase of 17.75% and 11.96% 
respectively over the end of the previous year (CITIC annual report, 2012). 
The establishment of self-service facilities, although improving efficiency, 
saved waiting time and improved service levels for individual retail customers 
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(Ms Yixuan Zhang, Sub Branch, Individual VIP Customer Manager, interview, 
17th July 2013). The credit card business has huge potential in China. CITIC 
Bank has encouraged the credit card business and made efforts to develop 
and promote different types of credit card for different customers. At the 
branch level, Mr Zhou (2012) states that he did not push his employees to 
promote the credit card service. Many employees tried to reach their target, 
and offered a credit card to customers without financial checks, which has 
resulted in many non-performing loans (Mr Heng Zhou, Tier 2 Branch, Vice 
Present, interview, 6th November 2012). To develop the credit card business 
in China effectively, there is need for a better risk management system and 
supervision of employees. 
 
The VIP individual customer is defined as having savings over 200,000 Yuan 
(it was 500,000 Yuan before 2013). Wealth management is for customer 
savings over 500,000 Yuan (1,000,00 before 2013). The private banking 
business is for customer savings over 6,000,000 Yuan (10,000,000 Yuan 
before 2013) (Ms Yixuan Zhang, Sub Branch, Individual VIP Customer 
Manager, interview, 17th July 2013). CITIC Bank launched its VIP Wealth 
Management Centers in 35 branches. In order to be responsive to customer 
demands, CITIC Bank offered products including equity investment and bank 
securities. By the end of 2012, CITIC Bank earned RMB 1.236 billion from 
wealth management fees. It has 18 categories of wealth management 
products. By the end of 2012, the total sales of its wealth management 
products reached RMB926.695 billion (CITIC annual report, 2012). 
 
In 2012, CITIC Bank further provided its private banking service for premium 
VIP customer to help them ‘preserve wealth, create wealth’. CITIC Bank 
provides customer professional consulting and investment advisory services. 
CITIC Bank headquarters established an open platform for private banking 
products, with the aim of enhancing direct interaction between the 
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headquarters and branches, which could help to obtain customer feedback 
more quickly and to meet product and service demand. CITIC Bank 
consistently provides online and video training to private banking customer 
managers, and to team members to ensure they implement the headquarters 
strategy (Ms Yixuan Zhang, Individual VIP Customer Manager, interview, 17th 
July 2013). 
 
CITIC Bank has strengths in regional marketing management for small 
enterprise development, for which guanxi is central to attracting clients. Many 
senior small to medium enterprise managers were recruited from other banks 
because they already have relevant business relationships and bought them to 
CITIC Bank (Mr Yang Zhao, Small to Medium Enterprise Manager, interview, 
17th July 2013). Product and service are important to this group of clients. The 
new product specially designed for small enterprises included property 
mortgages loans, micro loans, and credit. By the end of 2012, CITIC Bank had 
17,329 small enterprise clients, up from 1,957 in 2011, and the total loans to 
these customers reached RMB352.878 billion. The Bank has set up 
small-business operation and management centers. In 2012, CITIC Bank 
supported and provided loans to 14,132 small enterprises, worth RMB 191,333 
billion, which accounted for 52.9% of the Bank’s total business loans. In 2013, 
CITIC Bank made a strategic adjustment to its small enterprise finance 
business, prioritizing support to firms lending less than RMB 5 million. Mr. 
Yixuan Zhao, Sub Branch Small to Medium enterprise manager, states that 
‘the competition for medium enterprises was intensive. However, state owned 
banks tend to give less support to small and tiny enterprises, and, therefore, 
we focus on this group of customers’ (Mr Yixuan Zhao, Sub Branch Small to 
Medium Enterprises Manager, interview, 17th July 2013). CITIC Bank 
designed and launched products for small and tiny enterprise finance business, 
such as ‘CITIC Express Loan’, ‘Seed Loan’, ‘Trader Loan’ and ‘POS loan’. By 
the end of 2013, CITIC Bank provided RMB237.342 billion in loans to small 
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enterprises, an increase of RMB 53.511 billion (29.11%) over 2012, and RMB 
41.889 billion to tiny enterprises (CITIC Bank annual report, 2013). 
 
As well as focusing on the development of small to medium enterprises, CITIC 
Bank has developed its links with large corporate customers, by emphasizing 
innovation in product and service such as supply chain finance and cash 
management. CITIC Bank also adjusted the structure of loan allocation to 
customers. By the end of 2012, the total number of corporate clients was 
309,700, increased from 25,700 accounts from 2011(CITIC annual report, 
2012). Institutional banking business such as public utilities, health care, 
insurance, and educational establishments is important to CITIC Bank’s 
corporate finance business. CITIC Bank specially designs marketing activities 
to promote the institutional banking business, and it claims that its strength are 
in a combination of ‘team, product, program and system’, through which it 
designs products, service, and information management processes. By the 
end of 2012, CITIC Bank had nearly 15,000 accounts of institutional customers, 
and 280 licenses for fiscal agency business at national or province level, 
covering 28 provinces. CITIC Bank as a commercial bank has a large variety 
of licenses for fiscal agency business, with the balance of deposits from 
institutional customers been RMB477.790 billion, which accounts for 26.82% 
of total corporate deposits (CITIC annual report, 2012). 
 
CITIC Group has numerous financial subsidiaries that engage in multiple 
business areas including banking, securities, trust fund, insurance, and futures. 
CITIC Bank has unique competitive advantages via the integrated financial 
services within CITIC Group. CITIC Bank cooperates with four securities 
companies under CITIC Group - CITIC Securities, CITIC Securities (Zhejiang), 
China Securities, and CITIC Wangtong Securities - on third-party depositary 
services. It is the main depositary bank for CITIC Securities and CITIC 
Securities (Zhejiang), and the general depositary bank for China Securities 
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and CITIC Wangtong Securities. At the end of 2012, CITIC Bank shared 4,637 
institutional customers with securities companies under CITIC Group, 
achieving RMB11.35 million fee income for depository services. CITIC Bank 
shared 4,637 institutional customers, achieving RMB11.35 million fee income. 
Moreover, CITIC Bank cooperates with CITIC Prudential Insurance to promote 
insurance services to its customers. 
 
CITIC Bank accepts the importance of customer relationships, and has learnt 
how to improve services and to develop products for small to medium 
enterprises, and to provide for individual customers, who have traditionally 
been taken for granted by state owned banks. On these issues, it learnt from 
its foreign partners. As with other banks, CITIC Bank divided its clients and 
customers into four levels: individual customer, VIP customer, small to medium 
enterprises and corporate clients. For individual retail customers, CITIC Bank 
focuses on offering multi channel services to improve convenience and 
efficiency. For individual VIP customers, CITIC bank learnt how to develop 
wealth management and private banking from BBVA, and to achieve this goal 
it built an effective cooperative relationship with its foreign partner. As an 
indication of a growing responsiveness to market demand, CITIC Bank 
adjusted its entry barriers for different levels of VIP customer services. CITIC 
Bank focuses on providing services to small enterprises but it is specially 
noted for its business with tiny enterprises, whose needs have been ignored by 
state owned banks. For corporate level business, in addition to the design of 
targeted products, ‘guanxi’ plays an important role. CITIC Bank has the strong 
capability to integrate its customer and client resource within CITIC Group. For 
client and customer relationships and product development, the foreign 
multinational partner has been the significant influence, excepting the 
corporate level where the CBRC has had a very direct influence. CITIC Bank 
must follow the percentage of business for small and medium sized 
enterprises as a total percentage of all business as set by CBRC. The 
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regulatory authority needs to approve all new products and services, after 
CITIC Bank’s headquarters have designed and proposed them. At the 
provincial level, the tier one branch can develop a ‘short-term’ product based 
on perceived customer requirements that are available for up to six months. 
However, it still needs permission and approval by its headquarters and the 
CBRC, which largely reduced the market responsiveness and productivity. 
Overall, since reform from 2005, CITIC Bank has made significant 
improvements in the product development and customer service. It has the 
advantages of sharing clients’ resources and designing and selling products 
within the CITIC Group. As a result, CITIC Bank has the strong capability to 
integrate customers and services. 
 
8.5 Information and Technology 
 
As Prahalad and Hamel (1990:82), the ‘collective learning of the organization, 
especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple 
streams of technology’, is fundamental. For Teece et al. (1997), dynamic 
capability refers to the capacity to renew competences in a changing business 
environment, including periods of rapid technological change. The integration 
and re-integration of skills, knowledge and technology enable an organization 
to provide customers with unique services or products. CITIC Bank realizes 
the importance of information technology development, which largely supports 
business system innovation, and improves safe operation and risk 
management control, online banking systems and services, ATM facilities, and 
mobile services. There are many reasons to operate these services, such as 
out of hours banking, saving employee time and preventing the need for 
customers to queue in front of the counter. In 2012, CITIC Bank gave priority to 
supporting business innovation and management, and to developing IT 
systems and security. It implemented a group of key projects including the 
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online financial supermarket, supply chain finance, internal control platform, 
and wealth management information system, and put them into effective 
operation. Continuous efforts were made to promote integrated operation and 
maintenance (OM) management to reinforce internal control. CITIC Bank 
developed self check for information safety to protect sensitive information. 
In recent years, CITIC Bank created different kinds of online service. Mr. 
Junwei Lei (2013) indicates that Internet banking is one of the most important 
trends for the development of CITIC Bank. The aims are to support its 
traditional services, improve service efficiency, and reduce operational costs. 
With the launch of its online system, CITIC Bank gradually cancelled paper 
based business application forms, and customers could fill the electronic forms 
online and sign business contracts by themselves (Mr Junwei Lei, Tier 2 
Branch, Electronic Banking Department Vice Manager, interview, 19th July 
2013). Customers could transfer money and carry out other traditional services 
through online and mobile banking. They can pay credit card bills with this 
service. CITIC Bank developed software or platforms to ensure the 
effectiveness of online banking services, such as supply chain finance, internal 
control platforms, wealth management information systems, and risk 
management. Ever greater innovation of e-commerce products enables the 
bank to achieve key breakthroughs in online lending and mobile payments, 
and in B2C e-commerce. In 2012, CITIC Bank had 14,7714 million payments 
made via e-commerce portals. The Internet Banking Department operates 
both corporate and personal Internet banking business. In the areas of 
personal internet banking, CITIC Bank improved their software and operation 
systems to make it more convenient and safe for customers to use. In terms of 
corporate internet banking, CITIC Bank not only improved the systems, but 
also developed a new function of fund supervision, to improve the overall 
business process, trading risk and system performance. CITIC Bank has many 
marketing activities to promote its online service and attract new customers, 
and to enhance the brand reputation. By the end of 2012, the number of 
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personal Internet banking customers reached 7.5665 million nationwide, an 
increase of 1.8594 million or 32.58% over 2011. The corporate Internet 
banking customer reached 127,700, an increase of 30.62% over 2011. In 2012, 
the number and volume of transactions of personal Internet banking were 
RMB55.5915 million and RMB3.37 trillion, up by 54.70% and 48.46% over 
2011. The number and volume of transactions for corporate internet banking 
were 17.9340 million and RMB21.28 trillion, up by 33.70% and 22.2% over 
2011. In 2012, Internet banking business amounted to RMB 90.4746 million, 
an increase of 69.80% over 2011 (CITIC annual report, 2012). In terms of 
personal Internet banking, CITIC Bank developed new functions such as 
automatic batch pooling of funds, real time FOREX settlement and sales, and 
subscription for and collection of T-bonds. It released Internet banking 
software partner v2.0 to support these developments in its Internet banking. In 
terms of corporate Internet banking, CITIC Bank successfully launched 
corporate internet banking v.6.5, which features a brand new function of fund 
supervision over B2B commodity e-commerce, which optimizes business 
process, trading risk and system performance. As a plus, CITIC Bank 
organizes a series of marketing activities including ‘Win the China Market with 
Internet Banking’ and ‘Help Create a Blue Sky’. These initiatives help to 
acquire new customers, stimulate customer activity and upgrade customer 
recognition and loyalty. 
 
CITIC Bank focuses on the protection of customer information and safety in 
online banking. In 2013, CITIC Bank used the online banking certificates 
issued by an independent third party accreditation authority (the China 
Financial Certification Authority, or CFCA in abbreviation). This guarantees ID 
authenticity of the concerned parties and confidentiality and completeness of 
information in the course of online information transmission, and adopted the 
mechanism of independent customer information backup to prevent customer 
information loss caused by system failures (CITIC annual report, 2013). CITIC 
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Bank formulated the Measures of CITIC Bank for Safety Management of 
Customer Information, and concluded safety agreements on the use of 
personal information with employees who had access to customer information. 
In 2013, CITIC Bank inspected and assessed information the safety of 
e-banking, tested penetration of internet application systems, and conducted 
safety self-inspection of important information systems and websites, as well 
as the control of self-assessment and IT outsourcing risks. In addition, 
research was intensified to discover new technologies and methods so that the 
bank can timely prevent the risk of data leakage and improve its system for its 
prevention. 
 
In 2012, the Customer Service Center of CITIC Bank received 39.26 million 
incoming calls, including 35.18 million automated phone answering service 
calls and 4.08 million manual service calls, achieving a 20 second response 
rate of 85.77%, a customer satisfaction rate of 93.33% and 97.59 % rate for 
handling customer complaints. CITIC Bank’s Customer Service Center made 
telephone calls to 3.1942 million customers, and proactively marketed all sorts 
of bank cards and wealth management products. In addition, the Center 
promoted insurance products to 196,700 customers, driving forward the 
growth of this business and consequently bringing on higher fee-based 
incomes (CITIC Bank annual report, 2012). 
 
CITIC Bank made efforts to push forward the mobile banking business. In 
2012, personal mobile banking completed basic coverage of all versions of 
mobile terminals, and released unique functions such as money transfer via a 
mobile, express account transfer and credit card installments. It progressed 
functions related to fund and wealth management products. CITIC Bank is the 
first commercial bank to cooperate with China Mobile, China Unicom, China 
Telecom and China UnionPay. In 2013, CITIC Bank launched its official 
Wechat public platform (the most popular mobile application) called ‘Mr. 
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Inquirer’ whereby customers could check their credit card balances and 
payment dates. Customers could inquire or operate account information, 
available discounts and debt repayment. By the end of 2012, CITIC Bank has 
1.2657 personal mobile banking customers in total, 17.53 times that of in 2011. 
In 2012, its personal mobile banking completed 295,900 transactions, which 
was worth RMB 1.658 billion in total, 4.36 times and 2.63 times respectively of 
that in 2011. In 2013, CITIC Bank’s personal e-banking business enjoyed rapid 
development, further replacing traditional channels and playing an increasingly 
important role in upgrading service efficiency and customer experience. As at 
the end of 2013, number of customer accounts, traditional account 
transactions, and internet banking transactions all achieved higher than 30% 
growth, and personal mobile accounts and transactions achieved 170.11% 
and 920.39% growth respectively (Mr Junwei Lei, Tier 2 Branch, Electronic 
Banking Department Vice Manager, interview, 19th July 2013; CITIC Bank 
annual report, 2013). 
 
 
8.6 Chapter Summary  
 
Under guidance from the CBRC, CITIC Bank started its reform of products and 
services, and began the process of improving capabilities. While the case 
highlights how institutional pressure from the CBRC was the leading source of 
reform, the alliance with the overseas partner provided a major resource for 
understanding best practice, devising strategies, and implementation. CBRC 
sets out a policy framework that it would like to see fulfilled, and all banks 
understand in what ways they must development capabilities and competitive 
advantage. In parallel CITIC Bank, with the advantage of its partnership with 
BBVA, makes a range of product and service proposals to its regulatory body, 
which grants permission. 
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To facilitate reform of its capabilities, CITIC Bank’s ownership structure 
changed. It evolved into a shareholding bank, named China CITIC Bank 
Corporation Limited. As happened to state owned commercial banks, major 
shareholders include state owned enterprises, private enterprises, and foreign 
investors, and CITIC Bank must accept responsibility for its own loss of profit 
by law. Although BBVA could take two seats at the board meeting, it is not 
allowed to participate in management decisions, in any case regulated and 
supervised by the CBRC. BBVA had a cooperative agreement with CITIC 
Bank to help in particular in product development, private banking, and wealth 
management, which are those areas not as well developed in the Chinese 
banking industry. Therefore, a small number of personnel from BBVA worked 
in the relevant departments for these products CITIC Bank headquarters. 
However, these personnel were advisory and had no management 
decision-making authority. At the provincial level or below, there are no foreign 
employees. BBVA has the motivation to expand its business in China by using 
CITIC’ s network. Nonetheless, growth in China for BBVA was limited by 
restrictions imposed on foreign banks by CBRC and which remained. Another 
reason was implicit in the nature of banking and the service industries, which 
are reliant on building client networks and on developing and improving their 
services in conjunction with or in response to local customers. BBVA has 
limited chance to interact with local Chinese customers. At CITIC, its 
involvement was limited to the headquarters. Therefore, BBVA reduced 
investment in CITIC Bank from 15% to 9% by October 2013. But the influence 
of BBVA on the development of CITIC Bank, in product development, private 
banking, and wealth management remains. 
 
The case shows that, as with other banks, provincial level branches have 
limited authority to make decisions. CITIC Bank headquarters makes the 
strategic or major management decisions, approved by the CBRC. The 
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provincial level branch receives guidelines from the headquarters, and 
implements policies at the city level sub branches. As we have seen, they can 
introduce temporary products in response to the needs of their local customers, 
allowing some scope for initiative, although the processes of gaining 
permission continue to be extensive and lengthy. Overall, the view is that he 
CBRC strongly controls the management practice of the bank, and centralized 
management decision making from headquarters leads to the low responses 
to the market at the branch level. The long term aim is to develop capabilities 
and initiative at the local level, but for the time being the push for change is 
top-down. 
 
The case shows that the delivery of products and services relies heavily on the 
training of staff. CITIC Bank emphasizes the training of its employee, and, after 
2011, it provided specific training courses for different staff positions. These 
specialized courses largely enhanced specific knowledge and skills for each 
position, and internal promotion procedures have been altered to reflect the 
training programmes and the bank’s declared human resource objectives. 
Before the introduction of training programmes and examinations, promotion 
had relied almost entirely on ‘guanxi’. Employees under the new procedures 
need to attend a relevant training programme and pass examinations, and so 
they must have basic knowledge of their position before selection occurs 
through network connections. The restructuring of CITIC Bank’s human 
resource management started with the replacement of lifetime employment, as 
with the other banks, by the direct contract and the outsourcing contract. New 
employment conditions helped CITIC Bank to improve qualifications and skills, 
and so enhance efficiency. They were linked to initiatives in training, incentives 
and promotions. Compared to state owned banks, CITIC Bank prefers 
recruitment from the local labour market, as against graduate recruitment, and 
to hire experienced employees, particularly those who have previously worked 
in state owned banks. It strongly believes that, in the banking sector, 
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interaction with customers and client networks are strengthened by local 
connections. The policy explains why CITIC Bank tends to hire employees 
locally. The use of local employees and the recruitment of experienced 
candidates help CITIC Bank to enhance its competitive advantage by 
extending and deepening its client resources. For examples, many of its senior 
managers previously worked for CCB, and they have brought their clients to 
CITIC Bank. However, there is an danger that the completive advantage may 
not be sustained or stable since employees leaving the bank may take their 
client networks with them. ‘Guanxi’ still plays an important role in the Chinese 
banking sector, particularly for the corporate level. For these clients, state 
owned banks tend to have more competitive advantages than the commercial 
banks, as the corporates tend to be government bodies, state owned 
companies, or former state businesses. 
 
The resource-based view of strategy is founded on the idea that the long-term 
competitiveness of firms is rooted in their effective use of resources and 
capabilities that are not easily imitated by rivals. Under the aegis of CBRC, 
therefore, Chinese banks need to differentiate themselves, and build their 
competitive advantages. One way that CITIC Bank has begun to do this is in 
its focus on small and medium enterprises, which fits neatly with its preference 
for local managers, and, in Hunan, it has taken the lead in forging services for 
‘tiny’ scale firms. The bundle of products, services, client networks and 
especially trained personnel in these dimensions of banking amounts to a 
distinctive set of capabilities and resources. In addition, in the context of the 
Chinese market, CITIC Bank has dynamic capabilities in its integration of 
customers, products and services across the CITIC Group. 
 
The nature of service industry suggests that firms need to prioritize the 
creation of intangible capabilities in skills or knowledge with which to create 
locational specific and responsive products or services. Customer demands 
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and being able to meet them in a timely manner are important in the service, 
once, as is occurring in China, firms begin to compete. The trend in online and 
mobile banking shows an attempt to provide more convenience for customers. 
In 2013, guided by the strategy of offering multi-channel services, that is 
‘creating another CITIC Bank online’; the firm has made progress in Internet, 
mobile and telephone services. In 2013, CITIC Bank particularly improves the 
protection of customer information and safety in online banking. Mobile 
banking is considered important by CITIC Bank. In 2012, personal mobile 
banking service covered all versions of smart phone terminals, allowing 
customers to log on and see their accounts. In information technology 
development, as took place in state owned commercial banks, market demand 
forced the pace of change in service channel, while the experience of the 
foreign partner can assist implementation. The CBRC has had less influence 
in technology and Internet service in comparison to internal company initiative 
and foreign partner advice. 
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Chapter 9 
The Huarong Xiangjiang Bank 
 
9.1 Background  
As we have seen (see Chapter 2), the Chinese government established city 
commercial banks in order to increase competition in the banking sector and to 
accelerate local economic development. In essence, the policy was to 
establish better banks for better regions. City commercial banks were 
established from 1995 onwards, the first example being the Shenzhen City 
Commercial Bank, and occurred when the reform of Chinese banking entered 
its third phase (1994-2002). By 2002, city commercial banks had formed 
strong connections with small and medium enterprises, and with local 
government, whose own banking requirements but also its networks in the 
community served as the initial client base for the new businesses. However, 
they ran up large levels of non-performing loans. They were weakened by 
corrupt senior management, and by a lack of management capability for 
further development. Since the establishment of the CBRC, provincial or local 
government was not involved in the regulation or ownership of the banking 
sector, but the non-performing loan levels and the weaknesses of 
management teams worsened. Therefore, the case for reform of these banks 
became increasingly more compelling. 
 
China Huarong Asset Management Co. Ltd (China Huarong) is one of the big 
four-asset management firms in China. It is a state-owned financial institution 
approved by the State Council. China Huarong, founded in October 1999, 
focuses on banks, trust funds, and leasing businesses, for whom it provides 
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the management of equity and fixed income portfolios. Its main responsibility is 
to deal with the non-performing assets of domestic banks. Its headquarters are 
located in Beijing. China Huarong purchases, manages, and disposes of 
non-performing assets transferred from Chinese banks (China Huarong, 
annual report, 2013). 
 
China Huarong was interested in the acquisition and merger of commercial 
banks because it did not have a license to operate a banking business on its 
own accord. It wants to extend its activities into small and medium enterprise, 
and it gains synergies by offering loans and other financial products. City 
commercial banks, in response to CBRC supervision and reform , need a 
strategic partner able to provide capital support and professional asset 
management skills (Mr Wei Xiong, Headquarters, Broad of Supervisors, 
interview, 25th July 2013). From 2007, China Huarong and a number of key 
city commercial banks in Hunan began to prepare for restructuring. As the 
CBRC directly controlled and supervised the big state commercial banks, the 
Hunan government had no influence over their business decisions, but needed 
a sizeable provincial bank that could support local economic development and 
fund public projects. Therefore, Hunan government supported the merger 
between China Huarong and the local city commercial banks. The CBRC 
regulated that China Huarong could only take a shareholding in one single firm 
within the bank sector. China Huarong, the city commercial banks, and the 
Hunan all supported the creation of a new bank enterprise. 
 
Huarong Xiangjiang Bank Corporation (HXBC) was established in October 
2010, through the acquisition and merger of the Zhuzhou City Commercial 
Bank, Xiangtan City Commercial Bank, Hengyang City Commercial Bank, the 
Yueyang City Commercial Bank, and the Shaoyang City Credit Union. The 
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original plan was to include the Changsha City Commercial Bank, the largest 
of its kind in Hunan, and it decided that it had a future as an independent 
enterprise. By 2007, it would be China’s eighth largest bank of its kind. Having 
over several years arranged for the reform of the city commercial banks, the 
CBRC turned its attention other areas of the financial industry. HXBC’s 
headquarters is located in Changsha. In 2010, HXBC had ten Tier 1 city level 
branches. In 2013, the figure had increased to 13, located in Changsha, 
Xiangtan, Zhuzhou, Hengyang, Yueyang, Shaoyang, Chengzhou, Changde, 
Huahuai, Yinyang, Loudi, Yongzhou, and Zhangjiajie, so that only one Tier 1 
city in Hunan province is without a branch. The total number of sub branches, 
which are the operational units dealing with the customer directly, is 139 
(HXBC annual report, 2013). HXBC mainly provides services to local small 
and micro enterprises and individual customers, and it supports local 
government projects. HXBC aims to create “small, precise, new, special" 
services, and it is committed to a series of strategic steps, beginning with 
differentiation, and then market-orientation, diversification, regionalization, and, 
ultimately, internationalization. In this respect, HXBC’s statement of its long 
term goals is typical of Chinese banks. China Huarong aims to provide strong 
capital support and professional asset management skills to HXBC, which 
claims to have largely improved its governance structure, business 
management practices, risk management, and operating performance of 
HXBC. The company declares that it will improve in five areas in order to build 
sustainable competitive advantages: market share; create internal synergies; 
quality of service, customer satisfaction and loyalty; information technology; 
and brand recognition (HXBC, 2011).  
 
HXBC formulated a ‘five year, three step plan’ or development strategy 
between 2010 and 2015. The first stage was in 2010 - 2011. The main aim of 
this stage was integrating the services, products, processes, information 
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system, client resource, and corporate culture of the previous commercial 
banks in order to achieve consistent standards across the Hunan province. 
Having dealt with the internal organization, the second stage in 2012- 2013 
moved on to expanding the business, improving management structure, and 
building competitive advantages and core competitiveness. The third stage for 
2014-2015 seeks higher brand recognitions and achieving the standard of the 
national commercial banks. HXBC plans to list on the stock market in 2015, 
and become a national commercial bank (HXBC, 2011). 
  
In 2011, HXBC was given the ‘2011 annual best national banking financial 
services specialty products’ award by the CBRC. In 2012, HXBC established a 
new bill business, investment banking, international business, asset 
management, financial market department, an electronic banking and bank 
card department, and it also started to extend its business in China outside of 
Hunan Province, although these are for the time being representative offices 
such as the one in Beijing. In 2013, HXBC has been reward with the rating of 
level 2 for overall performance from the People’s Bank, which is the highest 
rate for all provincial level commercial banks. By the end of 2013, HXBC 
expanded by operating in 8 provinces (HXBC annual report, 2013). After about 
three years of development, HXBC is the largest provincial level commercial 
bank in Hunan province. In the first quarter of 2014, HXBC deposits increased 
by 24.29% to 22.115 billion yuan, higher than the provincial average;. Bank net 
profit increased 49.48%. It also holds more loans than any other firms 
operating in Hunan (HXBC Annual Report, 2013). 
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9.2 Strategy and Control 
HXBC is a shareholding bank. The basic ownership pattern was established in 
2010, and, as shown by the data for 2013, it remained intact for three years (as 
table 9-1):  
Table 9-1 Major Shareholders of HXBC (2013)  
Name of 
shareholder  
Nature of 
shareholder 
Total number of  
shares held 
Shareholder 
percentage 
China Huarong 
Asset  
Management Co. 
Ltd 
Stated-owned  3,141,250,000 50.98% 
Hunan, 
Hengyang City 
Construction and 
Investment Co. 
Ltd 
Stated-owned  312,087,500 5.07% 
Tianyuan Real 
Estate Ltd 
Domestic non 
state-owned  
227,000,000 3.68% 
Hunan Trust, Ltd  Stated-owned 194,431,668 3.16% 
Xiangtan City 
Construction and 
Investment Ltd 
Stated-owned 165,388,372 2.68% 
Xinhuang Group: 
Xiangtan 
Resource and 
Technology Ltd 
Domestic non 
state-owned  
146,517,768 2.38% 
Yueyang 
State-owned 
Asset 
Management Ltd. 
Stated-owned 143,950,000 2.34% 
Hunan Publishing 
Investment 
Stated-owned 100,000,000 1.62% 
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Holding Group 
Zhuzhou State 
Owned Asset 
Investment 
Holding Ltd 
Stated-owned 100,000,000 1.62% 
Jinan Juntuyuan 
Investment Ltd 
Domestic non 
state-owned  
87,500,000 1.42% 
 
(Source from: HXBC annual report, 2013) 
 
Most of the shareholders are state-owned firms, which are China Huarong 
Asset Management Co. ltd; Hunan, Hengyang City Construction and 
Investment Co. ltd; Hunan Trust, ltd; Xiangtan City Construction and 
Investment ltd; Yueyang State-owned Asset Management ltd; Hunan 
Publishing Investment Holding Group; Zhuzhou State-owned Asset 
Investment Holding ltd. The major non state owned domestic shareholders are 
Tianyuan Real Estate, ltd; Xinhuang Group: Xiangtan Resource and 
Technology ltd; Jinan Juntuyuan Investment ltd. Eight of these ten firms are in 
Hunan province. China Huarong has taken the largest ownership of HXBC 
since 2012. As with the national commercial banks, the Board of Directors 
retains management responsibility and makes the decisions within the 
framework set by CBRC. Those Chinese state owned companies and 
non-state owned companies that invested in HXBC are not expected to 
exercise control. China Huarong, with 50.98% of the shares, can not directly 
involve itself in the operation of HXBC, although they can express opinions at 
the shareholder’s general meeting. This situation is similar for all the other 
shareholders. For the overall improvement in internal management, the 
appointment of senior manager has become based on performance and 
examinations, although, as in other cases, they are subject to the final 
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approval of the CBRC. HXBC headquarters plays the guiding and leading role 
in market planning, policy guidance, information sharing, championing 
marketing efforts, technical support, product innovation, resource allocation 
and personnel training. The management structure, as in Figure 9-1, shows 
that below the headquarters and its departments are the tier 1 branches at the 
level of the cities. Each city has its own headquarters, with a human resource 
department and an information technology function. Within the city, the city 
headquarters follows the instructions and guidelines of the company 
headquarters, which is located in Changsha, and manages the sub-branches 
that deal with customers. Decision-making within the cities is limited, and it is 
HXBC headquarters that makes the management decisions. The CBRC is 
charged with setting common standards for all banks, but the provincial 
commercial banks believe that the CBRC allows the state owned banks to 
operate in more areas of banking business. For example, the CBRC did not 
allow HXBC to operate a personal credit card business. The CBRC monitors 
HXBC’s Board of Supervisors, which, as is standard in Chinese bank 
governance, reports to the shareholders’ general meeting. The bank has an 
organizational structure consisting of the shareholders’ general meeting, the 
Board of Directors, the Board of Supervisors and the senior management 
(HXBC annual report, 2013). The Board of Directors consists of 12 board 
members, including 4 executive directors, 5 non-executive directors, and 3 
independents. The Board of Supervisors consists of 9 supervisors, including 2 
shareholder supervisors, 2 external supervisors and 5 staff supervisors. The 
senior manager team consists of 11 people. The bank needs to operate and 
carry out business activities according to the requirements set by the 
‘Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of China’, as passed in 1995. 
From 2012, the CBRC pushed for the transformation of China Huarong and it 
became a joint stock company aspiring to have a greater commercial 
emphasis. But, while the China Life Insurance (Group) Company, one of the 
largest insurance companies in China, has taken a 1.94 per cent of Huarong 
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Group share, the Ministry of Finance owns the remaining 98.06 per cent. The 
joint stock company is the typical means in China for undertaking market listing. 
China Huarong has in fact floated a number of subsidiaries, such as Huarong 
Securities, Huarong Trust, Huarong Leasing, Huarong Yufu, Huarong 
Investment Zhiyuan, Huarong Asset Huiton, and Huarong (Hong Kong) 
International. Until 2014, China Huarong had 32 branch offices (sub-branches) 
and 11 subsidiary companies in mainland China, operating in 30 provinces 
(China Huarong annual report, 2014). The CBRC requires Huarong Group 
gradually to reduce its shares in HXBC during 2014-2016. 
 
Figure 9-1 Organizational Structure of HXBC  
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Senior Management Level and Domestic Branches 
 
(Source from: HXBC annual report, 2013) 
 
9.3 Human Resources 
9.31 Promotion  
When HXBC was founded in 2010, through a merger, it used both the direct 
contract system and outsourcing. HXBC has labour service agreements with 
sub-contractors and labour sourcing companies who meet the requests for 
particular types of employee on a fixed term basis. Priorities were to downsize 
the number of employees, to integrate and build the new management team, 
and to create the conditions to improve and change skills. As with other banks, 
HXBC chose four main ways to achieve the new objectives: all employees had 
to pass an examination commensurate with their position, or elect for 
alternative posts or retraining; long standing employees some could opt for 
early retirement; low skill employees and high skilled personnel such as those 
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in IT were sub-contracted; and needed staff were hired from other banks (Ms 
Ping Li, Tier 1 Branch HR Manager, interview, 26th July 2013). 
  
Key senior managers were selected from the original city commercial banks as 
since existing employees tended to be more familiar with the business and 
prevailing ‘guanxi’ relationships. HXBC hired in addition those who had 
previously worked in state owned banks. City branch presidents or vice 
presents and headquarters departmental managers or vice manager and other 
key managers were directly selected and appointed by HRBC headquarters 
Before formal appointment, HXBC evaluates all candidates with its own written 
examinations, and all candidates must pass. Normally, and as we have seen in 
the other banks cases, guanxi is influential in the selection of candidates who 
pass their examinations. 
 
Before 2010, it is important to note, promotion was almost entirely based on 
guanxi. Li (2013) states that ‘guanxi’ plays an important role when recruiting 
from external labour markets, and a large percentage of senior managers were 
from other state owned banks in Hunan provinces (Ms Ping Li, Tier 1 Branch 
HR Manager, interview, 26th July 2013). From 2010, no employee could be 
promoted without passing an examination, although guanxi was influential in 
the subsequent interviewing and selection. Other than those directly appointed 
by the headquarters, the management in each city makes appointments of the 
key managerial staff at city or below level. Similarly, in these cases, 
evaluations of the performance of candidates are conducted. Some positions 
require the candidate to pass the examinations set by the provincial branch, 
with interviews to follow, but the city level branch could appoint directly in other 
cases. While most management candidates are found internally, some are 
recruited from the labour market, or appointed by the CBRC. Each 
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management level has set job requirements and age limits. Compared to the 
state-owned enterprises, HXBC is more inclined to waive the age limit 
restrictions, focusing instead on the performance of employees, because its 
approach is more commercially inclined (Ms Ping Li, Tier 1 Branch HR 
Manager, interview, 26th July 2013). Guanxi continues to play a role in the 
appointment of employees – subject to them first demonstrating the basic 
knowledge requirements and knowledge – but less so than in many other 
Chinese banks.  
 
9.32 Recruitment  
As in the case of other commercial banks, such as CITIC, there are three types 
of recruitment: graduate recruitment, open recruitment and internship. Every 
year, HXBC Bank hires full-time graduates. The process is reflected in other 
national and provincial banks, as candidates apply online one year ahead of 
graduation, and the must graduate from a high ranking university. For 
positions at the headquarters, applicants must have a Master’s degree, and be 
studying from a university officially designated as one of the country’s leading 
institutions. After applying online, candidates attend written examinations, set 
by HXBC headquarters in papers that include English, administrative and 
professional skills, knowledge and expertise. After the candidates have 
passed the examinations, they must attend an interview (Ms Ping Li, Tier 1 
Branch HR Manager, interview, 26th July 2013). 
 
Compared to state owned banks, HXBC puts more emphasis on open 
recruitment, because it seeks to employ people with work experience and 
client networks. It draws from the local labour market by advertising on 
company websites or through recruitment agencies. In many cases, and 
	   267	  
especially where any future employee will need to work with clients, 
candidates must have at least three years working experience in the banking 
sector, two of which must be at the level to which they are being recruited or 
one level below. Working experience in one of the state owned banks tends to 
be preferred. An age limitation is set for each position. Liu (2013) states that 
the age limit for open recruitment is similarly less strictly applied than in the 
case of other banks. HXBC looks instead at people’s client network and 
experience. Liu indeed indicated that the client network was the most 
fundamental criteria in hiring managerial personnel (Ms Jun Liu, Sub Branch, 
VIP and Individual Client Relationship Vice Manager, interview, 25th July 
2013). 
 
The internship programme, introduced in 2011, shows that modernizing 
initiatives had mixed results due to long-standing practices being deeply 
embedded and difficult to transform. Interested candidates need to apply 
online, and as a minimum pass a level 6 in the national English test, before 
being interviewed. Internship experience counts as an additional factor for 
employment, once a candidate passes the examination in the subsequent year 
during the formal graduate recruitment process. As in other banks, guanxi and 
links with important clients explain the reason why most of students were 
chosen for the internship, with the overriding consideration being what kind of 
clients the candidate might bring to the bank (Ms Ping Li, Tier 1 Branch HR 
Manager, interview, 26th July 2013). 
 
9.33 Training and development 
Since 2010, HXBC carries out training programmes in its departments. New 
products or services require the relevant department to conduct training. 
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HXBC frequently updates and provides information and training materials. 
New employees will undergo induction training. In 2013, HXBC provided 2,560 
training sessions for recruits (HXBC annual report, 2013). The firm 
emphasizes the ‘customer focus’ concept in their training for all employees, 
even for those sub-contracted, such as cleaners. For example, they are asked 
to greet customers when they walk into the branch, and to provide assistance 
if they need (Ms Jun Liu, Sub Branch, VIP and Individual Client Relationship 
Vice Manager, interview, 25th July 2013). On-the job training is designed to 
improve employees’ specialized and general knowledge.   
 
9.34 Pay policy and welfare  
As with other banks, HXBC’s pay structure is determined by seniority or length 
of service, job grade, and a performance related bonus. The basic salary and 
seniority related pay accounts for the smaller part of remuneration. The 
performance related element, introduced in 2010 to improve personal 
performance, is consequently more important. Employees enjoy several 
benefits, such as house purchase, hospital and childcare allowances, plus a 
child education scholarship. Both the medical and pension allowances are 
linked with the national medical and pension system, part of a pattern in the 
banking sector (HXBC social responsibility report, 2013). 
 
9.35 Summary 
The employment contract was introduced in 2010 to replace the system of 
guaranteed lifetime employment. As in the case of the other banks, HXBC has 
two types of contract. Since it introduced the new system, HXBC reduced the 
number of employees and selected qualified employees on the basis of 
examinations. A particular issue for HXBC was that the new bank was a 
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merger of previous city commercial banks, and, as a result, it had employees 
undertaking the same tasks. It would need to subject many of these affected 
employees to demotion. For those unable to pass the examination that was 
introduced, and if further training was not suitable, retirement or dismissal 
were real possibilities. Downsizing helped to create the conditions to enhance 
and change skills. HXBC tends to recruit employees with working experience 
and in particular to hire senior managers from other banks, as they tend to 
bring clients based on their personal network. Yet some senior employees quit 
and joined other banks, taking many of their clients with them. However, staff 
turnover is not overall a major difficulty, given the firm ‘s stable employment, 
substantial welfare arrangements, and competitive pay rates. ‘Guanxi’ – in the 
sense of client networks - plays therefore an important role in any individual’s 
career progress. What has changed in a significant way is the introduction of 
examinations in 2010, ensuring a level of capability, even if selection occurs on 
another basis subsequently. After the restructuring, by the end of 2013, HXBC 
has 3,169 employees in total. Of these, 276 or 8.7 per cent had a Master’s 
degree or above; 1,655 or 39.1 per cent had the Bachelor degree (HXBC 
annual report, 2013). 
 
HXBC provides training programmes for different positions and levels, and 
training enhances both general and specific knowledge. In its training, HXBC 
emphasizes ‘customer service’ in order to maintain commercial relationships. 
The previous SOE system within the city commercial banks lacked monetary 
incentives to improve performance. HXBC focused on performance related 
pay to incentivize employees. Yet it is influenced too by ‘guanxi’ in the areas of 
recruitment and promotion. The positive side is that such personal networks 
can bring clients to the bank; however, such ‘guanxi’ based clients will follow a 
manager who leaves the company. Inherited from the SOEs system, the age 
limitation for certain positions is still a boundary, and removes the motivation of 
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senior employees not able to be promoted, although HXBC applies the rule 
less exactingly than competitors. The CBRC has directly influenced the terms 
of the promotion and the appointment of senior managers, and their 
recruitment, payment, welfare benefits, and labour contracts, but has not 
issued directions on training and development. 
 
9.4 Client and Customer Relationships and Product 
Development  
HXBC generally divides its clients or customers into four types, categorized by 
corporate, small to micro firm, individual VIP customer, and individual 
customer. Its first, corporate clients, is less important to its commercial 
operations than the other three, and so its profile is different to the other 
state-owned banks. To attract and keep the relationships with small and micro 
firms, both ‘guanxi’ and service quality can be pivotal. Nonetheless, because 
of the support from and connections with local government, HXBC has large 
number of institutional clients throughout Hunan, including public hospitals and 
television companies. These are supervised by its corporate department. 
According to Guo (2013) HXBC tends to hire young employees whose parents 
work as leader of those institutional organizations (Ms Jing Guo, Tier 1 Branch 
Vice Present, interview, 25th July 2013). For large and important clients, 
product development is influenced by customer requirements. The local 
branch passes on customer feedback and requirements to the headquarters, 
responsible for the design of any product. As we have noted elsewhere, the 
development of services and products for VIP customers has become an 
important trend for Chinese domestic banks, and HXBC seeks to improve 
customer service as well as products for individual customers. It particularly 
focuses on the training of employees to provide good customer service. In 
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addition, HXBC introduces clients to the asset management service and the 
overseas loans and finance services provided by Huarong Group. 
 
HXBC is a provincial level commercial bank, but it has less authority to operate 
in every sector of the banking business, unlike the state owned banks and 
national commercial banks. Therefore, their product development tends to be 
limited by the CBRC, which so far has not permitted HXBC to operate a 
personal credit card business. The bank does offer a company credit card, but 
only since December 2012. HXBC has made three-year product development 
plan, and decided to set up an electronic and card department in each city 
sub-branch. By June 2014, HXBC had acquired 25,206 business card clients 
25206 in total. The business credit card must be opened with the name of 
company client, yet it is used mainly by employees of each company for 
personal expenditure. Guo (2013) acknowledges the restrictions placed on 
HXBC by the CBRC, but the bank operates the business card flexibly because 
of the size of the personal credit market (Ms Jing Guo, Tier 1 Branch Vice 
Present, interview, 25th July 2013). HXBC implements the ‘customer focus’ 
business concept in its retail banking business. The bank made efforts to 
promote the retail business through price competition and product 
improvement. As the same as other banks, HXBC invested in the appeal, look 
and structure of its sub-branches, of which it has forty-nine. It concentrated on 
expanding its self-service facilities, including ATMs, minimizing waiting times 
and improving operational efficiency. 
 
HXBC is developing wealth management for its VIP customers. It has divided 
them into three levels. The first is for customers who have savings over 
300,000 RMB. The second level is for those with over 300,000 RMB, or those 
with loans from HXBC over 800,000 RMB. The third level is for customers who 
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have savings over 1,000,000 RMB, or have loans over 2,000,000 RMB. 
Different services and products are designed for each level. HXBC established 
VIP Wealth Management Centres at selected branches to provide professional 
consulting and investment advisory services. Again, most customers are found 
through “guanxi’ (Ms Jun Liu, Sub Branch, VIP and Individual Client 
Relationship Vice Manager, interview, 25th July 2013; HXBC annual report, 
2013).  
 
The development of small and micro enterprise business was given 
prominence. HXBC adheres to the ‘small, tailored, and new special" service 
orientation to create ‘the best partners for SME’. Since 2012, HXBC specially 
established the micro enterprise department, aiming to provide a quick efficient 
service. Normally, like other state banks or national commercial banks, small 
and micro enterprise clients are managed within the same department. In the 
meantime, to support its initiatives, HXBC established a risk management 
team and credit approval officers, seeking to shorten decision making 
processes, and offering a three days fast loan service (previously seven days).  
In 2013, the CBRC designated HXBC as an excellent small micro-enterprise 
financial provider. Guanxi has an important role in attracting this group of 
clients. Many small to micro enterprises senior managers were recruited from 
other banks because they already had good relationships with certain 
enterprises, and could bring a large number of clients with them (Mr Wei Xiong, 
Headquarters, Broad of Supervisors, interview 25th July 2013). HXBC provides 
banking, financial leasing, trust, equity investments, bond issuance, listing and 
other financial services to its small to micro clients.  
 
The CBRC regulates the percentage of each type of banking business every 
firm must achieve. For HXBC, it is not a problem to achieve the target for the 
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small and medium enterprise, as this is one of them main businesses. The 
CBRC has limited HXBC’s product development. Because HXBC is a province 
level bank, its business and products can only operate in designated areas. 
HXBC headquarters develops products within the remit of CBRC regulations 
and with its approval. The city level branch has no authority to develop 
products and concentrates on reporting customer feedback to the 
headquarters. HXBC based on ‘guanxi’ to bring and maintain customer and 
client relationships is one of its competitive advantages in Hunan province. 
However, it cannot be considered a sustainable competitive advantage, as 
clients who brought by ‘guanxi’ can be easily lost through ‘guanxi’ when 
managers leave for another business. In the area of individual customers, 
HXBC has the competitive advantage of providing efficient and fast services. 
But it has a potential disadvantage in its processes for evaluating customers, 
which might result in non-performing loans. Also, due to the limitations 
imposed on its products and services by the CBRC, HXBC always ‘adjusts’ its 
strategy, as in its use of business credit cards for what is essentially a personal 
credit card market. 
 
9.5 Information Technology  
HXBC claims that it supports business system innovation; the improvement of 
risk management control; online and mobile banking systems and services; 
and self-service systems and ATM facilities. They serve customers outside of 
office hours, reduce waiting terms at counters, and boost efficiency. Since 
2011, HXBC has developed different kinds of online service. Dong (2013) 
indicates that online banking is key to the bank’s strategic development, and 
new technology is being used to support   traditional services through 
product innovation, the expansion of service capacity, greater efficiency, and 
lower operational costs (Mr Zhiqiang Dong, Tier 1 Branch, Electronic 
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Department Banking Vice Manager, interview, 26th July 2013). With the launch 
of the online system, the bank gradually cancelled paper application forms, 
and customers could fill forms online and sign business contracts. Customers 
now have the choice to transfer money electronically although some 
operational and technical difficulties remain. HXBC has created a separate 
Internet Banking Department for corporate clients and another for its personal 
service. HXBC has enhanced its multiple-channel customer service. In the 
area of personal Internet banking, HXBC improved its software and 
operational systems to increase convenience and security. In terms of 
corporate Internet banking, HXBC has developed an online system for 
supervising funds and tracking business activities. HXBC runs a series of 
marketing activities to promote its online service, win new customers, and 
maximize brand reputation. 
 
HXBC started its mobile banking business since August 2013 to enhance the 
multiple-channel customer service. Most smart phones can log in to their 
mobile banking. HXBC also has developed telephone banking, and it has a 
special line for VIP customers. Telephone banking operates 24 hours, and its 
services include lost and stolen reports, service advisors, transfer, and pin 
number changes. In addition, HXBC reached agreement with its institution 
clients, so that customers can check and transfer their social insurance 
payments and pensions through HXBC within Hunan province (HXBC annual 
report, 2013; Mr Zhiqiang Dong, Tier 1 Branch, Electronic Department Banking 
Vice Manager, interview, 26th July 2013).   
 
In the area of information technology, in its effect on service channels, market 
demand has been instrumental. HXBC has prioritized online banking, mobile 
and telephone banking, multiple channels, and quick and convenient service. 
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The building of the information and operational system was sub-contracted. 
The problem remains in the updating of its systems and when there are 
technical problems. Compared to the big national commercial banks, HXBC 
lacks the help of foreign strategic partners. Therefore, HXBC does not have 
strong competitive advantage in IT.  
 
9.6 Chapter Summary  
Under the supervision of the CBRC, many local commercial banks lost the 
protection of local government, and their weaknesses including 
non-performing loans were more fully exposed. The CBRC forced the reform 
of local commercial banks following their initiatives with the big four banks and 
the national commercial banks. City commercials banks began a series of 
changes. They should have strong capital support and asset management 
skills. Huarong Group is one of the big four-asset management companies in 
China. Huarong Group is a state agency charged with clearing bad loans in 
banking and providing asset management. Therefore, since 2007, China 
Huarong and those city commercial banks begin to prepare for merger. Firstly, 
the city commercial banks needed the capital and management skills support 
of China Huarong. Secondly, China Huarong wanted to operate its own 
banking business through the network controlled by the city commercial banks. 
Thirdly, Hunan government desired a strong and capable provincial bank, 
which could support local economic development and government projects. It 
consequently supported the acquisition of city commercial banks by Huarong. 
Therefore, Huarong Xiangjiang Bank Corporation Limited was established in 
2010 with its headquarters located in Changsha. 
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The case demonstrates that the CBRC has been the leading force for reform. 
It insisted on the reform of the city commercial banks, and Huarong initiated 
the acquisition and the merger as the solution to the policy aim. The merger 
allowed strong financial support and formed a resource for best practice. In 
terms of providing new products and services, customer and market demand 
as well as institutional factors have been influential. With the merger, HXBC is 
a shareholding bank. The bank’s major shareholders include state owned and 
private enterprises. The majority of those top ten shareholders are from Hunan 
province. HXBC has been made formally responsible for its profits and losses. 
The headquarters makes the majority of management decisions, and the 
authority of the tier 1 city level branch is limited. 
 
Since 2010, the labour contract system-assisted downsizing, and created the 
conditions to improve, integrate and change skills. ‘Guanxi’ remains in 
promotions and in recruitment. The introduction of examinations during 
promotion and recruitment ensures basic knowledge for any position. HXBC 
imposes an age limitation for promotion and recruitment, as do other banks, 
but it is less strict in its application than its rivals, leaning to a greater extent on 
personal performance. Performance related pay is more common since 
employment reform, and HXBC has begun to provide different training for each 
department and employee grade since 2010. The HXBC case shows that 
methods of knowledge transfer rely heavily on the training of staff. Training 
programmes enhance both the general and specific knowledge. One of the 
strengths of HXBC is its focus on ‘customer service’ training, so that even their 
sub contracted employees such as cleaners must also attend customer 
service training. The CBRC has directly shaped promotion policies, and it has 
to approve appointment to senior level. It has indirectly influenced recruitment, 
as it needs to approve examination papers. 
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As a provincial level commercial bank, under CBRC regulation, HXBC could 
not operate business in all sectors as other national commercial banks. In the 
sectors in which it is allowed to operate, HXBC emphasizes customer 
relationships, small to micro enterprises, individual VIP customers, and retail 
business. State owned banks have traditionally overlooked the small and 
micro firms. HXBC relies on previous client and customer relationships, and 
has strong competitive advantages within Hunan province and its networks, in 
its target sectors. HXBC has significant support from the local government in 
terms of policy, resources, projects and institutional clients. It has proved 
better at interpreting customer feedback from the branches for the 
consideration of the headquarters in comparison to the state owned banks and 
the national commercial banks, providing some source of competitive 
advantage. HXBC as a provincial level bank has fewer layers of management, 
and the result is a higher measure of operational effectiveness than its national 
rivals. It has introduced professional and technical personnel to improve 
technological competence and innovation, shown in its use of IT and online 
services. 
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Chapter 10 Comparisons and Conclusion 
 
This chapter compares five Chinese banking cases, the continuous 
differentiation and hybridization of practices, and the strong influences of 
government and domestic institutions, FDI, and firm-level agency, in the 
development of human resources, client and customer relationships, product 
development, and informational technology. 
 
10.1 Background  
China’s decision to begin the process of economic reform in 1978 brought 
about the first steps in the change of the banking system. Until 1984, the main 
task was separating the People’s Bank of China (PBC) from its involvement in 
commercial banking and banks. It began therefore to focus on its role as 
regulator and supervisory central banker, and four state owned banks in 1984 
took over the commercial activities of the PBC. The Bank of China (BOC), 
originally established in 1912, had a tradition and experience with foreign 
exchange and trade finance. Therefore, in 1979, BOC had formally taken over 
PBC’s business in trade and foreign currency transactions, although the 
practice differed from the reality of PBC’s continued involvement. The China 
Construction Bank was established in 1954. As it main responsibility was 
supporting, providing and allocating the funds to government construction and 
infrastructure projects, the China Construction Bank in 1979 took over the 
main responsibility for providing funding for the government and urban large 
construction projects. The Agricultural Bank of China, which was founded in 
1951, had taken over main responsibility for providing funds for farming and 
rural areas. In 1984, the Chinese government established the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China to be mainly responsible for commercial banking 
	   279	  
activities in urban areas. By 1984, the first stage of reform’s main task had 
almost achieved, and the PBC did not have commercial bank functions, 
concentrating as a central bank on monetary policy, financial markets, and the 
issuing of bank notes. The four specialized state owned commercial banks 
operated in their designated sectors, base, and there was no competition at 
this stage in the banking sector. 
 
The second period of reform occurred between 1984 and 1994. The chief task 
was to remove the restrictions on the four specialized state owned commercial 
banks, allowing them to operate commercial and retail service in all sectors. 
The main aim was moving from a wholly policy-driven banking system to a 
more market-oriented one. These four state owned banks could cross 
business sectors but they were still very much government controlled. In order 
to bring further competition, the Chinese government allowed the commercial 
banks to provide services to individuals and to small and medium sized urban 
firms. CITIC Bank, established in 1987, was a pilot for the commercial bank 
sector. Other national commercial banks included the Bank of 
Communications, the Shenzhen Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, China 
Merchants Bank, China Everbright Bank and Hua Xia Bank. The Chinese 
government allowed urban credit cooperatives in order to diversify banking 
services to individuals, small to medium firms, and rural areas. Although, since 
the mid of 1980s, the government removed restrictions for the four specialized 
state owned commercial banks, they were still focusing on the industry in 
which they were specialized. Due to rapid economic development in China, the 
large amount of urban development, and government projects, the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank became the leading bank, by 1993. During this time, 
domestic banks still needed to conduct lending decisions based on the needs 
of the national economy and social development, following the direction of the 
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state’s industrial policy. The policy led to a huge amount of non-performing 
loans as the result of lending to SOEs.  
 
After the 14th National Congress, in November 1993, the State Council issued 
the Resolution on Financial System Reform. Then, entering the third period of 
banking reform, from 1994 to 2001, the main tasks were further removing the 
restriction on state-owned specialized banks, permitting them to operate 
business across sectors, and encouraging competition among banks. The 
main objective was transforming banks into market functioning and profitable 
organizations. Therefore, in 1994, the Chinese government established three 
policy banks to take over long-term development finance and policy lending as 
previously performed by the four state owned banks. In 1995, the Commercial 
Bank Law of China officially confirmed PBC as the central bank, and made the 
major state-owned banks into shareholding banks. The Law regulated that 
banks needed to responsible for their profit and losses. In order to further 
increase competitions, the Chinese government allowed the establishment of 
city level commercial banks. The establishment of three policy banks, with the 
aim of reducing the impact on banks’ credit allocation decisions, sought to 
enhance the independence of the commercial banks, but local government still 
invented in the local commercial banks’ credit allocation decisions. The 
support from local government and the ‘guanxi’ based local network had 
helped the quick growth of local commercial banks during the late 1990s. In 
the meantime, the major clients of state owned banks were still SOEs, and the 
state owned banks still had significant non-performing loans. The Chinese 
government kept writing off and cleaning up their deteriorated balance sheets. 
Therefore, on the one hand, the local commercial banks had support from local 
government; and the state owned banks still had help from central government; 
domestic banks still had less incentive to compete with each other, and the 
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Chinese banking sector was still marked by bureaucracy, inefficiency, and 
out-dated practices.   
 
In 2002, China joined the WTO, and committed itself to opening up the 
financial and banking sector. However, the Chinese banks suffered from high 
levels of non-performing loans, and lacked the competitive advantages 
needed to face global competition. Under these circumstances, in order to 
protect, regulate and accelerate the development of the Chinese bank sector, 
in 2003, the Chinese government established the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) to oversee reform. The banking sector reform entered 
the critical fourth phase of development. Following the rise of greater local and 
international competition, and WTO accession, Chinese banks needed to 
evolve their own strategies, capabilities and systems. The CBRC selected 
CCB and BOC to be the pilots for its policy of creating more market oriented 
and profit conscious commercial banks. The lessons learnt from CCB and 
BOC were used to transform other banks. Following these initiatives, ICBC 
started reform in 2005. In the meantime, national commercial banks started to 
change from 2005. For example, CITIC Bank began its restructuring in 2005. 
Then the next wave of restructuring was the city level commercial banks. The 
Hunan province city level local commercial banks, including Zhuzhou, 
Xiangtan, Hengyang City and Yueyang City Commercial Banks, and the 
Shaoyang City Credit Union were put the management of the China Huarong 
Asset Management Corporation, and restructured and merged as the Huarong 
Xiangjiang Bank in 2010. It showed how institutions were the leading force for 
each stage of Chinese bank reform. 
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10.2 Strategic Control  
Under the newly appointed CBRC, in 2003, with the clear aim of creating a 
commercially orientated structure, Chinese banks started restructuring as 
shareholding banks. The first wave was the two pilot banks: BOC and CCB, 
which both started restructuring in 2003, and becoming joint stock, limited 
companies in 2004. Then the second wave was the other state owned bank, 
ICBC, and the national commercial banks. Both ICBC and CITIC Bank 
became joint stock limited companies in 2005. Interesting the Agricultural Bank 
began its change process in 2004, finishing 2009, and transformed to a joint 
stock structure in 2010. In 2005, at the requirement of the CBRC, and with aim 
of further evolving into a commercial bank, CCB was the first Chinese bank 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange market. In 2006, also under the 
requirement of the CBRC, BOC listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and was the first Chinese commercial bank to 
launch an A-Share and H-Share initial public offering and achieve a dual listing 
in both markets. At the same year, ICBC listed in both Hong Kong and the 
Shanghai Stock exchange market. One year later, in 2007, CCB floated on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange market. Then the next wave was the restructuring 
of city commercial banks. By the end of 2007, the four banks of CCB, BOC, 
ICBC and CITIC had all listed on both Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock 
Exchange market. At that time, within the top 10 shareholders, they had both 
state owned enterprises, non-state owned domestic enterprises, and foreign 
investors. 
 
By 2013, most of the main shareholders had remained intact for seven or five 
years. For the three state owned banks - CCB, BOC, ICBC - their main 
shareholders were Huijin and HKSCC. Huijin took over 50% of the shares in 
CCB and BOC, and over 35% in ICBC. Huijin is the Central Huijin Investment 
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Ltd, which was founded in December 2003, and is headquartered in Beijing. 
Central Huijin is a state owned company, and mandated to exercise the rights 
and the obligations as an investor in major state-owned financial enterprises, 
on behalf of the State. Although those banks moved towards being commercial 
oriented banks, the State still exercises a large share of control through Huijin. 
The cases indeed show the decline of the shares from foreign investors. The 
CBRC encourages Chinese domestic banks to cooperate with foreign banks. 
In the meantime, in order to protect ownership and control, it firstly regulated 
that foreign investors could have no more than 15% of shares in any bank. It 
secondly regulated that foreign investors could not be involved in management 
decision-making. The cases findings indicate that the most significant changes 
occurred in foreign investors’ shares. In 2007, the Bank of America was 
amongst the top 10 shareholders in CCB, with its share being 8.19%, but, in 
2013, the share was only 0.8%. RBC China Investment was among the top 10 
shareholders in BOC, having 8.19%. However, in 2013, the share was 8.25%, 
and it was no longer one of the top 10 shareholders in BOC. Similarly, 
Goldman Sachs and American Express were the top 10 shareholders in ICBC 
in 2007, but no longer so in 2013. HXBC was established in 2010, and, since 
then, until 2013, the China Huarong held over 50% of its shares, the rest being 
held by the state or domestic non-state owned firms, meaning that there are no 
foreign investors. 
 
Despite changes in ownership structure, Chinese banks maintained 
management control. The Board of Directors of each bank retained the greater 
responsibility for management decision-making, within the policy framework 
and subsequent approval provided by the CBRC. Shareholders are not 
expected to exercise control over the operations of those banks, and they are 
unable to determine management decision making, even if they give opinions 
at the shareholder’s general meeting, and offer broad supervision and 
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corporate governance. One consequence of the change in ownership and 
objectives has been an overall improvement in internal management, with the 
appointment of senior manager being based on performance and 
examinations, subject to the final approval of the CRBC. 
 
The three state owned banks and the national commercial bank, CITIC Bank, 
have similar management structures. Normally, below the headquarters and 
its department are the branches at the level of the provinces, the autonomous 
regions of Hong Kong and Macau, municipalities such as Beijing and 
Shanghai, and special listed cities such as Shenzhen, all being defined by 
officially determined structures. There are in addition the Overseas Branches 
and Representative Offices. Within the provinces, there is a provincial level 
headquarters, which acts as the means for implementing policy at the level of 
the City or Country sub-branches that deal with customers. The municipalities 
act similarly by carrying out the directives down towards the operational level 
of the Urban District, just as Special Listed Cities and autonomous regions 
have parallel sub-branches. Decision making within the provinces- as in the 
case of the autonomous regions, municipalities and special listed cities - is 
limited. Each bank headquarters makes the management decisions with the 
approval of the CBRC. The provincial, municipal and listed city branches have 
specialized departments at their headquarters, including human resources, 
information technology and credit cards, in order to coordinate with the main 
office, help with policy implementation at the sub-branches, and manage 
corporate clients. HXBC is a provincial level commercial bank, but its 
management structure is similar to those national commercial ones, excepting 
the fact that its headquarters inevitably operates at the provincial level. Below 
its headquarters and its departments are the Tier 1 branches at the level of the 
cities. Again, each city has its human resource and information technology 
function. Within the city, the city headquarters follows the instructions and 
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guidelines set by the company headquarters, and acts as the means for 
implementing policy at the level of the sub-branches that deal with customers. 
Decision-making within the cities is limited, and it is the HXBC headquarters 
that makes the management decisions with approval of CBRC. All those cases 
indicate that Chinese banks implemented similar management structures. 
Each bank headquarters made the management decisions, with the approval 
by the CBRC. The CBRC has the same regulations for all banks. The state 
owned banks cases indicate that the CBRC exercises more strict supervision 
compared to non-state owned banks. On the other side, the commercial banks 
believe that the CBRC provides more monopoly business for the state owned 
banks. What is apparent is that the CBRC as the regulatory institution is the 
formative influence on the ownership, governance and management structures 
of Chinese banks. 
 
All banks have established and improved their organizational structures for 
corporate governance, consisting of the Shareholders’ General Meeting, the 
Board of Directors, the Board of Supervisors, and senior management. The 
Board of Directors makes the strategic decisions of the Bank. The senior 
management is the executive body of the Bank accountable to the Board of 
Directors. Each bank has a strict division of duties and separation of power 
between the Board of Directors and senior management. The senior 
management operates the business based on the decisions made from the 
Board of Directors. The Board of Supervisors takes the responsibilities of 
supervising the operations of the bank, and it is accountable to the 
Shareholder’s General Meeting. 
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Table 10-1: Development of Resources and Capabilities: Strategy and 
Ownership  
 2003 2013 
Ownership 
control 
Central or provincial 
government control  
Indirect government control 
through state owned 
investment firms such as Huijin 
Minority private and foreign 
ownership  
Decision-making Company headquarters 
makes management 
and product decisions, 
but central or provincial 
governments intervene 
in decision-making 
Company headquarters makes 
management decisions with 
approval of CBRC  
Listing Status  Wholly state owned  CCB, BOC, ICBC and CITIC 
listed on both Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and Shanghai 
Stock Exchange 
HXBC not listed on any stock 
market 
 
 
FDI facilitated the development of manufacturing in China, such as 
automobiles, electronics, and clothing sectors. In order to further enhance the 
competitive advantages of domestic banks, the CBRC encouraged Chinese 
banks to cooperate with foreign banks. Chinese banks sought strategic 
alliances with foreign multinational investors with the aim of learning 
management skills and global ‘best practice’. In 2005, the China Construction 
Bank Corporation (CCB) signed a five years cooperation agreement with the 
Bank of America. In the same year, the Bank of China (BOC) allied with Royal 
Bank of Scotland and UBS AG. In 2006, CITIC Bank established a strategic 
alliance with the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argetaria S.A (BBVA). In the same year, 
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the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited signed an agreement 
with Goldman Sachs, Allianz and American Express. Chinese banks looked to 
improve its managerial skills, human resources, information technology, and 
product development, and its understanding of the consequences of being 
listed on the stock market. Foreign MNEs wanted to expand their business in 
China by using the networks of domestic banks. Different banks choose their 
partners based on different requirements. CCB, BOC CITIC chose commercial 
banks which are mainly focused on corporate and consumer banking and on 
wealth management as their partners. Therefore, those partners could help 
Chinese banks in many areas of commercial banking business. ICBC chose 
finance companies which were mainly focused on specific finance markets: 
ICBC chose American Express to help improve its credit card business; Allianz 
to help improve its insurance business.  
 
The cases findings in this research show that the motive for FDI was the 
transfer of know-how, and the impact on ownership and management control 
was minimal and falling. Foreign partners were rarely involved in their 
decision-making. The case findings show that the means of foreign partners 
being involving in the business were different. Some foreign managers could 
be in the board member position. Some foreign personnel could work in 
selected departments of the banks’ headquarters. But they had no 
management responsibility in any of the cases. For example, CCB allowed 
one member from the Bank of America to the board of directors, although that 
person has no management responsibility, and that member could give 
opinions in the shareholders meeting. About 50 personnel from the Bank of 
America at one point worked in CCB’s departments such as risk management, 
governance, and consumer banking. Similarly, CITIC Bank allowed two 
representatives from BBVA to attend the Board of Directors, again without any 
management responsibility, and they could give opinions in the shareholders 
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meeting. ICBC allowed one member from Goldman Sachs to attend its Board 
Directors, again without any management responsibility, and as in other cases 
with the right to speak at shareholders meeting. However, ICBC did not allow 
Allianz and American Express representatives, who helped its development of 
particular business areas, to attend the Board Directors. BOC allowed one 
representative from RSB to attend the Board of Directors, but not USB AG. 
The case findings show that the different level of foreign partner involvement in 
Chinese banks might impact their approach to extending their strategy 
agreement. CCB and the Bank of America extended their cooperative 
agreement in 2011, lasting to 2016. The Bank of America had personnel in 
CCB, and both parties achieved their targets through their cooperation. 
Similarly, CITIC Bank and BBVA extended their cooperative agreement. 
Nonetheless, BBVA shares in CITIC Bank slightly decreased from 15% to 
9.9%, even if BBVA remains listed amongst the top 10 shareholders in CITIC. 
On the opposite scale, BOC and ICBC’s foreign partners were less involved in 
their management. Those parties did not achieve what they want through 
cooperation. Therefore, RSB and USB AG gradually sold out their shares in 
BOC. Similarly, Goldman Sachs, Allianz and American Express gradually sold 
out their shares in ICBC. The cases indicate that there have never been any 
foreign managers involved in banking operations in Hunan province or at the 
any operational level. While the potential for cross-border alliances could be 
beneficial for headquarters development, the evidence suggests that 
multinationals have established relations as investors with the headquarters of 
China’s large banks, but that the CBRC regulations have limited the levels of 
investment. 
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Table 10-2: Development of Resources and Capabilities: Foreign Direct 
Investment 
 CCB BOC ICBC CITIC 
Bank 
HXBC 
Listing 
Status  
Listed on 
Hong Kong 
Stock 
Exchange in 
2005 and 
Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange 
market in 
2007 
Listed on 
Hong Kong 
Stock 
Exchange 
and 
Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange 
in 2006 
Listed on 
Hong 
Kong 
Stock 
Exchang
e and 
Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchang
e market 
in 2006 
Listed on 
Hong 
Kong 
Stock 
Exchang
e and 
Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchang
e in 2007 
Not listed 
on any 
stock 
exchange 
Major 
Foreign 
Investors  
Bank of 
America 
 
Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland 
UBS AG 
Temasek 
American 
Express 
Allianz 
Goldman 
Sachs 
BBVA 
 
 
No foreign 
investor  
Influence 
of 
investor 
on 
managem
ent 
practice 
and 
products 
Corporate 
governance, 
risk 
management, 
consumer 
banking, 
wealth and 
private 
banking 
RBS: 
wealth 
manageme
nt, credit 
cards, 
corporate 
banking 
UBS: 
investment 
banking 
and 
securities 
Amex: 
credit 
cards 
Allianz: 
insurance 
Goldman 
Sachs: 
risk 
manage
ment, 
and 
corporate 
and 
investme
nt 
banking  
Human 
resource 
manage
ment, 
informatio
n 
technolog
y, product 
developm
ent, 
private 
banking, 
and car 
financing 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   290	  
Cooperati
ve 
agreemen
t (2013)  
Renewed 
cooperative 
agreement  
Ended 
strategic 
alliance  
Ended 
strategic 
alliance 
with 
Amex 
and 
Allianz, 
but still 
cooperat
es with 
Amex in 
credit 
card 
Renewed 
cooperati
ve 
agreeme
nt  
N/A 
 
 
10.3 Human Resource 
Highly skilled employees are a key resource in the banking sector for creating 
new products and strengthening client relationships. Personal contact and 
interaction are important to the development of networks and client 
relationships. The CBRC guides Chinese banks in developing ‘best practice’ 
human resource management, and combines overseas and established 
domestic systems. One important sign of CRBC’s intention to transform the 
industry was the change in employment contracts, as introduced in 2003. 
Under the stipulations of the Labour Law and Labour Contract Law, there are 
two types of contract that replaced lifetime employment; the direct contract 
system and the outsourcing system. All five banks used both types of contract. 
As well as employing staff directly on a permanent basis, the new contract 
system helped the banks to select suitable candidates, and to reduce 
redundant employees. Furthermore, the banks have labour service 
agreements with sub-contractors and labour sourcing companies, which meet 
requests for particular types of employee on a fixed term basis. 
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10.31 Promotion 
The cases show there are similarities and differences in human resource 
practices amongst the five cases. The former state owned banks tend to 
promote mostly managerial staff internally rather than recruiting from the 
external labour market. Normally, managerial staff are directly selected and 
appointed by the headquarters. Internal selection has a rationale, as 
employees tend to be more familiar with the bank and its business. Moreover, 
the iron rice-bowl approach of the SOE system still influences recruitment and 
determines internal selection, because of the effects of lifetime employment. 
The banks never directly owned by the state tend to promote managerial staff 
internally, but they will hire people from the external labour market since they 
can bring their clients with them. For example, the case of CITIC Bank shows 
that, in Hunan province, most senior managers were recruited from CCB. In all 
the five cases, before formal appointment, all candidates need to pass written 
exams set by the bank’s headquarters and approved by the CBRC. Normally, 
at that point, the candidate is selected due to strong political or organizational 
support. Most of them are members of Communist Party of China, although 
the claim is that there is no connection between promotion and membership of 
the Party. Performance during the past years must also be evaluated, and 
interviews will be held. Personal relations with high-level officials are still 
important elements in promotion after the passing of exams. Other than those 
directly appointed by the headquarters, low-level managerial staff are 
appointed at province or city level. Their performance during past years is 
likewise evaluated. Some positions are linked to passing examinations set by 
the banks at the provincial branch and subsequent interviews. While 
employees are likely to be promoted on the basis of personal networks, they 
must first demonstrate that they have reached the basic knowledge 
requirements for the position. Appointments retain age maximums, but the 
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non-state owned banks such as CITIC and HXBC tend to less strict on the age 
limit and focus more on performance. 
 
10.32 Recruitment 
In all cases, banks have three types of recruitment in common, which are 
graduate recruitment, open or agency recruitment, and internship. For the 
state owned banks, they have targeted recruitment as an additional method, 
although graduate recruitment is the main means. Every year, they hire 
graduates from the university, with online application being open one year 
ahead. The CBRC regulates that all that all those hired must graduate in the 
same year. The banks prefer students that have participated in social activities 
or as leaders of the student union, but no work experience is required. The 
candidates need to finish applications through an online registration system, 
and next sit examinations at the bank headquarters. Targeted recruitment is 
similar to graduate recruitment. For state owned banks, every year, there is 
limited space for targeted recruitment, for which the grades or university 
ranking are less strict. This recruitment is more likely to open the door for 
graduates who did not reach the standard of graduate recruitment but have 
strong “guanxi” or are the children of employees. Agency recruitment gives 
opportunities to the local labour market, with jobs being advertised through the 
company website and employment agencies. It follows the same process as 
the graduate programmes. Non state owned banks tend to provide more 
opportunities for agency recruitment. All banks have an internship programme, 
which provides opportunities for the student who will graduate in the following 
year to learn about aspects of banking. For state owned banks, they prefer to 
hire fresh graduates, and their recruitment policies favour well-educated young 
people with a high level of commitment. The commercial, with more chances 
for open or agency recruitment, seek employees with working experience. 
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10.33 Training and development 
Due to the bank industry’s demand for more skilled workers, banks need to 
provide training, which the CBRC encourages. The case findings reveal how 
all of the cases have focused on training and development since 2003. The 
evidence shows that the state owned banks - CCB, BOC and ICBC - tend to 
focus their training efforts at the managerial level, and selects managers for 
training opportunities overseas. The commercial banks - CITIC and HXBC - 
tend to focus on the training for customer services, and emphasize the concept 
of service. In particular, HXBC emphasizes the ‘customer focus’ concept in 
their training for each level of employee. Even sub-contracted employees such 
as cleaners receive ‘customer service training’. 
 
10.34 Pay policy and welfare 
The case findings show that all banks have the basic welfare provision based 
on relevant national or local government regulations, plus additional systems. 
Pay is based on the basic salary, performance related pay, and position and 
seniority pay. In the previous SOE system, employees enjoyed many benefits 
such as the house purchase allowance, hospital allowance, childcare 
allowance, and child education scholarship. After the SOE reform, the hospital 
allowance or pensions, for example, are linked to general medical and pension 
systems, in accordance with the revised legal requirements. All banks have 
participated in local social insurance schemes to provide basic pensions, 
healthcare, unemployment cover, industrial injury cover, and maternity 
benefits, and they have in addition set up a housing provident fund for its staff. 
The introduction of the performance related pay system is intended as an 
incentive and as device for raising productivity.  
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10.35 Summary  
The CBRC has directly influenced the promotion and appointment of senior 
managers. It has less directly influenced recruitment, pay, welfare, training and 
development, but it has set the framework. The previous human resources 
system in SOEs still influences recruitment. For example, previously, 
employees would expect their children to work in their firm. Currently, both 
state owned banks and commercial banks have three recruitment methods: 
graduate recruitment, open or agency recruitment and internship. However, 
state owned banks utilize targeted recruitment to employ those not fulky 
qualified but connected to the firm. The age limit for certain positions reduces 
incentives for senior employees who cannot be promoted, but there is greater 
flexibility on age criteria in the commercial banks. One significant improvement 
is the introduction of examinations in promotion and recruitment. While 
employees are likely to be promoted on the basis of personal networks, they 
must first demonstrate that they have reached the basic knowledge 
requirements. All banks have the same remuneration combination of basic 
salary, bonus and welfare benefits. SOEs lacked monetary incentives to 
improve performance, while banks currently use performance related bonuses. 
Banks, after reform, provide training and development. While state owned 
banks tend to focus more on management level employees, commercial banks 
tend to concentrate more on shop floor employees. 
 
Table 10-3: Development of Resources and Capabilities: Human Resources 
 2003          2013  
Employment Life time employment  Contract employment 
Recruitment Mix of unregulated company 
examinations and guanxi   
Graduate recruitment: main 
method of CCB, BOC,ICBC   
Targeted recruitment: CCB, 
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BOC, and ICBC  
Open recruitment: main 
method of commercial banks 
In general, primarily by CBRC 
regulated examinations, 
secondarily guanxi   
Promotion Primarily guanxi, 
secondarily performance  
Primarily performance, plus 
examinations for specified 
posts, and secondarily guanxi 
Province level (Tier 1) or 
above: senior manager 
appointed by headquarters, 
with approval of CBRC 
Below province level: manager 
appointed at province level or 
city level 
Training and 
development 
Limited opportunities, 
largely reliant on on-the-job 
training  
Structured and specialized 
training, plus formal 
qualifications and in general 
examinations   
Managerial training, on the job 
training, specialized training for 
specified roles, selective 
overseas training 
Pay policy 
and welfare 
Position and seniority pay 
and benefits 
Mix of performance, position 
and seniority pay and benefits 
 
10.4 Client and Customer Relationships and Product 
Development 
Service firms need to prioritize the creation of intangible capabilities in skills 
and knowledge. In the banking sector, client and customer relationships and 
product development are key resources, and they are additionally closely 
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linked. Customer feedback can help to improve and develop products. In turn, 
good products and services can help to attract and maintain clients and 
customers. As in outlined in strategic management theories, long term and 
value adding relationships with clients, which are founded on a unique or 
distinctive service, cannot easily be imitated or substituted by rivals, and could 
offer firms a sustainable competitive advantage. Therefore, it is important to 
develop the capability of valuable client and customer relationships, as well as 
the capability of product development. More importantly, the aim is to make 
both of them more effective by ensuring that they enhance each other. All five 
cases generally divided their clients or customers into four levels, which are 
corporate client; medium to small (micro) firms client; individual VIP customer; 
and individual customer. They demonstrate that, to attract and keep 
relationships with corporate clients, small to medium firms, and individual VIP 
customers, ‘guanxi’ still plays an important role. Furthermore, products and 
services are important factors in attracting individual VIP customers, and 
became an important trend in Chinese domestic banks. The CBRC regulates 
that banks need to develop personal wealth management and private banking 
services, which Chinese banks did not operate before the period of economic 
reform. All of the five case studies prove that the banks made efforts to 
develop services for high-end customers. More specifically, CCB, BOC, ICBC 
and CITIC Bank cases illustrate that one important way to develop these 
services is learning from foreign partners. For the individual customer, also 
reliant on products and service, the banks developed the organizational 
resources needed. CITIC Bank and HXBC implemented the ‘service focus’ 
concept to improve good customer service to individual clients. Product 
development is based on individual customer requirements and more general 
market trends. For all the cases, the headquarters designed the products. The 
local branch could reflect customer feedback and requirements to the 
headquarters. For state owned and national commercial banks, at the province 
level branch, they could develop short term (under six months) products after 
	   297	  
receiving approval from the headquarters and the CBRC. For the case of 
HXBC, which is a province level commercial bank, local branches could not 
develop products and services, but they did pass on customer feedback and 
requirements to the headquarters.  
 
The five cases show that, firstly, Chinese banks started with improving the 
appeal, look and structure of their sub-branches. Secondly, they expanded 
self-service, including ATMs, to reduce waiting times and to improve the 
efficiency of their operations. Compared to commercial banks, state owned 
banks tended to focus on developing products rather than providing customer 
service. CCB leant how to develop products from its foreign partner, the Bank 
of America. For example, CCB has established customer experience centres 
in selected cities, with the aim to collect customers’ opinions and feedback to 
improve its products. CCB developed personal loans to meet the requirements 
of customers. However, overall, in the Chinese banking sector, personal credit 
history systems have not been well developed, which results in difficulties 
when providing loans to individual customers. When CCB agrees to provide 
loans to individual customers, the process is always very time-consuming. 
BOC did not, however, emphasize customer service as much as the 
commercial banks, which are not former state-owned firms. Personal foreign 
exchange settlements, currency sales, and personal international remittance 
are one of BOC’s traditional services, and one of its competitive advantages. 
BOC mainly focuses on developing and providing RMB and personal foreign 
exchange products to its individual customers. Compared to the non-former 
state-owned commercial banks, ICBC’s customer services still need to be 
developed, compared to the other non-former state-owned banks, but ICBC 
provides better customer services than the other former state-owned national 
banks. ICBC was original established by the Chinese government to take 
responsibility for commercial banking activities in urban areas. Therefore, it 
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has competitive advantages in these markets with a large number of individual 
customers. ICBC has three main ways of collecting customer feedback. Firstly, 
the customer offers feedback to the local branches, and then the local 
branches report back to ICBC headquarters. Secondly, ICBC hires third 
parties to collect customer feedback. Thirdly, ICBC invites customers for 
pre-launch product and service events, and customers can reflect their 
suggestions immediately. The procedures show that customer feedback is one 
important force to help ICBC to improve its products and services. ICBC 
particularly focuses on the development of its card business. ICBC and 
American Express Company developed different types of credit cards to 
different Chinese domestic customers. ICBC, later on, applied the same 
approach to developing its own card business. It shows that the impact from 
the foreign partner tends to be significant in product and service development. 
ICBC improved its customer data systems, which could provide information 
and assist marketing activities for targeted customer groups. Compared to 
former state owned banks, national or province commercial banks put more 
effort into improving services to individual customers. China CITIC Bank 
implements a ‘customer focus’ business concept and puts the customer 
service in first place in its retail banking business. CITIC Bank keeps 
innovating its service and product range. For example, CITIC Bank developed 
different types of deposits for individual customers to apply for loans for their 
mortgages, cars, and tuition fees. CITIC bank maintains personal housing 
mortgage loans and credit card loans as its core businesses. HXBC provides 
the best customer service amongst our five cases. It emphasizes the training 
of employees to provide good customer service, although CBRC places limits 
on its service and product range. HXBC has the competitive advantage of 
providing efficient and fast services. But it has a potential disadvantage in its 
processes for evaluating customers, which might result in non-performing 
loans. HXBC has improved its products within the limitations set the CBRC.  
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On 25 March 2013, CBRC issued the Notice on Matters Concerning the 
Regulation of Wealth Management Business of Commercial Banks, further 
regulating the development of wealth management business, and playing an 
active role in standardizing the business structure of commercial banks and 
mitigating wealth management risks. Therefore, all banks developed services 
and products for high-end customers, and they were able to respond to market 
demand as well the regulation from the CBRC. The cases show the 
importance of individual VIP customers in domestic banks.  The banks 
normally divide their individual VIP customers into three levels. The first is VIP 
customers. The second level is wealth management. The third level is private 
banking. Different banks have different requirements for savings or loans for 
each level of client, but the requirements are similar. Then, each bank has 
designed different services and products for each level. All five cases set up 
VIP or wealth management centres at selected branches to provide 
professional consulting and investment advisory services. In the case of CCB, 
personnel from the Bank of America work in the wealth management and 
private banking department as a part of their strategic alliance agreement. 
CCB learnt how to develop individual VIP customers from its foreign partner. 
Services included the right of family members of VIP customers to enjoy the 
same benefits. VIP customers can also gain from non-financial services, such 
as CCB organizing different social events based on individual interests and 
located, for example, golf clubs. 
 
BOC is in strategic alliance with UBS AG to learn how to develop wealth 
management, and provided training to its wealth management advisors and 
managers. BOC cooperates with other firms to provide extra benefits to 
customers apart from financial products and services.  For example, as a 
member of BOC’s wealth management scheme, customers have extra 
benefits in Chinese domestic airports, and assistance from BOC partners 
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when overseas. ICBC seeks to develop products and services for customers. 
In the meantime, it conducts marketing to promote its current products and 
services toward new customers. For example, ICBC launched precision 
marketing campaigns amongst target customers, and scaled up the Elite Club 
Account service for them. ICBC emphasizes the training of employees so that 
they are qualified to offer wealth management services. ICBC focused on 
providing channel services to customers, by providing mobile banking and 
internet banking platforms, as well as by releasing the ‘ICBC Private Banking’ 
and the Wechat service platform for high-end customers.  Moreover, it set its 
global product research and development unit in the Hong Kong Private 
Banking Centre. ICBC improved its private banking management product lines 
and services by leveraging interaction of the group’s domestic and overseas 
operations. In the case of CITIC Bank, there are personnel from BBVA working 
in the wealth management and private banking department. CITIC learnt how 
to develop wealth management and private banking from its foreign partner. 
For example, CITIC Bank focuses on design tailored products and provide 
premium services for wealth management and private banking clients. CITIC 
also established an online platform only for private banking clients, with the 
aim of enhancing direct interaction between headquarters and customers. 
CITIC consistently provides training to private banking department employees. 
In the case of HXBC, there is no foreign partner involved at any level. Most of 
its VIP customers are connected through ‘guanxi’. However, it cannot be 
considered as a sustainable competitive advantage, as clients who have been 
brought by ‘guanxi’ can be easily lost through ‘guanxi’, when managers leave 
for another firm.  
 
Under the regulation of CBRC, each bank must support the development of 
small and medium enterprises. State owned banks traditionally provided loans 
to state owned firms, even if those SOEs might not be able to pay back. In 
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such instances, the Chinese government would help the SOEs to pay back, or 
help the banks to write off bad debts. State owned banks always considered 
small and medium firms therefore as high risk. As the CBRC regulates the 
percentage of medium to small enterprise business each bank needs to 
achieve, former state owned banks started to adjust their strategy. CCB learnt 
from its foreign partner, the Bank of America, how to manage and control risks 
with small to medium firms, as well as developing products and financial 
services for them. BOC started to improve its credit authorization and product 
system for small and medium sized enterprises by learning best practices from 
its strategic investors. Firstly, BOC has simplified the process of providing 
loans to small and medium enterprises, with the aim of providing more efficient 
and convenient services. Secondly, BOC based on the feedback from SMEs, 
developed short term financing products. It created a separate risk control 
management system for micro-sized enterprises, in order to provide faster 
services for them. However, small to medium enterprises are still not BOC’s 
main clients. Similarly, ICBC adjusted its business strategy on small to 
medium firms, and enhanced its relevant risk control management. However, 
its process of providing loans to small to medium enterprises is still based on 
strict conditions and noted for its slowness. 
 
Yet small and medium enterprise is the main business for national or province 
level commercial banks. One important reason is that non-former state-owned 
commercial banks face difficulties in competing with the former state owned 
banks to gain large corporate clients. The CBRC retains restrictions on these 
commercial banks in operating business in certain sectors. CITIC bank made 
efforts to provide products and services for small to medium firms. For 
example, it developed different types of deposit accounts for small or medium 
enterprises applying for loans to expand their business. Similarly, HXBC’s 
main client is small to micro firms. ‘Guanxi’ plays an important role for 
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attracting this group of clients. Both CITIC bank and HXBC tend to hire senior 
managers from other banks who can bring in clients. Therefore, it cannot be 
considered a sustainable competitive advantage 
 
Compared to CITIC and HXBC’s focus on the development of small to medium 
or micro enterprises, three former state-owned banks tend to serve large 
corporate customers. CCB traditionally has advantages with large construction 
enterprises. BOC’s main business is always corporate business, particularly in 
the areas of foreign exchange and international trade. ICBC has advantages 
with large urban enterprises. Institutional links in public utilities, health care, life 
assurance, education are an important part of the bank’s corporate finance 
business, but former state owned banks tend to have a monopoly over these 
opportunities, as regulated by the CBRC. The policies of large institutional 
clients were influenced by the agenda set by CBRC. In the case of CITIC Bank, 
one of its competitive advantages is to integrate services for corporate clients 
from across the CITIC Group. For HXBC, the province level commercial bank, 
it tends to have contracts with local institutional business and local 
governments, showing a dependence on ‘guanxi’ as against some capability it 
has evolved.  
 
The five cases show that their respective headquarters design and develop 
products. In the province level branch, they can develop short term (under six 
month) products, after approval from the CBRC. In the city or sub branch, they 
cannot develop products, but merely give feedback to the province level 
branch, and then to the headquarters. The CBRC regulates the percentage of 
each type of banking business every firm should have in the totality of its 
operations, which directly influences bank strategy. The three former state 
owned banks cases prove that, only after the regulation had been imposed by 
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the CBRC on targets for small and medium firms, did they adjust their strategy, 
leading to the development of products and improved services for small to 
medium firms. National commercial banks or provincial commercial banks 
(those never directly owned by the state) tend to focus on small to medium 
firms as their main clients, because they are too weak to compete or formally 
restrained from competing with state owned banks for large corporate clients. 
All five cases show a trend in developing products and services for high-end 
individual customers, again because of CRBC policy. One reason is that 
high-end individual clients constitute a large potential market. CCB, BOC, 
ICBC and CITIC learnt how to develop wealth management and private 
banking business from their foreign partners. Products and services are two 
key elements to attract this group of customers, although ‘guanxi’ should not 
be downplayed. Particularly, for HXBC, constrained by the CBRC, most of 
their high-end individual customers are based on ‘guanxi’. Overall, it shows 
that the CBRC is still the major force for changes among Chinese banks., 
although foreign partners helped Chinese banks to learn ‘best practice’ more 
quickly, and customer and market demand also provokes organizational 
change. 
Table 10-4: Development of Resources and Capabilities: Client Relationships 
and Product Development 
 2003 2013 
Product 
development  
Basic products with low 
service quality, low 
incentives for change and 
innovation  
Change as a result of market 
demand, institutional direction, 
and influence from foreign 
partners 
Designed and developed by 
headquarters, with approval by 
CBRC. 
For national commercial banks, 
province level can develop 
financial products with 
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subsequent approval of 
headquarters and CBRC 
Client 
relationships 
‘Guanxi’ relationship 
dominant  
Mix of product, service and 
‘guanxi’  
 
10.5 Information and Technology  
The integration of skills, knowledge and technology enable a bank 
organization to provide particular benefits to customers. For example, 
technology could help the development of online banking, mobile banking, and 
self-services, thereby offering more convenient service to customers, and 
improving the customer relationships. The cases studied show that they all 
realized the importance of the development of information technology. Online 
services, ATMs, telephone and mobile services could serve customers outside 
of office hours, reduce waiting terms at counters, and increase the efficiency of 
internal operations. Online banking or mobile banking for corporate clients and 
individual customers were supplied separately. The development of multiple 
channel service constitutes service enhancement. The development of 
information technology and management systems does not only help to 
improve systems and facilities for the end-user customers, but allows each 
bank to improve their management systems. Each bank integrated new 
technological applications and improved their back office management 
process. All banks started using social media such as ‘Weibo’ and ‘Wechat’ to 
conduct marketing activities and to collect customer feedbacks and 
requirements directly. CCB, ICBC, and CITIC Bank have put extensive 
resources into their IT capabilities. CCB, ICBC and CITIC have won an 
innovation championship competition every year to encourage technology 
innovation. However, BOC and Huarong Xiangjiang are some way behind the 
other three. BOC only made its online and mobile banking available to different 
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devise users in 2012. But BOC has started to offer its online, mobile and 
telephone banks to certain of its branches overseas. Similarly, ICBC began to 
provide those services to selected overseas branches. The HXBC case shows 
that, as a provincial bank, it has limited personnel and higher costs for 
developing its own technology or information system. Therefore, most of its 
information systems or management systems are sub-contracted. Compared 
to the big national commercial banks, its capability tends to be limited.  
 
In the area of information technology development, the CBRC has no direct 
influence. Market demand played the dominant role for changes in service 
channels. All five cases used customer feedback to improve their services and 
to develop products. Also, the impacts from foreign partner tend to be more 
significant. In CCB, there are personnel from the Bank of America to help 
technology development. Also, the impact from the foreign partner tends to be 
more significant, which helps to explain why Huarong Xiangjiang has been left 
behind comparatively.   
Table 10-5: Development of Resources and Capabilities: Information and 
Technology  
 2003 2013 
Online 
banking  
Limited function and service Corporate and personal 
internet banking, replacing 
certain traditional services 
Mobile 
banking  
Limited function and service  Personal mobile banking 
Telephone 
banking  
Limited function and service  24 hours service 
Self service 
facility  
Limited function and service  Updated facilities and service  
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10. 6 Analysis: Capability Development and Institutions  
 
10.61 Causes of change in Chinese banking 
This research considered established ideas on the role of institutions in 
developing and transition economies, which highlight the concept of 
‘institutional gaps’ holding back the process of market reform and take the 
views that in these circumstances the state is a block on economic 
development. These views contrast with those that see developing economies 
as able to create institutions that are actively involved in the long-term building 
of a more competitive economy. As we have seen in the case of the Chinese 
banking industry, since 2003, the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) has been at the forefront of encouraging the adoption and 
development of what it has determined as ‘global best practice’ in banking. We 
know, too, that strategic alliances with or foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
foreign companies can be a source for knowledge acquisition and the transfer 
of ‘global best practice’. This assessment has been notably true with respect to 
China since the beginning of the ‘open door’ policy and the arrival of foreign 
multinational companies, which transformed the country’s manufacturing. 
China provides clear evidence of core capabilities being transferred to 
multinational subsidiaries and joint ventures, even if debates continue on the 
extent to which practices can be adopted or have to be adapted. While 
Chinese manufacturing achieved the status of global competitiveness, other 
sectors such as banking remained comparatively unreformed in their levels of 
competition and in the retention of established management practices. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to say that FDI and the cross-border transfer of 
practices and capabilities can have a significant impact on a host country. 
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This thesis asks to what extent inward FDI has had a similar impact on the 
extensive changes introduced to Chinese banking since 2003, and had a 
direct and positive effect on core capabilities. It additionally raises interesting 
questions about the role of a key institution, the CBRC, about the efficacy of its 
policies and the reasons why it might have had a major part in the evolution of 
a service sector such as banking. As we have seen, FDI by itself cannot 
adequately explain how capabilities could be transferred or evolved at the 
operational branch level of Chinese banks. Left to their own devices, even if in 
partnership with foreign multinational, individual Chinese banks would not 
have reformed their entrenched traditional business practices, nor accepted 
increased levels of competition in the industry. The evidence from the case 
studies indicates additionally that banking services can only be created 
through interaction with clients and through the operation of client networks. 
Success ultimately depends on personnel and on the levels of experience, 
training and qualifications. At the operational level, branches might potentially 
resist change, or create a diversity of outcome, doubly so since provincial 
governments had traditionally been influential in the investment decisions 
made by banks with their provinces. The CBRC has the capacity to gain 
knowledge of ‘global best practice’, and to the legal and regulatory power to 
enforce new practices and standards. Moreover, it can set policy for the whole 
industry, and bring about the more rapid transformation of individual Chinese 
banks across the whole sector. Inevitably, the drive to force through change at 
a fast rate leads to similarity in the practices of banks, and the key question is 
to what extent banks have enough freedom to develop their own distinctive 
capabilities. As we are investigating a period of transformation, it is possible to 
see examples of hybrid local and international systems, and this mixing 
provides examples of varying management policies between Chinese banks. 
Overall, we perceive the substantial contribution of FDI partners to the 
transformation of Chinese banks, but the more direct and more notable impact 
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of the CBRC on the policies of their headquarters and on the operations of 
branches. 
 
This thesis demonstrates how a national institution – such as CBRC – has 
been able to progress the transformation of an industry. If we go back to the 
theories of national institutions, the emphasis is on top-down isomorphic 
pressures, in which national institutions such as the state, finance, law, or 
education systems fundamentally determine the nature of firms and their 
management. Within this literature, debates exist on how much scope is left for 
entrepreneurial or managerial initiative, and on the extent to which variations in 
firm-level are possible. But there is small indication of how institutional 
isomorphic pressures shape firm and managerial characteristics, and the 
processes involved. One contribution of this thesis is to look at the 
mechanisms by which the CBRC has affected the resources and capabilities 
of Chinese banks, and, in order to provide adequate evaluation, to do so over 
a lengthy period. The case of the CBRC demonstrates an instance of 
leadership from a national institution established to drive the pace of economic 
development in China. However, the importance of local agency and specific 
client needs in the banking industry must be considered, as practices have to 
adapt in order to be the ‘best fit’ to local conditions. The unit of analysis is the 
individual bank, as the best means of assessing management initiative and 
client interaction, but also as the optimum means of demonstrating the impact 
of foreign multinationals and institutions on management practices. The thesis 
looks at the resources and capabilities that are core to success in banking, and 
focuses on matters of human resources, remuneration, training, qualifications, 
products and services, technology, and client networks. The comparative case 
studies enable an assessment of the extent to which Chinese banks can be 
differentiated from each other, and the extent to which changes are driven by 
firm-level capabilities as opposed to external influences. For the recent 
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evolution of Chinese banks, we can perceive the link between internationally 
transferred practices and strategic capabilities and the even stronger link 
between institutional influences and firm-level capability. We can ask therefore 
to what extent we can employ ideas in strategic management such as the 
Resource Based View (RBV) to analyse the nature of firm-level capabilities in 
Chinese banking. We can ask, too, to what extent the Dynamic Capabilities 
Approach (DCA) allow us to incorporate and judge influences external to each 
bank, such as international capability transfer, reforming institutions, or 
markets, and to account for the enhancement of capabilities over time. 
 
To what extent and in what ways have China’s banks been able to develop 
their strategic resources and capabilities in personnel, products, client 
networks, and information technology as required by increasing domestic and 
international competition? 
No detailed case study of China’s banks has focused on analysing their 
strategic resources and capabilities, nor described empirically what has 
occurred or changed in the industry in the last decade or more. There is a 
further need to study the evolution of Chinese banks in the long term, and to 
demonstrate the emergence of sustainable competitive advantages from the 
previous system. There is a gain to defining which resources and capabilities 
are suited to the banking sector for the period of China’s transition and its 
particular institutional context.  
 
Since 1978, the Chinese government has led the reform of the Chinese 
banking sector. It split commercial banking from regulatory and supervisory 
central banking, and gave the commercial functions of the People’s Bank of 
China to four state-owned banks. Next, it sought to transform a policy-driven 
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banking system into a more market-oriented one, by allowing the four state 
owned banks freedom to operate commercial services in all banking services, 
and by enabling the establishment of local commercial banks. Having removed 
the restrictions on the state-owned specialist banks, the government made 
them, under the 1995 Commercial Bank Law, responsible for their own losses. 
 
When China joined the WTO, in 2002, the banking sector still had problems 
with low efficiency and poor management, and was unsuited for international 
competition. In 2002, the Chinese government held the Second National 
Financial Work Conference, which concluded that problems remained with 
Chinese banking, namely the incomplete supervisory system, the inefficiency 
of the banks, a weak legal framework to protect and regulate the sector, a lack 
of staff with specialized financial knowledge and skills, poor internal 
organization, and low technological innovation. In 2003, the Chinese 
government decided to restructure Chinese banks through four main methods: 
capital injection; granting the banks approval to issue bonds to supplement 
their capital; the disposal of non-performing loans (NPLs) through asset 
management companies (AMCs); and permitting the introduction of foreign 
strategic investors. The important steps in completing the supervisory system 
were the establishment of the CBRC with the purpose of reforming the banking 
sector. This research investigates three state owned banks (CCB, BOC, ICBC), 
one national commercial bank (CITIC Bank), and one province level 
commercial bank (HXBC), and analyses all of them at an operational level. 
The findings indicate that the regulatory institution, the CBRC, took on the role 
as the leading force of reform, after its launch in 2003. Therefore, compared to 
2002, the Chinese banks system has more complete and effective supervisory 
framework. More importantly, the CBRC is responsible for the restructuring of 
Chinese banks, and for transforming them from government organizations into 
more market-oriented or client responsive firms. It started with changes in the 
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ownership of Chinese banks, from 2003 onwards, and guided them to be 
shareholding companies and possibly to list on the stock market. Large 
amounts of capital were injected to Chinese banks through their new 
ownership structures, mostly through capital or asset management firms 
established and directly controlled by the Chinese central government, such as 
the Central Huijin Investment Company. 
 
The problem of a lack of staff with specialized financial knowledge and skills 
has been gradually solved through the reform of human resource practice. 
There were a large number of initiatives, but four major changes from practices 
established in Chinese banking should be noted.  Firstly, the ending of the 
lifetime employment system for the contract system helped Chinese banks to 
reduce redundant employees and improve operational efficiency. Secondly, 
the introduction of examinations in recruitment and promotion became the 
basis for selecting capable employees. Thirdly, training and development 
programmes helped to improve the skills and financial knowledge employees, 
and, fourthly, changes in payment brought measures of incentive. In product 
and service development, banks became more adept at taking account of 
customer opinion. For example, they introduced credit cards targeted at 
particular customers, specialist wealth management accounts and services, 
and greater use of IT and mobile banking facilities. Client networks were 
transformed in operation because firms were obliged to compete in all aspects 
of banking and because they began to recruit talented staff from rivals. What 
can be perceived is an investment by firms in their capabilities. Human 
resources and IT were seen as needed core capabilities in the development of 
the banking sector, and as important components to evolving new products 
and services and being more responsive to clients. 
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The CBRC began its reform of the banking industry with significant changes in 
the ownership and governance structures of banks, and, through the foreign 
multinationals it allowed to invest, it initiated important improvements in 
technology levels. One motive was to make government influence less direct, 
and to encourage competition between banks. Another outcome through the 
founding of shareholding structures was to enable investment by foreign 
multinationals. In the pursuit of enhancing firm-level capabilities, the CBRC 
encouraged Chinese banks to cooperate with foreign firms in order to learn 
‘best practice’. An obvious example of the influence of foreign multinationals 
on Chinese banks was the introduction of IT systems. The CBRC was careful 
to regulate that foreign banks could only operate in selected aspects of 
banking and in specific areas of China, which indirectly forced foreign firms to 
ally with indigenous banks if they wanted to expand in the Chinese market. In 
order to protect domestic banks, the CBRC passed regulations that limited the 
percentage of shares a foreign firm might own in any one Chinese bank and 
within the domestic banking industry overall. The case findings show 
furthermore that Chinese banks developed levels of distinctiveness in their 
capabilities to develop products, maintain client relationships, and even in the 
use of new technology, such as online banking, mobile banking, and new 
social media for marketing. Overall, during 2003 to 2013, Chinese banks have 
begun to reform established practices in order to be more market orientated, 
albeit under the protection of the Chinese government, and, at the current 
stage, despite being too weak to compete in the global market.  
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How effectively does FDI theory adequately explain how capabilities and 
global ‘best practices’ have been implemented and developed at the 
operational branch level of Chinese banks? 
For examples of FDI, in which a parent multinational owns or controls a 
subsidiary, or has a major stake in a joint venture, the foreign investor has in 
principle the mechanism for transferring its ownership capabilities. As we shall 
see, in the examples of Chinese banks, the levels of ownership and control 
open to a foreign investor was limited, but the transfer or adaptation of global 
best practice did occur. In exploring how new cases were embedded in 
Chinese banking, the cases in this thesis analyses to what extent they copied 
systems used overseas or introduced hybrid outcomes. Given its generalized 
framework, can FDI theory explain how capabilities and global ‘best practices’ 
were implemented and developed at Chinese banks’ operational, within, or, 
crucially, at the subsidiary level? 
 
Hymer (1960) states that the transfer of capital funds by themselves could not 
fully explain the overseas operations of firms. He explains that MNEs must 
have some ‘ownership advantage’, such as advanced technology, product or 
management skills that allows them to overcome the problem of being foreign. 
Hymer (1972) and Kindleberger (1983) argue the importance of protecting and 
transferring ownership advantages to subsidiaries and the need for strategic 
control by the parent multinational the coordinate overseas operations. 
Buckley & Casson (1976) integrate important ideas of internal coordination 
and transaction costs, and developed the internalization theory, which 
considers how firms could enhance competitive advantages through 
managerial hierarchies to improve performance. They further state that the 
reduction of transaction costs explains the motivation of cross-border 
operations. Dunning (1980) identify company’s specific ownership advantages 
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(O), location advantages (L) and internationalization advantages (I) as the 
determining factors for the expansion of international activities, and offers the 
OLI framework. He suggests that a firm will engage in international production 
because it has specific ownership advantages it can exploit in a specific 
location, and can internalize these ownership and locational advantages to 
increase profits or achieve strategic goals. Ownership advantages can be 
effectively transferred, exploited and protected by a managerial hierarchy and 
corporate control through a process of internalization. Here the emphasis is 
mainly to explain the initial motivation and condition for FDI, alongside the 
necessary cross-border organization connected to that strategic motivation. 
The need control and the guarding of core capabilities makes FDI the choice 
over licensing. 
 
One issue is whether leading FDI theories fully address the particular 
demands of services FDI (Sabi, 1988; Casson, 1990; Chen, 2009). Service 
MNEs ultimately seek new clients, new markets or assets at a particular 
location, and to exploit their ownership advantages. Most services – unlike 
manufactured goods - need to be produced in direct contact with the consumer. 
Service firms must therefore localize their services or establish 
person-to-person contact. In banking, organizational learning, quality of 
managerial resources, and internal coordination has been important factors for 
MNEs expanding overseas. Arguably, the level of localization of capabilities – 
given differing market and client needs – is greater than in many instances of 
manufacturing. 
 
In combination with institutional rules for inward FDI, the need for localization 
and the importance of market entry have encouraged foreign banks in China to 
enter joint ventures. More generally, regulations and legal requirements may 
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raise transactions costs and limit international trade in services. Cho (1986) 
therefore proposes the need for an effective managerial structure or business 
strategy to help reduce transactions costs in foreign markets. As we have 
noted previously, when he suggests that multinational banks transfer capital, 
management, and technological assets across borders, they need to integrate 
those assets with knowledge of local markets, policies, regulations, consumer 
behaviour, if they are to retain the potency of their assets in different 
circumstances or to create new competitive advantages. They must, in other 
words, have the ability to achieve localization and internalization of adapted 
practices, much as occurred with manufacturing examples. 
 
Access to skilled personnel, managerial resources, financial sources, efficient 
banking networks, knowledge, expertise with a particular customer type, and 
product differentiation are the main ownership advantages in banking. The 
attainment of these ownership advantages from multinational banks or foreign 
investors formed the key reason why Chinese banks sought international 
strategic alliances. The government has allowed multinational banks or foreign 
investors to enter China since 1979, but at this point they allowed only 
representative offices. In 1982, it agreed to multinational banks operating 
branches in selected regions. Even after China joined the WTO, and the 
Chinese government promised to gradually open the financial market, the 
CBRC still imposes many restrictions on multinational banks in terms of 
permitted areas for their branches and the range and type of business they 
could provide. Therefore, multinational banks or foreign investors looked to 
cooperate with local banks, by using their existing client network to expand 
business in China. Therefore, the peak time for strategic alliances between 
Chinese banks and foreign investors was around 2006. Chinese banks tend to 
look for partners that can provide them with improvements in product 
development, technology innovation, marketing skills, and distribution 
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expertise. The CBRC guides the Chinese domestic banks to cooperate with 
foreign banks, but did not point out which foreign investors they should 
cooperate with. Chinese banks have their freedom to choose their partners. 
The case findings, therefore, show that different banks had different concerns 
and strategies, leading to different choice of foreign partners. The China 
Construction Bank (CCB), and CITIC Bank chose to have one major foreign 
partner, as they believed it important to establish able a wide range and deep 
levels of cooperation to implement needed change. CCB chose the Bank of 
America as its main partner, and CITIC Bank chose the BBVA. The industrial 
and Commercial Bank (ICBC), on the other hand, selected multiple partners, 
with each chosen to supply a particular expertise for different areas of the 
banking business. While the expertise was more specific, the relationship with 
each partner was not so strategic and ultimately less stable. ICBC chose 
American Express to cooperate over credit cards, and Allianz as its partner for 
insurance business. Bank of China (BOC) used a combination of both 
approaches. It chose the Royal Bank of Scotland to help it to improve its 
banking business in general, particularly in risk management, governance, IT, 
wealth management, credit cards and corporate banking, but it chose UBS AG 
for its specific knowledge of investment banking and securities. 
 
The case findings suggest that different corporate strategies and levels of 
cooperation resulted in different outcomes. In the case of CCB and CITIC, both 
of their foreign partners appointed personnel to departments in their 
headquarters, resulting in a long term and stable relationship. Therefore, CCB 
and CITIC extended their initial agreement with foreign investors, even if the 
percentage of shareholding fell. However, BOC and ICBC’s foreign partners 
were less directly involved in the formation of policies at the headquarters. 
Therefore, RBS and USB AG over time sold up their shares in BOC, just as 
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Goldman Sachs, Allianz and American Express reduced their commitments in 
ICBC. 
 
The cases findings show that foreign investors played a positive role in 
improving the areas of client and customer relationships and product 
development, as well as information technology. Since forming their 
international partnerships, Chinese banks expanded their self-services, 
including ATMs, which reduced waiting times and improved the efficiency of 
branch operations. They started to differentiate clients and customers into four 
levels. Chinese banks acquired knowledge on how to deal with private banking 
and wealth management from its foreign partners. CCB, ICBC, CITIC and 
BOC all learnt how to develop products and services to different customers 
and clients from their foreign partners. For example, CCB built a customer 
experience centre, and directly gained feedback from customers on how to 
improve products and service. ICBC in particular learnt how to develop its 
credit card business from America Express. But HXBC, as a provincial level 
commercial bank, does not have any foreign partners, and for most of its 
clients and customer it still largely relies on ‘guanxi’ as opposed to product or 
service differentiation. The integration of skills, knowledge and technology 
enables an organization to provide particular benefits to customers. The cases 
present the importance of the development of information technology and 
online and mobile banking, plus the use of online social media to promote their 
product and services. The four national commercial banks cases show that the 
foreign partners helped them to develop information technology. The provincial 
commercial bank, HXBC, without the help of a foreign partner, tends to lag 
behind those big national commercial banks in IT related services. Foreign 
partners had a perceivable impact on Chinese banks through the adoption of 
‘best practices’, particularly in product development and information 
technology. 
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The one area of Chinese banking that underwent fundamental changes – 
human resources – cannot be explained by the influence of inward FDI. The 
move to contract employment, examinations in recruitment and promotions, 
and extensive training were important to an industry in which the quality of 
human resources determines its ability to deal with clients, respond to their 
needs, or develop new products. The cases reveal nonetheless that some 
vestiges of the old system – the use of guanxi amongst those that could pass 
examinations for recruitment and promotion – remained. We must bear in mind, 
moreover, that most of the foreign banks reduced their shareholding, and so 
failed to a larger extent to gain the market seeking goals that had originally 
attracted them to China. They are still awaiting further deregulation to see if 
they can exploit the knowledge and experience gained, but they would still 
face considerable entry barriers and local, operational contacts. As well as not 
being able to fulfil their commercial objectives, the advantages that the foreign 
banks owned could be understood and replicated by China’s banks, and 
differentiated this service industry from aspects of manufacturing such as R&D 
capability. After a comparatively short time, the value of the investing foreign 
partner declined. The CBRC furthermore encouraged China’s banks to learn 
from overseas, but sought ultimately to create competitive national industry, 
and did not want to facilitate a banking sector controlled by foreign 
multinationals. The institution too acquired knowledge on the nature of 
internationally competitive banking practice, and in combination with the banks 
could take an increasingly proactive role in the development of capabilities. 
Lastly, while we can detect the influence of multinationals on the formation of 
bank headquarters policy, they did not have the managerial influence or the 
resources to bring about widespread and multi-level change in any one bank. 
Indeed, in-built practices throughout each bank might have resisted the 
effective introduction of new practices. As a result, regulatory and strategic 
direction was important to the inculcating the lessons to be learnt from foreign 
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banks, as well as increasing important in framing new policies and introducing 
new practices. 
 
To what extent is the CBRC, the formative regulatory institution, responsible 
for the development of capabilities in Chinese banks? 
In a market-based view of transition economies, institutions as the instruments 
of a policy or regulatory culture being reformed are viewed as the problem. But, 
in the late development perspective, government and other institutions are 
essential drivers of economic development. We can legitimately ask if ideas 
about institutional failings holding back the process of market reform in 
transition economies reflect what occurred in China’s banking industry. 
Similarly, we can review the notion of strong isomorphic pressures, in the 
theory of national institutions, being the force shaping the evolution of Chinese 
banks over time. Advocates of strong isomorphic pressures, as suggested by 
some explanations of institutional theory, would not allow much scope for 
Chinese banks to achieve variations or differentiation in capability, not give 
space for international forces of change to have a long term impact. In this 
thesis, the Chinese banking cases show that isomorphic pressures have not 
inhibited the development of firm-level or differentiated capabilities, nor 
prevented the transfer or emulation of international best practice. The China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has emerged as the major force for 
reforming banks and enhancing their capabilities. 
 
Davis & North (1971) consider an ‘institutional framework’ as ‘the set of 
fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that establishes the basis 
for production, exchange, and distribution’. In other words, a country’s 
established systems of government and law can provide the conditions that 
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allow markets and economic growth to function effectively. Institutions reflect 
also a set of values and norms that exist outside of firms and influence how the 
firm is managed and structured (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). It is 
institutions that determine the nature of organizational practices. One of a 
firm’s core competences is an ability to adapt to changes in external conditions 
and to assimilate new external information through utilizing its experience of 
the previous context. Whitley’s national business systems approach considers 
that firms are deeply embedded in their institutions, and that institutions 
determine the structure of firms and the nature of management practices. The 
later new institutionalism strand considers the importance of strategy, and 
admits to some extent that firms have the capability to resist to a limited extent 
institutional framework. Nonetheless, they all ignore or downplay the human 
agency of firms and firm level action. 
 
In international business study, institutionalist approaches raise the question of 
how powerful national institutions can accommodate the fact of international 
influence and global ‘best practice’? Morgan & Whitely (2003) outline a range 
of transfer scenarios, depending on the strength of local institutions, or the 
ability of a multinational to achieve a high degree of cross-border integration. 
The outcomes tend to be adopting parent firm practice with minor alterations, 
the adoption of local practices, or the hybridization of transferred practices 
based on home and host country’s institutional variations, cultural differences, 
market differences, and levels of economic development. Jefferson & Rawski 
(1995) state that in an emerging economy, such as China, economic success 
is the result of a market-led withdrawal of government controls, and increased 
property rights that provide the incentive for change. In reality, emerging 
economies often show elements of marketization and privatization mixed with 
strong institutions and regulations, and both have the potential to shape the 
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business strategies of firms. Institutions have a role to play in the emergence 
of competitive mechanisms, or in the development of firm-level capabilities. 
 
The findings of this study of Chinese banks presents that Chinese institutions 
were the key force for the reform and development of Chinese banking sector. 
Particularly, after 2003, the establishment of the CBRC had a specific and 
formative role in supervising and regulating the banking sector. The first 
purpose was to protect the domestic Chinese banks, by helping to build an 
effectively banking system after near 30 years of reform. As we have noted, 
the CBRC directly guided the reform of human resource practices in Chinese 
banks. In order to break the traditional practice of life  time employment, 
which encouraged low productivity, the CBRC instructed all banks to change 
from lifetime employment to contract. During this process, employees needed 
to pass exams related to the positions to which they were being recruited or 
promoted, which helped to improve the standing and qualifications of 
managerial positions and ensured the quality of employees. At senior levels, 
an employee’s promotion needed the direct approval of the CBRC to ensure 
the capability of the personnel. 
 
The findings in this thesis show that the CBRC was directly involved in bank 
product development and business strategy, since the purpose was to ensure 
that each type of business could be developed by each bank. Firstly, it 
regulated what types of business each bank needed to develop. For example, 
in recent years, the CBRC has emphasized medium and small enterprises as 
well as individual VIP customers. This has had direct impact on banks strategy. 
So, all the ‘big four’ banks, which had traditionally ignored business with 
medium and small enterprises, were given targets for the building of medium 
and small enterprise accounts as a percentage of total business. Also, banks 
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had to create capabilities that would enable them to provide product and 
services for high-end customers, a new market in China. However, the 
measures regulated by the CBRC were important in driving Chinese banks to 
develop a full range of commercial banking business with international 
standards as the benchmark. The CBRC involved itself directly in product 
development. All new products and services needed its approval before being 
launched. Although the 1995 Bank Law allowed all Chinese banks could 
compete in all sectors, the CBRC still regulated on which firm could enter 
which banking markets. As a result, the province level commercial bank, 
HXBC, does not offer as many products and services as the national 
commercial banks. The CBRC similarly approves initiatives in information and 
technology development. 
 
Institutionalist perspectives, particularly in their early phase, perceive 
institutions as determining and shaping the structure of firms and the nature of 
management practices. The case findings from Chinese banks indicate that 
the leading supervisory institution, the CBRC, has been a formative influence 
on business strategy and management practice. New institutional theory has 
conceived institutions as the principal determinant of firm level practice, 
although more recent interpretations conceive of firms having diversity and 
scope for managerial action within firms and see firms as influencing 
institutions reciprocally. So far, the evidence from Chinese banking provides 
no clear case of firms influencing the CBRC or government policy. Once 
enhanced practices are identified and accepted by the CBRC, it can regulate 
that they are implemented by all banks. The thesis shows that, importantly in 
instances of emerging economics, strong institutions can be a major force for 
the adoption of global ‘best practice’. The CBRC does regulate what 
percentage the foreign investor can own within a bank, and limits their 
involvement in management decisions. Its aim was to protect immature 
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Chinese banks and national ownership of the banking sector, and it never 
intended to curb engagement with foreign banks and the opportunity to learn 
‘best practice’. The case findings indeed illustrate how Chinese banks learnt 
‘best practices’ from foreign partners, even if the CBRC proved more influential 
in promoting and enforcing the adoption of best practice.  
 
10.62 Explaining change in Chinese banking 
A main objective of the thesis was to identify the character of the change in 
management practices and capabilities in Chinese banking, and specifically 
since the government announced its plan from 2003 to make the industry 
internationally competitive, and to learn best practice from foreign rivals and 
investors. The firm-level focus of the research enabled the tracking of these 
changes from 2003 until 2013, and allowed the identification of core 
capabilities in the banking sector and in the context of China’s institutional 
environment and economic development. The research demonstrates, 
moreover, what Chinese banks need to achieve strategically in order to obtain 
further improvements in their performance. In order to deepen our 
understanding of the capabilities and core capabilities of Chinese banks, the 
thesis presented an overview and analysis of the strategic management 
literature, most notably lessons from the Resource Based View (RBV) and the 
Dynamic Capabilities Approach (DCA). The thesis has been concerned with, 
firstly, demonstrating the nature of management change in Chinese banks, 
and, secondly, with the explanations of the causes of such change. We have 
seen from the case evidence that there have been two major formative 
influences: an alliance with a multinational through FDI, and the reform 
programme of the supervisory institution, chiefly the CBRC. The thesis offers 
new insights into how precisely alliance with a foreign multinational and, in 
particular, the influence of a key national institution can shape management 
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practice at an operational level, and, critically, shape the development of core 
capabilities that can lead to a sustainable competitive advantage. By utilizing 
and combining insights from the RBV and DCA, we can provide a fuller 
explanation both of the extent and of the causes of capability development. 
 
As we have noted previously, the design school is considered as the 
foundation of strategic management theories. One of the key concepts of the 
design school is the SWOT framework: strength, weakness, opportunities, and 
threats. The SWOT provides the key terms of the business environment and 
the capabilities of an organization that are most likely to impact on its strategic 
development. The case findings reveal that, although China’s banks have 
operated under the guidelines of the CBRC, the firms themselves have 
different strength and weakness (as the table shows below). In the case of 
state-owned banks - CCB, BOC and ICBC - they all have strengths in large 
corporate client business. One reason is their established long-term 
relationships with large SOEs. The other reason is that they have monopoly 
clients assigned by the CBRC. Even so, their main corporate clients are 
different. CCB’s mainly focused on large construction firms, ICBC on large 
SOEs in urban areas. BOC concentrates on supporting large SOEs or those 
firms investing overseas. CITIC Bank is one of the largest national commercial 
banks, and it has strengths in small to medium enterprises. These clients have 
long been ignored by the large state owned banks, and, compared to state 
owned banks, CITIC Bank is still on a small scale and disadvantaged to 
compete with them for large corporate clients. For HXBC, as a province level 
commercial bank, it has a speciality in small to micro enterprises, overlooked 
by state owned banks and national commercial banks. All banks had 
opportunities for developing products and services for high-end VIP individual 
customers. CCB, BOC, ICBC and CITIC banks all have foreign partners to 
help them develop products and services for high-end VIP individual 
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customers, although ‘guanxi’ continued to play an important counter role to 
market competition. Compared to the larger firms, HXBC’s VIP individual 
customers largely rely on ‘guanxi’. 
 
All banks could use information technology to develop online and mobile 
banking, self-service facilities, and new social media marketing strategies, as 
well as implementing management information system for internal control and 
for gaining first move advantages. CCB was the pilot firm chosen to develop 
self-service facilities; ICBC took the initial role in providing monitors at their 
banks to explain and expand self-service banking; CITIC Bank was selected 
as the first to provide a mobile banking system for all mobile users; and BOC 
was the pilot to provide online banking for its overseas clients. One of the 
reasons for state owned and national commercial banks leading in information 
and technology development, compared to province level commercial banks, 
is their alliances and ability to learn from their foreign partners. Unlike the large 
national banks, therefore, HXBC remains largely behind in the use of IT. In 
contrast to the commercial banks, the weakness of state owned banks is their 
service for individual customers, such as dealing with enquiries, although they 
realized the importance. Amongst our five cases, HXBC provides the best 
individual customer services, through emphasis in its training approach, 
followed by CITIC. State owned banks had traditionally ignored customer 
service, emerging as they did from the planned economy. While state owned 
banks place less strategic focus on individual customers, they still need to 
improve their basic customer service. More importantly, the CBRC regulates 
the percentage of business each bank need to achieve in each sector of 
banking, and every bank has a retail banking target. Since 2002, when China 
joined the WTO and promised to gradually open the financial sector within five 
years, the government has opened up the financial sector, although to a lesser 
extent than promised. The CBRC has allowed multinationals to set up their 
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own branches in selected areas and allowed them to operate more products 
and services in China. These initiatives suggest long-term threats to Chinese 
domestic banks, particularly in the area of high-end VIP individual customers, 
and they need to fashion competitive responses. 
  
Table 10-6: Competitive Strength and Weakness of Chinese Banks  
Bank Strengths  Opportunities Weaknesses Threats 
CCB Corporate 
clients 
Online and 
mobile 
banking 
High-end VIP 
individual 
customers 
Lack of 
customer 
service for 
individual 
customers  
Entry of 
foreign banks 
Expanding 
national and 
provincial 
commercial 
banks 
BOC Corporate 
clients in 
foreign 
exchange 
and outward 
investment  
Online and 
mobile 
banking 
High-end VIP 
individual 
customers 
Lack of 
Customer 
service for 
individual 
customers  
Entry of 
foreign banks 
Expanding of 
national and 
provincial 
commercial 
banks 
ICBC Corporate 
clients and 
individual 
customers  
Online and 
mobile 
banking 
High-end VIP 
individual 
customers 
Lack of 
customer 
service for 
individual 
customers  
Entry of 
foreign banks 
Expanding of 
national and 
provincial 
commercial 
banks 
CITIC Bank Small to 
medium 
enterprises 
Good 
individual 
customer 
Service  
Online and 
mobile 
banking 
High-end VIP 
individual 
customers 
Lack of 
strong 
corporate 
clients 
Entry of 
foreign banks 
Expanding 
provincial 
commercial 
banks 
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HXBC Small to 
micro 
enterprises 
Good 
individual 
customer 
service 
Online and 
mobile 
banking 
High-end VIP 
individual 
customers 
Lack of large 
corporate 
clients 
Lack of 
foreign 
partners 
Entry of 
foreign banks 
Expanding of 
other 
provincial 
commercial 
banks 
Tighter 
restrictions 
from CBRC 
on provincial 
banks 
 
The positioning school argues that the external framework is needed to 
analyse a firm’s competitive advantages. It relates strategy to the 
attractiveness of an industry in which a firm competes, and to the relative 
position of the firm in that industry’s value chain, from which it can derive the 
greatest competitive advantage. Porter introduced two frameworks: the five 
forces framework and the generic competitive strategies. Porter’s five forces 
includes the bargaining power of buyers, the bargaining power of suppliers 
and buyers, the intensity of rivalry, the threats of new entrants, and the treats 
of substitutes, and forms a tool for firms to analyse their external environment 
and to deal with potential threats. Our five cases illustrate how the Chinese 
banking sector is highly controlled by the Chinese government through the 
CBRC. The bargaining power of buyers and suppliers is weak, and the threats 
of new entrants and substitutes are low. Although Chinese banks are free to 
compete with each other, as the regulation from the CBRC facilitates, the level 
of rivalry is limited. 
 
The premises of positioning analysis are that firm profitability and growth are 
determined by its strategic position within an industry. Porter (1985) bases his 
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ideas on competitiveness on a firm’s relative position within its industry, which 
determines whether its profitability is above or below the industry average. He 
developed three generic competitive strategies: cost leadership, differentiation 
and focus that a firm could pursue to enjoy superior performance in its industry. 
Chinese banks cannot implement a cost leadership strategy, as the CBRC 
regulates their product and service prices. Chinese banks can however 
choose to implement a differentiation and focus strategy. Although, since 1995, 
the Chinese bank law regulates that firms could compete with each other in all 
sectors. In reality, the CBRC does provide monopoly business to certain banks, 
and regulates that provincial commercial banks must operate from selected 
products and services. Therefore, many Chinese banks, particularly provincial 
commercial banks, can use focus strategies and operate in those areas 
ignored by state owned banks or national commercial banks. Historically, the 
Chinese government divided the tasks for each state owned banks and other 
commercial banks. For example, CCB was responsible for conducting 
business in the construction industry and supporting large government 
projects. BOC was responsible for foreign exchange business. ICBC was 
responsible for large urban SOEs. Nonetheless, these legacies continue to 
influence current bank operations. For example, CCB has an advantage with 
corporate clients in the construction industry. BOC has the lead in foreign 
exchange business. Not surprisingly, Chinese banks have built upon these 
historical specialisms, and used their advantage to differentiate themselves 
from other banks, as the table below. 
 
Table 10-7: Competitive Positioning of Chinese Banks 
 Differentiation  Focus  
CCB Corporate clients Construction industry  
BOC Corporate clients Foreign exchange and outward 
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investment 
ICBC Corporate clients 
 
Individual retail customers  
Industrial and urban corporate 
clients 
Urban areas 
CITIC Bank Superior customer service Small to medium enterprises 
Individual retail customer 
HXBC Superior customer service Small to micro enterprises 
Individual retail customer 
 
The prescriptive schools and the design schools tend to focus on how firms 
should respond to external factors, and how firms adjust product development, 
operations, marketing and support services accordingly to sustained 
competitive advantage. Firms should react strategically to opportunities and 
threats outside the firm by identifying and utilizing the resources they control, 
and, as a result, it is the external environment that influences a firm’s 
development. The cases findings indicate that, in the Chinese banking sector, 
the strong institutional framework affects firms similarly, but the long-term 
objective is to create differentiated firms with their own competitive internal 
capabilities. The resource-based view seeks to provide an answer by 
concentrating on how firms evolve their internal capabilities, and, in a reversal 
of previous interpretations, on how the resulting competitive advantage has an 
impact on the external environment. 
 
Penrose (1959) depicts firms as a set of resources, and its expansion involves 
either exploiting existing resources or developing new ones. Williamson (1975) 
considers that, for the growth of firms, relevant resources are physical capital 
(plant, equipment, and raw materials), human capital (training, experience, 
and skills), or organizational capital (formal reporting structure, and 
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coordinating systems). Wernerfelt (1984) was the pioneer of the phrase 
‘resource based view’, and divides resources into tangible assets such as 
plant and intangible assets such as the brand name. He adds that a firm can 
own a resource that gives it an advantage at a specific point in time over those 
firms not in possession of such a resource or something similar. Barney (1991) 
states that a firm develops heterogeneous resources to differentiate it from 
competitors and that these resources are imperfectly mobile between firms. A 
firm’s resources can determine strategy, which are emergent within a firm. 
Grant (1991) argues that not all resources can help firms to gain competitive 
advantage, implement valuable strategies, or improve effectiveness and 
efficiency. He further proposes the idea of sustained competitive advantages, 
based on resources that are difficult for rivals to imitate or match in exactly the 
same way. 
 
In the Chinese banking sector, in which the market environment is highly 
regulated, domestic banks have little flexibility in deciding how to respond to 
external developments. Chinese banks do seek, however, to improve their 
internal resources such as managerial ability and technological know-how. 
There is a link between interaction with clients and the building of internal 
capabilities. Chen (2009) argues that the maintaining of good relationships 
with clients is the key capability in the banking sector, and the case findings 
have discovered the ways in which Chinese banks have tried to maintain their 
client relationships. Although the CBRC regulates the percentage of each 
sector of banking that a firm needs to achieve, it does not provide guidelines 
on how each bank should achieve its targets. Therefore, each bank can focus 
on client relationships and act in response to market demand and client 
requirements. One of the methods Chinese domestic bank choose to improve 
their client relationships is cooperation with foreign partners and learning from 
them how to develop products and services that keep and attract clients. The 
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findings prove that providing good customer service through the training of 
personnel is another way to maintain and improve client relationships. 
Technology and information development is an important capability in the 
banking sector. Chinese banks have cooperated with foreign partners in order 
to improve their technological know-how. One significant finding is that, 
compared to CCB, BOC, ICBC, and CITIC Bank, all of whom had foreign 
partners, HXBC remained deficient in the area of information and technology 
development.  
 
The RBV is concerned with the importance of specific resources in creating 
competitive advantages that contribute to a firm’s development. However, it 
does not clearly explain how firms could achieve competitive advantage by the 
implementation of a strategy. Teece et al. (1997) state that dynamic 
capabilities refer to the capacity to renew competences to achieve congruence 
with the changing business environment. Therefore, innovative responses are 
required when time to market and timing are critical, the rate of technological 
change is rapid, and the nature of future competition and markets are difficult 
to determine. Dynamic capabilities refer to the abilities of a firm to achieve new 
competitive advantages. It emphasizes a firm’s ability to integrate, build and 
reconfigure existing resources for this purpose. Chinese banks have forged 
strategic alliances with foreign multinational investors, creating new resources 
and competitive advantages, particularly for developing products and services, 
as well as information technology. The cross integration of product, service 
and advanced information technology further assisted banks in building 
effective long-term client relationships. Client relationships themselves 
constitute an important resource in the banking sector, and client interaction 
can be the foundation for strengthening the supply and development of 
products and services. Collecting customer feedback on products and services 
could help to shape products and services. The notion of dynamic capabilities 
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is based on interpreting and responding to external sources of information and 
feedback, and then reconfiguring internal resources accordingly, and this is a 
good description of how to improve client relationships in banking. In recent 
years, as the number of social media users has grown, Chinese banks began 
to operate social media platforms, which directly communicate with customers, 
and made the collection of customer feedback even quicker, whereby banks 
can respond to market demand in time. The Chinese bank cases gradually 
realized that they were part of a service industry, rather than government 
institutions, and they have made efforts to collect customers’ opinions and 
improve services and products. As information technology has been 
developed, it can also help to build long-term customer relationships. For 
example, ICBC developed its ‘big data’ management system, which could 
store all customers’ information, and consequently they could promote or offer 
tailored products and services. Online training programmes provide more 
up-to-date training for employees, and focus on how staff can recommend 
suitable products and services to customers. The cases show that Chinese 
banks have dynamic capabilities to respond quickly to institutional pressure 
and regulation. To give one further example, when the CBRC encouraged the 
development of wealth management business, Chinese banks adjusted their 
strategies and their service portfolios. 
 
The Resource Based View in strategic management can provide insights into 
the nature of firm-level capabilities. Can it, however, be the basis for an 
adequate analysis of the evolution of Chinese banking over time? 
Consequently, can the Dynamic Capabilities Approach allow us to incorporate 
the external influences that have shaped the process of change in Chinese 
banking? What this research adds to the discussion on dynamic capabilities is 
that the list of external forces on internal firm resources should be extended 
from market and technological changes to include institutional pressures or 
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regulations, most obviously in instances of developing or transition economies. 
It is possible to state that, in contrast to the example of many manufacturing 
initiatives and the rise of Chinese industry, there is a more important link 
between institutional influences and firm-level capability. Moreover, and again 
especially so in the circumstances of developing or transition economies, we 
should include the role of strategic alliances, joint ventures, and the 
international transfer of capabilities and know-how by multinationals as an 
external factor. The cases studies have been revealing by showing the 
process by which external factors – a particular combination of institutional 
change, multinational capability transfer, market reform, and technology 
acquisition – brought about a transformation in resource and capability transfer 
over time within banking firms. The thesis shows the development of bank 
resources and capabilities in China during the period since 2003, and focuses 
on matters of human resources, remuneration, training, qualifications, 
products and services, technology, and client networks. Because it takes a 
comparative firm-level approach, and because it focuses on the processes of 
resource and capability change, it can achieve the dual objectives of linking 
environmental influences and internal transformation, and indicating 
differences in internal processes and outcomes. It follows that there has been 
scope – although the capability levels between Chinese banks and 
multinational partners remains significant, and although the institutional 
pressures from the CBRC remain strong – for differentiation in resources and 
capabilities in the Chinese banking sector. 
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Figure 10-1: External Factors Determining Development of Chinese Bank 
Capabilities 
 
 
Figure 10-2: Internal Factors Determining Development of Chinese Bank 
Capabilities 
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10. 7 Implications and Assessment  
The comparison and analysis of case evidence have brought insight into how 
institutions and FDI have shaped Chinese banks and firm-level capability, and 
they have shown how Chinese banks were able to develop capabilities at an 
operational level. Firstly, and from perspective of theory, this thesis finds that 
ideas in the FDI literature can explain why capabilities or specific capabilities 
are transferred from a foreign partner or multinational to a Chinese bank. The 
case evidence in addition offers new insights into how the process of resource 
and capability transfer is conducted and implemented. On the other hand, the 
role taken by multinationals could not fully explain all aspects of firm-level 
change or the extent of change across the industry as a whole. Secondly, 
contrary to the widely-held view that institutions must be a barrier to 
competitive mechanisms driving the pursuit of global ‘best practice’ in 
emerging economics, this thesis suggest that the CBRC has had a formative 
place in the transformation of Chinese banking. This key institution, regulator 
and supervisory body facilitated multinational investment and joint venture 
arrangements, and furthermore regulated to improve practices in all aspects of 
management and in key banking capabilities. It imposed restrictions that 
protected the ownership control and management decision-making of Chinese 
banks from foreign partners and investors, securing their long term future as 
competitive indigenous enterprises and gaining the time needed to learn from 
best practice. Unlike the typical role assumed regulatory bodies in developed 
economies, in the finance and banking sector, the CBRC was given the task of 
changing the strategies, management, organization, and competitive 
capabilities of individual banks and the industry as a whole.  Thirdly, the 
thesis has shown the process by which Chinese banks improved their core 
capabilities, and demonstrated the direct link between that process and 
external factors such as national or institutional forces and global or 
multinational investor influences. Fourthly, this thesis shows that Chinese 
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banks have the capacity to develop levels of distinctiveness in their capabilities 
and competitive advantages, consequently differentiating themselves at an 
operational level, although regulatory restrictions remain. In addition, this 
thesis demonstrated the interaction and combination of various factors, both 
external and internal to the firm: MNE inward investment and global ‘best 
practice; institutional and regulatory forces, most obviously the CBRC; market 
and technology trends, and the emerging requirements of clients and 
customers; economic development; and changes in management structure, 
firm-level competitiveness, IT and communication technology, client relations, 
products, marketing, and human resources and skills. From the practical 
perspective, this thesis tracks the changes in Chinese banking since the 
reform from 1978, and particularly after the establishment of the CBRC in 2003. 
It has investigated the causes of the changes and the development of 
firm-level capabilities. A contribution of this thesis is that it provides a detailed 
case study of China’s banks at an operational level, and shows change in 
practice by looking at institutional factors, FDI, and management agency. 
 
For the further development of Chinese banks, this thesis has the following 
implications. Firstly, in terms of ownership control and strategy, it suggests that 
Chinese banks can gain from a strategic alliance with MNEs, but there have to 
be mechanisms for ensuring mutual benefits are achieved in pursuit of a 
long-term cooperative relationship. Secondly, the case evidence shows that 
Chinese banks at the provincial level or city level should have more authority 
to design and develop products and services for a quicker response to market 
demand and client needs. Thirdly, in terms of human resource management, 
Chinese banks need to invest further in the training of employees, particularly 
for providing ‘customer service’. Chinese banks could remove the age 
limitation in promotion or recruitment, and focus more on overall performance. 
Internship programmes should be used as a channel to discover talented 
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employees rather than as a way to maintain ‘guanxi’. Fourthly, in terms of 
product development and client relationships, Chinese banks and particularly 
former state-owned banks need to stress customer service and product 
development for customers. One way to achieve this aim would be through 
employee training, improved feedback, and a more comprehensive marketing 
and information strategy. Chinese banks need to provide further for high-end 
individual clients through consistently developing products and services, 
especially as they constitute a huge potential market. Fifthly, in terms of 
information technology, Chinese banks must continue to improve online and 
mobile banking. Moreover, they can combine digital and traditional marketing 
to promote products and services. Lastly, but most importantly, Chinese banks 
need to realize that they are no longer a government institution, but officially 
service firms. While they need the support and protection of government, in 
developing capabilities and in managing global rivalry, the ultimate objective is 
to create competitive and profit-generating firms. 
 
The thesis therefore has a number of perspectives and contributions. From the 
point of view of theory, it explores the relationship between FDI and 
institutional factors in shaping the development of Chinese banking, and links 
these external factors with firm-level strategy the internal evolution of 
competitive capabilities. From an empirical point of view, the thesis provides 
new case evidence on Chinese banks, and especially on their development in 
the key years since 2003. It has furthermore linked their development with 
theories on firm strategy and competitive capabilities. From a practical point of 
view, it has produced proposals for the strategy and management of Chinese 
banks in ownership and governance, product development, client relationships, 
human resources, training, and information technology. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
   A. Personal Details 
 1. Could you outline your personal background and career, and your 
current role and responsibilities in the company? 
 B.  Marketing and Product Development  
 2. What new products and services has your bank developed in the last 
ten years, and in what ways do they differ from your previous portfolio?  
 3. To what extent do ideas for new services and products come from the 
company headquarters? What, on the other hand, is the involvement of 
local management in generating new services or products, or adapting 
headquarters policies to local conditions? 
 4. How have the marketing and advertising of products and services 
changed over the last ten years? 
 5. To what extent are headquarters or local management responsible for   
the conduct of marketing and advertising? 
 6. What differentiates your products, services, marketing and advertising 
from other banks?  
C. Customer Relationships and Information Technology 
 7. How important is the improvement of customer and client relationships 
in the strategy of the bank? 
 8. How do you find out what your customers and clients want in terms of 
products and services? 
 9. In what ways have customer and client relations been improved for 
large private firms, small to medium enterprises, VIP or wealth 
management clients, and retail customers in general? 
 10. How have you used information technology to improve organisational 
efficiency and customer services? 
 11. What plans do you have to develop   online banking and mobile 
banking 
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D. Human Resources 
12?How has the recruitment and training of staff changed at the bank over 
the last ten years? 
13. How and why have promotion and reward systems changed at the 
bank?  
 14. Which aspects of human resources remain to be addressed if the bank 
is to fulfil its strategic objectives? 
E. Regulation and Governance 
 15. To what extent do you believe changes in nature of banking regulation 
and control in China, in the last ten years, and notably the appointment of 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission, have transformed the strategy 
and management of the bank? 
 16. To what extent and in what ways is the influence of the Hunan 
provincial government important to the management of the bank and the 
services provided? 
 17. To what extent are you aware of the influence of the foreign joint 
venture partner on the management, products, services, marketing, and 
human resource policies of the bank? ?CCB, BOC, ICBC and CITIC bank 
only? 
 18. Have there been significant developments in the decision-making 
structures, governance and management of the bank, in the last ten 
years? 
 19. To what extent, specifically, has the relationship between local 
management and the headquarters changed, over the last years, and 
where does authority for both major and operational decisions lie? 
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Appendix 2: Interviews  
 
CCB 
Mr Heng Chang, Tier 2 Branch, Chairman of the Labour Union, 7th November 2012 
and 10th July 2013 
Ms Juan Yu, Sub Branch, VIP Clients Relationship Manager, 12th July 2013 
Mr Li Lin, Sub Branch, Vice Present, 7th November 2012 and 12th July 2013 
Mr Liang Gong, Tier 2 Branch, Electronic Banking Department Manager, 10th July 
2013 
Mr Long Xu, Tier 2 Branch, Corporate Clients Manager, 11thJuly 2013 
Mr Shaoming Huang, Tier 2 Branch, Senior Client Relationship Manager, interview, 
7th July 2013 
Ms Yanmei Xia, Tier 2 Branch, HR Vice Manager, 10th July 2013 
 
 
BOC 
Mr Junping Liu, Tier 2 Branch Vice Present, 15th July 2013 
Ms Luo Li, Tier 2 Branch HR Vice Managers, 15th July 2013 
Mr Ruoguo Cheng, Tier 2 Branch, Electronic Banking Department Manager, 15th July 
2013 
Ms Ting Feng, Sub Branch, Small to Medium Enterprise Clients Manager, 16th July 
2013 
Mr Yun Xie, Sub Branch VIP Client and Individual Customer Manager, 16 July 2013 
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ICBC 
Ms Haojuan Zhang, Sub Branch VIP and Individual Customer Client Relationship 
Manager, 23rd July 2013 
Mr Jiangang Chen, Tier 2 Branch Present, 23rd July 2013 
Mr Qin Zeng, Tier 2 Branch, Electronic Banking Department Vice Manager, 23rd July 
2013 
Mr Xin Xu, Sub Branch, Small to Medium Enterprises Department Manager, 22nd July 
2013 
Mr Xueming Lu, Tier 2 Branch HR Manager, 24th July 2013 
 
CITIC Bank 
Ms Changshun Jiang, Tier 2 Branch HR Vice Manager, 19th July 2013 
 
Mr Guozhong Xie, Tier 2 Branch, Vice Present, 6th November 2012 and 18th July 2013 
Mr Heng Zhou, Tier 2 Branch, Vice President, 6th November 2012 and 18th July 2013 
Mr Junwei Lei, Tier 2 Branch, Electronic Banking Department Vice Manager, 19th July 
2013 
Mr Yang Zhao, Tier 2 Branch, Small to Medium Enterprise Manager, 17th July 2013 
Ms Yixuan Zhang, Sub Branch, Individual VIP Customer Manager, 17th July 2013 
 
HXBC 
Ms Jing Guo, Tier 1 Branch Vice Present, 25th July 2013 
Ms Jun Liu, Sub Branch, VIP and Individual Client Relationship Vice Manager, 25th 
July 2013)  
Ms Ping Li, Tier 1 Branch, HR Manager, 26th July 2013 
Mr Wei Xiong, Headquarters, Broad of Supervisors, 25th July 2013 
Mr Zhiqiang Dong, Tier 1 Branch, Electronic Banking Department Vice Manager, 26th 
July 2013 
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